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
BAGHDAD

1

3/10

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO

*Dear Veronica*



1 May 1971

*Copy to  
copies sent  
5/5*

*WED  
WRD*

*Research Dept  
Assessments Staff*

*pa 16575*

IRAQ/EAST GERMAN RELATIONS

1. In a way rather fitting for the 2 Ugly Sisters of their respective regional/ideological blocs, the Iraqi/East German mutual admiration society's activities have continued to flourish in 1971; already the East Germans seem to have managed to dip their fingers into every kind of Iraqi pie.
2. There have been 3 Ministerial visits during 1971. On 14 April the Minister of Northern Affairs and a member of the Kurdish Democratic Party's political bureau visited Berlin on their way back from Moscow where they had represented the KDP at the 24th Congress of the CPSU.
3. The Iraqi Minister of Youth (Hamid al-Jebouri who is also Chairman of the Iraqi-GDR Friendship Association) visited East Germany from 21-29 January. His East German opposite number, Helmut Oppermann, visited Iraq during 24 February - 3 March. His delegation signed a "protocol or cooperation" under which Iraqi Youth Centres will be supplied with audio-visual equipment. It was also reported that an Iraqi delegation to discuss sport and culture would visit East Germany a few days later, but we have no confirmation of this. Other noteworthy items in the youth field have been the (modest) publicity given to the National Union of Iraqi Students' (GDR Branch), Annual Conference in mid-April, and the current despatch of 11 youth leaders for training on gliders.
4. In the economic field, loans have been made, under the 1969 economic agreement, for Iraq to buy printing equipment and electricity cables. They have also sent a delegation to the Leipzig Fair.
5. We have also seen, in January, a high-level delegation attending the Iraqi Army's 50th Anniversary celebrations, and an exhibition of painting; in February a delegation to the General Federation of Trades Unions conference (who stayed longer than most other visiting delegations) and the celebration of the 2nd Anniversary of the foundation of the Friendship Association; in March the ratification of the Judicial Cooperation Agreement signed last December; and in April visits by the Director of the East German School of Journalism,





and a technical delegation which has concluded agreements under which the East Germans will

- a. set up a printing school, and train Iraqi managers for it; and
- b. provide experts in agricultural cooperatives to work in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform here.

6. Finally, the Baghdad Observer for 29 April carried the text of the speech made by the Iraqi delegate to the Bulgarian CP's 10th Congress in April, in which he pointed out, as proof of Iraq's "Socialist" solidarity, that Iraq was the first country outside the "Socialist Community" to give full diplomatic recognition to East Germany.

*Com. Gen*  
*lan*


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**BRITISH EMBASSY**

**BUDAPEST**

14 May 1971

3

**D G Martin Esq  
East European and Soviet Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

Nima al Nima, Under-Secretary of State at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, paid an official visit to Hungary from 8 to 11 May at the invitation of Frigyes Pujá, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his stay he had meetings with Csaba Kishazi, a Vice-President of the Presidential Council, János Péter, the Foreign Minister, and Peter Varkenyi, who is head of the Government Information Office.

2. The talks which took place between al Nima and Pujá were concerned with "international questions of mutual interest, and the relations between the two countries were discussed . . . possibilities of the development of relations between the two countries were examined and current international issues were discussed with special regard to the Middle East situation".

3. Al Nima's visit returns that made by Pujá to Iraq earlier this year during his "goodwill tour" of the Middle East. (Alyson Bailes' letter of 8 February).

4. You may think it noteworthy that the Foreign Minister found time to receive al Nima, although he could not do so for Mr Royle when he was here in March.

(P D R Davies)

24/5

**c c Chancery, Baghdad  
N E D, FCO**

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BUDAPEST

14 May 1971

Enter

cc 125

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3/30

D G Martin Esq  
East European and Soviet Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



*Dear Douglas,*

Nima al Nima, Under-Secretary of State at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, paid an official visit to Hungary from 8 to 11 May at the invitation of Frigyes Puja, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his stay he had meetings with Odon Kishazi, a Vice-President of the Presidential Council, János Péter, the Foreign Minister, and Peter Varkonyi, who is head of the Government Information Office.

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2/2 ① — (Alyson Bailes' letter of 8 February).

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*Yours ever*  
*Peter Davies*

(P D R Davies)

c c Chancery, Baghdad  
N E D, FCO

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BUDAPEST.

V3  
8

1 June, 1971.

The Chancery,  
British Embassy,  
Baghdad.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -7 JUN 1971
NEQ 2/2

Enter

Dear Chancery,

A delegation of the Iraqi Communist Party headed by its Secretary-General Aziz Mohamed visited Hungary from 18 to 24 May at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The Iraqis were received by Zoltan Komocsin, a member of the Political Committee and Andras Gyenes, head of the Party's Foreign Affairs Department.

2. An article on the visit which appeared in Népszabadság, the Hungarian Party newspaper on 25 May said that representatives of the two parties "discussed some international issues of topical interest and surveyed the current questions of the international communist movement and the relations between the two parties . . . the representatives of the Central Committee of the HSWP assured the Iraqi Communist Party of their Solidarity in their struggle fought under difficult circumstances for the interests of the working people of Iraq, the unity of the Iraqis progressive forces, for democratic rights and social progress and for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression". A "full identity of views" was expressed in the talks between the two parties.

Yours ever,

(P. D. CRANDAVIES)

Copy to:

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Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

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*Restricted*



With the compliments of  
**THE EASTERN EUROPEAN AND  
SOVIET DEPARTMENT**

NE D

*Please return to  
Mr. Martin after entry.  
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**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**

**S.W.1.**

*21 May, 19 71*



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**BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BUDAPEST.**

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1 June, 1971.

**The Chancery,  
British Embassy,  
Baghdad.**

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
-7 JUN 1971

NEQ, 2/1

Dear Chancery,

③

In my letter of 1 June I refer to a recent visit to Hungary by a delegation of the Iraqi Communist Party.

2. There has also been some activity in governmental relations between the two countries. It was announced on 25 May that Peter Varkonyi the Head of the Information Office of the Council of Ministers had left for Iraq to sign "the Hungarian-Iraqi information work-plan for the period 1971-72. On 26 May a delegation headed by the Iraqi Minister of Education Mahmoud Al Mirjani, arrived in Budapest to negotiate "the Hungarian-Iraqi cultural and scientific co-operation work-plan for 1971-72". No further details of these unlikely sounding agreements have been published.

Yours ever,

(P. D. R. DAVIES)

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
BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

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3/12

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO



VISIT OF NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION TO IRAQ - 24-31 MAY

1. Baghdad was blessed by a high-level visitation from North Korea (which included the second Deputy Prime Minister, Comrade Pak Sung Chul) for a week. I enclose the whole of the turgid communiqué which was released after the Koreans had left, on 2 June.
2. The North Koreans were given maximum publicity treatment in all the media. For a week it was difficult to see much else on the television at news time but Koreans scrambling over the ruins of Babylon, or staring inscrutably at relics in the museums (both archaeological and Party) of Baghdad - conversation having presumably run dry at a fairly early stage of the visit.
3. Our ~~ghar~~ calligraphers are still debating what all this was about. It is generally agreed that the visit was of the North Koreans' asking and was in line with the more extrovert turn in their foreign policy at present. But what there was in it for the Iraqis is hard to see. As you will notice, the communiqué contains nothing except a good deal of mutual back-slapping on political issues of one sort or another; but the Koreans' backs get slapped rather more often than the Iraqis'. I cannot imagine that anything tangible by way of a serious economic agreement beneficial to Iraq can result (though I suppose they might manage to get rid of a few more dates to the North Koreans). Some of my MFA contacts have shown signs of embarrassment at the disproportionate and somewhat ludicrous dimensions of the welcome given to these irrelevant and unamiable visitors.
4. I am sending a copy of this letter (plus enclosure) to Seoul, in case they are interested in what their neighbours are up to in this part of the world.

A C D S MacRae

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON VISIT OF KOREAN  
PARTY AND GOVT. DELEGATION TO IRAQ

Baghdad, 2nd June - INA

A joint communique was published simultaneously today in Baghdad and Pyongyang on the party and official talks

conducted by the Korean delegation led by Comrade Pak Sung Chul, Member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and 2nd Deputy Prime Minister in Baghdad with a party and official delegation led by Sd. Salih Mahdi Ammash, Member of the ABSP National Leadership and Vice-President of the Republic.

Following is the text of the joint communique:

On the invitation of the ABSP National Leadership and Government of the Republic of Iraq, a party and Government delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea led by Mr. Pak Sung Chul, Member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and 2nd Deputy Prime Minister paid a friendly visit to the Republic of Iraq in the period between May 24 - 31, 1971. Comrade-struggler Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, Secretary General of the ABSP Regional Leadership and President of the Republic of Iraq received the party and government delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The delegation handed the President a personal message and a token present from Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, Head of State and Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The delegation also met with Comrade Saddam Husain, Deputy Secretary General of the ABSP Regional Leadership and Vice-Chairman of the RCC, Comrade Salih Mahdi Ammash, Member of the ABSP National Leadership and Vice-President of the Republic, Comrade Shebli al-Aysami, Assistant Secretary General of the ABSP National Leadership and Comrade Abdul Karim al-Shaikhly, Member of the ABSP National Leadership with whom it had cordial conversations.

The Korean delegation visited the landmarks of the city of Baghdad as well as the Party Museum. It paid visits to the Governorates of Wasit and Nineveh and had a close look at factories and cultural establishments and organs and met with

Cont'd...



Iraqi workers in them. The Iraqi people expressed great respect and deep love to President Kim Il Sung, the great leader of the 40 millions of the Korean people and warmly welcomed the party and Government delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which is sent by the Leader. The Korean delegation expressed profound thanks to President-struggler Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Leader of the Iraqi People and President of the Republic, for the great welcome with which the Arab Baath Socialist Party and people and Government of the Republic of Iraq received the guest delegation. Friendly talks were conducted between the party and government delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea led by Mr. Pak Sung Chul, Member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and 2nd Deputy Prime Minister and the party and Government delegation of the Republic of Iraq led by Comrade Salih Mahdi Ammash, Member of the ABSP National Leadership. On the Korean side, the following gentlemen took part in the talks:

\* Sun Song Bel, Candidate Member of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and Minister of High Education

\* Kim Cuo Nam, Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Baghdad.

\* Kadan Li Cuong, Deputy Foreign Minister.

and on the Iraqi side the following gentlemen took part:

\* S. Mohammad Sulaiman, Member of the ABSP National Leadership.

\* Ed. Na'em Haddad, Member of the ABSP Regional Leadership.

\* Dr. Saadun Hammadi, Minister of Oil and Minerals.

Cont'd...



\* Dr. Sued Khalil Ismail, Minister of High Education and Scientific Research.

\* Dr. Fakhri Qaddouri, Member of the Economic Affairs Bureau at the ROC.

\* Dr. Mahmoud Ali al-Dawood, Ambassador and Director General of the Political Department at the Foreign Ministry.

\* Sd. Shahir Yousif, Director of the Palestine and Armed Struggle Bureau at the ABSP National Leadership;

as well as attended by a number of technicians from both countries. The two sides exchanged view-points on the further expansion and development of the relations of friendship and cooperation between their two parties, Governments and peoples and on issues of bolstering the common struggle against imperialism and U.S. colonialism and other issues of interests to both sides.

The Korean side highly appreciated the brilliant feats which the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the people and Government of the Republic of Iraq have achieved in the period following the July 17 Revolution under the prudent Leadership of Comrade-struggler Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Republic and Distinguished Leader of the Iraqi People. These feats have been made possible after the smashing up of the subversive, conspiratorial & spying acts perpetrated by Zionism, U.S. imperialism and the reactionary forces, both from within and from without, that colluded with them. The Korean side congratulated the ABSP Leadership and the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the realization of National Unity through the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish Issue as well as congratulated the government of the Revolution on the endeavours of the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) in the exploitation of local natural resources and riches for serving the well-being of the Iraqi people. The Korean delegation extolled the efforts of the

Cont'd...



Government of Iraq in the implementation of major irrigation projects and for the progressive gains achieved in the social and economic domains and in building up the durable foundations for independent national economy. The Korean side wishes further successes for the implementation of the 5-year plan in Iraq.

The Korean side denounced the imperialistic and reactionary avidities, provocations and conspiracies which constantly threaten the security and sovereignty of the Republic of Iraq. The Iraqi side expounded its view-point vis-a-vis the crisis contrived by Iran through its unilateral abrogation in an arbitrary and unlawful manner of the Iraqi-Iranian Frontiers Agreement

of 1974. The Korean side displayed full understanding and support to the attitude of Iraq in its adherence to its inalienable rights to its complete sovereignty over its national waters and territorial integrity. The Iraqi side greatly appreciated the transformation by the Korean people of their state into a strong industrial, socialist state, thanks to the wise leadership of Comrade-President Kim Il Sung, the Respected and Beloved Leader, through the embodiment of the Great Idea of Juche of the leader and the revolutionary line of independence and self-sufficiency, in all spheres and at a steady pace. The Iraqi side wished further success in the implementation of the 6-Year Plan and expressed absolute solidarity with the Korean people who are adhering to the policy of the Revolution of South Korea and the independent, peaceful unity of their homeland championed by President Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader of the 40 millions of the Korean people who are waging a just struggle in implementation of this policy. The Iraqi side completely support the proposals embodied in the 3-Points for National Salvage as expounded in the 5th Session of the 4th Supreme People's Assembly which was convened in April 1973. The Iraqi side strongly denounced the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism and the renegade clique in South Korea which seek to launch a new war and firmly demanded the immediate

Cont'd...



withdrawal of the aggressive U.S. imperialist forces from South Korea and downfall of the renegade clique of Park Chung Hee. The Iraqi side vigorously demanded that Korea must be independently unified at the hands of the Korean people.

The Korean and Iraqi sides proclaim their full support for the struggle of the Palestinian people in quest of the restoration of their despoiled rights and the liberation of the Palestinian soil. The two sides underscore their determination to provide every support and backing for the Palestine Resistance Movement which, under all odds, proved its ability for persistence and growth and proved its deep-seated roots in the conscience of the Palestinian people. It is, in the views of the Korean and Iraqi peoples, the only legitimate representative to the aspirations of the Palestinian people. On this occasion, the two sides also vigorously condemn the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism and Zionism and their puppets which seek complete liquidation for the Palestine Issue and the valiant Palestinian Resistance Movement. They, likewise, denounce the U.S. schemings designed against the Palestinian people in particular and the Arab Nation in general. Both sides expressed full conviction and confidence that the Palestinian people will achieve ultimate victory in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and Zionism by virtue of complete support from the World's revolutionary peoples. The two sides expressed their support to the struggle of the Arab people in the Arab Gulf in quest of national liberation and social advancement and demanded immediate and full pull-cut of British occupation forces from this area and liquidation of all imperialist military bases in it.

The two sides expressed firm solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia now waging heroic resistance war for freedom and independence and in order to deliver

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their countries from U.S. imperialism and demanded complete and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. imperialist aggressive troops from Indo-China. They strongly denounced the aggression and war-making policy pursued by the imperialists and colonialists headed by U.S. imperialism. They also expressed militant solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and all peoples of the World in quest of freedom and liberation and for the consolidation of national independence and progress. They expressed confidence that both imperialism and Zionism will meet their doom when the peoples of all struggling states come to a strong unity and launch a relentless anti-U.S. struggle. The two sides strongly denounced the close collusion and cooperation of Zionism and the puppet clique of South Korea with the policy of aggression and war pursued by U.S. imperialism. They also condemned various conspiratorial moves perpetrated by U.S. imperialism and its puppet Israel and the renegade clique in South Korea in pursuance of infiltration into Asia, Africa and Latin America in order to strike at the liberation movements, weaken the anti-imperialist front and undermine the solidarity and friendship between nations. They are confident that these attempts are doomed to utter failure. The two sides expressed great satisfaction for the fruitful development of the relations of friendship and cooperation existing between the two parties, governments and peoples at all levels and underlined the necessity of expanding these relations, increasing exchange of delegations and promoting economic, trade and technical cooperation between the two friendly countries.

Issued

Apr 2, 1971.

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
British Embassy

BAGHDAD

6

3/13

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
F C O



p/w soon

Dear Richard,

## COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ (2)

1. When, in my Despatch (NEQ 2/1) of 20 January 1970, I examined the extent of Soviet and East European penetration of Iraq in the military, economic and political fields, it was already clear that USSR had something approaching a monopoly over Iraq's military equipment, had acquired a special standing as the source of development aid and as the promoter of Iraq's national oil policies, and was increasingly well placed to advance the cause of revolution further south. But the West, ourselves in particular, still retained certain advantages, and the slither to Moscow was not irreversible.

2. Since then we have reported piecemeal the further progress made by the Russians and their friends in consolidating their position here. In paragraph 15 of my Despatch 1/7 of 17 June (on the way the Iraqi Ba'ath have been shaping) I said that I would be sending you a round-up of these developments. This is it (enclosed). (25) NEQ 1/2

3. In brief, the conclusions from the last 18 months are the following:

- a. Militarily, the stranglehold - based on a near monopoly of equipment and strengthened by further training facilities - has tightened.
- b. Economically, new credits, new contracts and the assistance lavished on Iraq's national oil policies have given body to the bloc's claim to be Iraq's best friends.
- c. Politically, in addition to the dividends from (a) and (b), the Kurdish settlement, the Novikov mission and the course of history in the Gulf - coupled with the left wing radicalism assumed by



the Ba'ath in their regional isolation -  
have accelerated the slither towards Moscow.

4. The Iraqis themselves continue to make gestures or signals in the direction of the West. Some of these gesticulations are doubtless ambivalent, and to the gloomier observers the impression received is of "Not Waving but Drowning". We in this Embassy do not believe that total submersion is imminent or inevitable and consider that the provision of a stronger Western life-line would keep the struggler afloat and in doing so serve the Western interest.

*Long can  
Glen*

~~H G Balfour Paul~~

c.c. Chanceries at:

AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
JEDDA  
KUWAIT  
KHARTOUM  
TRIPOLI  
ALGIERS  
RABAT  
BAHRAIN RESIDENCY  
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COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ AS AT JULY 1971

A. MILITARY

1. Iraq's dependence on the Soviet bloc for both equipment and training in all services has increased still further in the last 18 months.

2. I attach at Annex A a table, as accurate as we can make it, showing the present sources of armour and artillery in the Army. Comparison with figures given by me in January 1970 (and quoted alongside) is not immediately rewarding since a large number of infantry battalions have meanwhile been mechanised and equipped with Soviet armour; and improved coverage has shown some inaccuracy in our previous figures. The table shows that only 10% of the armour and 15% of the artillery is known to come from Western sources. Small arms and soft skinned vehicles in all field formations are as before 100% of bloc origin.

3. As for the Air Force the second of the tables at Annex A shows major increases in Soviet fighters (from 124 to 210) and in Czechoslovak trainers (from 72 to 110), together with steady attrition of residual holdings of British aircraft.

4. In the Navy, which remains wholly Soviet-equipped, the only known development of moment is that 2 of the expected KOMAR FFB's are now definitely expected before the end of 1971. As regards land-based missiles our evidence is too uncertain to tabulate; but the installation of a number of Soviet SAM 2's in the Basra area is thought to be well advanced and there have been signs of Iraqi interest in SAM 3's.

5. Although there are still no Soviet "advisers", in the sense applicable in Egypt and Syria, in units and formations, there are certainly more experts and technicians employed on maintenance of bloc equipment and training in respect of it. The best estimate available is 500. And the number of Iraqis sent for training to Communist countries, though not quantifiable, has certainly increased in the Air Force and (more conspicuously) in the Navy, where overseas training has been switched from Egypt to Russia. Pressure is also known to be building up for the adoption of Russian establishment patterns and tactical doctrine in place of British, which would of course have a direct bearing on future equipment policies.

6. Against all these a continuing, perhaps intensified, desire to purchase from Britain and France has been manifested. A second regiment has been equipped with PANHARD armoured cars; but in general this desire is thwarted because we and the French



either price ourselves out of the market or have political/ security reasons for not responding. In matters of training, Iraqi eagerness to secure courses in the United Kingdom has redoubled, but though the MOD are doing what they can, the response is regarded by the Iraqis as sadly inadequate.

7. In sum, the near monopoly in equipment etc now possessed by the bloc is due much less to deliberate government policy (and still less to the inclination of the armed forces themselves) than to the fact that bloc equipment can be obtained, cheaper quicker and easier, and that a tendency once established is not easily reversed. The point, however, is that the stranglehold is tightening.

#### B. FINANCIAL/INDUSTRIAL/ECONOMIC

1. At Annex B, I attach a revised and up-dated list of loans or credits negotiated with communist countries, omitting the 1959/60 crop whose fate has been obscured by time. I have included in it, since this has now become a basic consideration in Iraq's economic policy, a column showing the proportion of these loans declared or believed to be repayable in crude oil.

2. On this latter point the IPC here, with whom I have compared notes, calculate that, if all communist bloc credits were taken up, repayments in crude oil (taking account of interest rates and differing periods of repayment) would work out at 140,000 b.p.d. or about 7 m.t.a. To this they would add further possible liabilities of some 148,000 b.p.d. under various agreements with non-Communist countries (Ceylon, India, Japan and Sudan), making a total of 288,000 b.p.d. or about 14.5 m.t.a. I would certainly regard their estimate of liabilities to non-communist countries with reserve though they omit the recent Brazilian undertaking to take 15m tons over the next five years (ie an average of 3 m.t.a.). Even their calculations of repayments to the bloc, to judge by the most recent of many conflicting indications, appear to over-estimate in certain cases the proportions repayable in oil. But at a conservative guess (and excluding non-Communist takers) the Iraqis must have found a home for at least 5 m.t.a. of crude oil over the period of communist bloc loan servicing. Since production in INOC fields is planned to reach 18 m.t.a. by 1975 their marketing plans still have quite a long way to go; but (and this is the point here) it is doubtless the bloc to whom they will turn, if need be, to bale them out.



3. The extent to which the credits at Annex B have been utilized cannot be assessed with accuracy. (The purchase of military equipment, Soviet and Czechoslovak, does not appear to have been financed this way). What is currently noticeable is the tendency to tie the credits to specific projects ab initio. Some indication of the growing dominance of the bloc in the field of industrial development may be gained by a glance at the rough check-list of projects (Annex C) financed and executed by bloc countries or under active negotiation. I have included one or two instances of equipment supplied under the same credit facilities (but not as part of project packages), simply as indicators of the way the East Germans in particular turn their loan to good commercial advantage.

4. As in the case of military equipment we are constantly being told - by Ministers as well as by their immediate subordinates - how anxious they are for British contractors to enter the field more strongly and for British machinery and equipment to retain or regain its leading position. The extent to which Iraqi behaviour in practice discourages this lies outside the scope of this note. The principal obstacle as seen by the Iraqis is that the bloc offers easier terms and shows greater initiative (the quality of work done and equipment supplied being as yet a secondary consideration in Iraqi perspectives). The extent to which the Iraqis genuinely want greater British participation may become evident from their response to our current offer of credit facilities; but even if this response is encouraging, it is clear that the bloc has acquired a steadily sharpening edge over the West in this field too. This is not to say that Western enterprise (in the form of consultants, contractors and suppliers), is suffering a net reduction. We cannot produce comparable Western statistics since Western activity is seldom given publicity here. What is beyond question is the increase in bloc participation.

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6. In the fields covered by this section, then, the last 18 months have seen a substantial increase in bloc participation, the provision of still larger cheap credit facilities, widespread appearance in industrial development on the ground, and reinforced popularity as the underwriters of Iraq's national oil policies.

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4. A more recent development which the bloc must welcome is the campaign launched in May by the President to cleanse the professions and universities of "bourgeois thinking" - though this is more likely to have been anti-capitalist than pro-communist in intention, its practical purpose being to justify the still further substitution of party hacks for better qualified "liberals" in university and similar posts.



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5. One purpose of the important Novikov mission in June 1971 must certainly have been to re-define, in the Soviet interest, the working relationship between the Communist Party of the USSR and the Ba'ath and to tie the latter more securely to the wheels of the Soviet juggernaut. The success of the mission in this respect is not yet measurable; but the probable course of events in the Gulf will certainly give it a helping hand. Meanwhile, the unprecedented expulsion in July 1971 of three senior members of this Embassy staff for "plotting to overthrow the régime" will certainly have been applauded (if it was not also inspired) by the Russians.

6. Against all these indications of a further slither to Moscow one must certainly set the desire, repeatedly expressed at all levels by the Iraqi authorities (let alone by such sections of the educated public as are still able to express it), for increased links with Britain and the West in professional, educational, technical and business fields. One of the reasons adduced by the authorities for this is their determination to retain a balance between East and West in their dealings with the outside world. Moreover there seems little doubt that several at least of the present Revolutionary Command Council members, in terms of political philosophy (and especially in its domestic application), are strongly anti-communist by conviction. But given (a) that the Russians have sensibly abandoned the Iraq Communist Party as a vehicle for acquiring influence; and (b) that the Iraqis seem (no doubt mistakenly) confident of being able to use the Russians, rather than the reverse, this fact has little practical effect on the situation. If the future of Iraq lay more distinctly in Iraqi hands (even those of the present régime), I have little doubt that in the longer term the pendulum would swing back to something like a central position. But this would increasingly seem to depend on the Russians playing their hand badly - and nothing in the last 18 months encourages this hope.

7. In political terms, then, the last 18 months - beginning with the Kurdish settlement and ending with the Novikov mission - have seen the presence and influence of the Communist bloc further reinforced. The political isolation of Iraq in the Middle East stimulates its leaders into further leftist radicalism; and though their desire to escape dictation from anywhere calls them to non-alignment, the slither towards Moscow continues. The risk is that, unless the West exercises a stronger counter-pull than it is now doing, the slither may soon pass the point of no return.



1. Iraqi Army Equipment (Major Items)

<u>Source</u>	<u>Armour including APC</u>		<u>Artillery</u>	
	<u>Units</u>	<u>% age</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>% age</u>
Soviet bloc (certain)	21 (16)	50 (64)	39 (35)	56 (65)
Soviet bloc (probable)	17 (6)	40 (24)	18 (5)	29 (11)
Western	4 (3)	10 (12)	11 (13)	15 (24)
Totals	42 (25)	100 (100)	68 (53)	100 (100)

Notes

- (1) Figures given in January 1970 (less accurate than these) are shown in brackets  
 (2) With artillery units a heavy battery has been taken as a  $\frac{1}{2}$  unit, a light battery as  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd.

2. Iraqi Air Force Aircraft

<u>Source</u>	<u>Fighters</u>	<u>Bombers</u>	<u>Transport</u>	<u>Helicopters</u>	<u>Trainers</u>
USSR	210 (124)	21 (19)	22 (27)	47 (36)	
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	110 (72)
UK	34 (37)	-	10 (8)	9 (12)	26 (54)

Note

January 1970 figures shown in brackets.



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ANNEX BCOMMUNIST LOANS TO IRAQ1969-1971 (JULY)

Serial	Source	Year	Amount £m. sterling	Proportion repayable in oil	Remarks
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2	USSR	1969	30	Uncertain - 70% or 100%	
3	USSR	1969	26.5	Uncertain - 70% or 100%	
4	USSR	1971	94	100%	
5	GDR	1970	35	70%	
6	Czechoslovakia	1969	26	£12m. (latest report)	Apparently replaces earlier loan of £13m
7	Hungary	1969	7.5	100%	
8	Hungary	1970	12.5	70%	Serial 8 may be a re-vamp of Serial 7
9	Poland	1969	2.4	-	
10	Bulgaria	1970	12	100%	Assumes that loans of £5m. and £7m. announced successively are distinct.
11	China	1971	16	-	

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ANNEX C

Communist bloc projects financed on credit in Iraq

- \* = Completed
- ± = Physically under way
- / = Under active negotiation

USSR

- \* Kut textile factory
- \* Samarra pharmaceutical factory
- \* Construction of massive mechanical industries complex at Iskanderia
- \* Ramadi glass factory
- \* Provision of much equipment and assistance in southern oil fields
- ± N Rumaila to Fao oil pipe-line
- ± Basra and Umm Qasr port development
- / Oil products distribution network Baghdad/Basra
- / Rawa (Euphrates) dam
- / Euphrates/Tigris major water-control project, based on Tharthar reservoir
- / Mosul Oil Refinery
- / Sundry enterprises in the fish industry (following on the Fisheries Agreement of 1969)
- / Establishment of new Dairy plants
- / Power Stations at Dukkan and Derbendikhan
- / Exploitation of phosphate deposits

Czechoslovakia

- \* Tractor assembly plant at Iskanderia
- ± Basra oil refinery and related jetty development

Poland

- ? \* Mosul sugar factory
- \* Basra fertiliser project
- ± Mishraq sulphur works

Hungary

- \* Drilling of 4 oil wells in N Rumaila
- \* Provision of 200 buses
- ± Drilling of 3-6 oil wells in Jambour (near Kirkuk)

Bulgaria

- \* Two tomato paste factories



East Germany

- \* Machinery and machine tools (ID 1½ million)
- ± Northern electrification project (ID 2m.)
- \* Medical equipment (ID 1m.)
- ± Construction of 5 silos (ID 5.6m.)
- ± Slipway in Basra (ID 660,000)
- ± Ramadi drainage network (ID 50,000)
- ± Dredging equipment for Umm Qasr port (ID 133,000)
- ± Road and agricultural machinery (ID 2.35m.)
- ≠ Substantial assistance with cooperative farm installations and training

Rumania

Diwaniya-Nasiria road construction (53kms).  
Finance arrangements not known.



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6

NEQ 2/2

24 July 1971

Departmental Series  
Near Eastern Department  
DS 3

**COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ**

(Her Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad  
to Near Eastern Department, FCO)

1. When, in my Despatch (NEQ 2/1) of 20 January 1970, I examined the extent of Soviet and East European penetration of Iraq in the military, economic and political fields, it was already clear that USSR had something approaching a monopoly over Iraq's military equipment, had acquired a special standing as the source of development aid and as the promoter of Iraq's national oil policies, and was increasingly well placed to advance the cause of revolution further south. But the West, ourselves in particular, still retained certain advantages, and the slither to Moscow was not irreversible.
2. Since then we have reported piecemeal the further progress made by the Russians and their friends in consolidating their position here. In paragraph 15 of my Despatch 1/7 of 17 June (on the way the Iraqi Ba'ath have been shaping) I said that I would be sending you a round-up of these developments. This is it (enclosed).
3. In brief, the conclusions from the last 18 months are the following:
  - a. Militarily, the stranglehold - based on a near monopoly of equipment and strengthened by further training facilities - has tightened.
  - b. Economically, new credits, new contracts and the assistance lavished on Iraq's national oil policies have given body to the bloc's claim to be Iraq's best friends.
  - c. Politically, in addition to the dividends from (a) and (b), the Kurdish settlement, the Novikov mission and the course of history in the Gulf - coupled with the left wing radicalism assumed by the Ba'ath in their regional isolation - have accelerated the slither towards Moscow.
4. The Iraqis themselves continue to make gestures or signals in the direction of the West. Some of these gesticulations are doubtless ambivalent, and to the gloomier observers the impression received is of

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**"Not Waving but Drowning". We in this Embassy do not believe that total submersion is imminent or inevitable and consider that the provision of a stronger Western life-line would keep the struggler afloat and in doing so serve the Western interest.**

**H G Balfour Paul**

**c.c. Chanceries at:**

**AMMAN  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
JEDDA  
KUWAIT  
KHARTOUM  
TRIPOLI  
ALGIERS  
RABAT  
BAHRAIN RESIDENCY  
TEHRAN  
MOSCOW  
PARIS  
WASHINGTON  
UKMIS NEW YORK**



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**COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ AS AT JULY 1971**

**A. MILITARY**

1. Iraq's dependence on the Soviet bloc for both equipment and training in all services has increased still further in the last 18 months.
2. I attach at Annex A a table, as accurate as we can make it, showing the present sources of armour and artillery in the Army. Comparison with figures given by me in January 1970 (and quoted alongside) is not immediately rewarding since a large number of infantry battalions have meanwhile been mechanised and equipped with Soviet armour; and improved coverage has shown some inaccuracy in our previous figures. The table shows that only 10% of the armour and 15% of the artillery is known to come from Western sources. Small arms and soft skinned vehicles in all field formations are as before 100% of bloc origin.
3. As for the Air Force the second of the tables at Annex A shows major increases in Soviet fighters (from 124 to 210) and in Czechoslovak trainers (from 72 to 110), together with steady attrition of residual holdings of British aircraft.
4. In the Navy, which remains wholly Soviet-equipped, the only known development of moment is that 2 of the expected KOMAR FPB's are now definitely expected before the end of 1971. As regards land-based missiles our evidence is too uncertain to tabulate; but the installation of a number of Soviet SAM 2's in the Basra area is thought to be well advanced and there have been signs of Iraqi interest in SAM 3's.
5. Although there are still no Soviet "advisers", in the sense applicable in Egypt and Syria, in units and formations, there are certainly more experts and technicians employed on maintenance of bloc equipment and training in respect of it. The best estimate available is 500. And the number of Iraqis sent for training to Communist countries, though not quantifiable, has certainly increased in the Air Force and (more conspicuously) in the Navy, where overseas training has been switched from Egypt to Russia. Pressure is also known to be building up for the adoption of Russian establishment patterns and tactical doctrine in place of British, which would of course have a direct bearing on future equipment policies.
6. Against all these a continuing, perhaps intensified, desire to purchase from Britain and France has been manifested. A second regiment has been equipped with PANHARD armoured cars; but in general this desire is thwarted because we and the French either price ourselves out of the market or have political/security reasons for not responding. In matters of training, Iraqi eagerness to secure courses in the United Kingdom has redoubled, but though the MOD are doing what they can, the response is regarded by the Iraqis as sadly inadequate.
7. In sum, the near monopoly in equipment etc. now possessed by the bloc is due much less to deliberate government policy (and still less to the inclination of the armed forces themselves) than to the fact that bloc equipment can be obtained, cheaper quicker and easier, and that a tendency once established is not easily reversed. The point, however, is that the stranglehold is tightening.



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**B. FINANCIAL/INDUSTRIAL/ECONOMIC**

1. At Annex B, I attach a revised and up-dated list of loans or credits negotiated with communist countries, omitting the 1959/60 crop whose fate has been obscured by time. I have included in it, since this has now become a basic consideration in Iraq's economic policy, a column showing the proportion of these loans declared or believed to be repayable in crude oil.

2. On this latter point the IPC here, with whom I have compared notes, calculate that, if all communist bloc credits were taken up, repayments in crude oil (taking account of interest rates and differing periods of repayment) would work out at 140,000 b.p.d. or about 7 m.t.a. To this they would add further possible liabilities of some 148,000 b.p.d. under various agreements with non-Communist countries (Ceylon, India, Japan and Sudan), making a total of 288,000 b.p.d. or about 14.5 m.t.a. I would certainly regard their estimate of liabilities to non-communist countries with reserve though they omit the recent Brazilian undertaking to take 15m tons over the next five years (ie an average of 3 m.t.a.). Even their calculations of repayments to the bloc, to judge by the most recent of many conflicting indications, appear to over-estimate in certain cases the proportions repayable in oil. But at a conservative guess (and excluding non-Communist takers) the Iraqis must have found a home for at least 5 m.t.a. of crude oil over the period of communist bloc loan servicing. Since production in INOC fields is planned to reach 18 m.t.a. by 1975 their marketing plans still have quite a long way to go; but (and this is the point here) it is doubtless the bloc to whom they will turn, if need be, to bale them out.

3. The extent to which the credits at Annex B have been utilized cannot be assessed with accuracy. (The purchase of military equipment, Soviet and Czechoslovak, does not appear to have been financed this way.) What is currently noticeable is the tendency to tie the credits to specific projects ab initio. Some indication of the growing dominance of the bloc in the field of industrial development may be gained by a glance at the rough check-list of projects (Annex C) financed and executed by bloc countries or under active negotiation. I have included one or two instances of equipment supplied under the same credit facilities (but not as part of project packages), simply as indicators of the way the East Germans in particular turn their loan to good commercial advantage.

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### C. POLITICAL

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IN X  
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1. Iraqi Army Equipment (Major Items)

<u>Source</u>	<u>Armour including APC</u>		<u>Artillery</u>	
	<u>Units</u>	<u>% age</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>% age</u>
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## ANNEX B

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Communist bloc projects financed on credit in Iraq

- \* = Completed
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- ≠ Power Stations at Dukkan and Derbendikhan
- ≠ Exploitation of phosphate deposits

Czechoslovakia

- \* Tractor assembly plant at Iskanderia
- ‡ Basra oil refinery and related jetty development

Poland

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- \* Basra fertiliser project
- ‡ Mishraq sulphur works

Hungary

- \* Drilling of 4 oil wells in N Rumaila
- \* Provision of 200 buses
- ‡ Drilling of 3-6 oil wells in Jambour (near Kirkuk)

Bulgaria

- \* Two tomato paste factories



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**East Germany**

- \* Machinery and machine tools (ID 1½ million)
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- \* Medical equipment (ID 1m.)
- ‡ Construction of 5 silos (ID 5.6m.)
- ‡ Slipway in Basra (ID 660,000)
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- ‡ Dredging equipment for Umm Qasr port (ID 133,000)
- ‡ Road and agricultural machinery (ID 2.35m.)
- ✕ Substantial assistance with cooperative farm installations and training

**Romania**

Diwaniya-Nasiria road construction (53kms)  
Finance arrangements not known.



Mr Evans

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

Flag A

1. Mr Balfour Paul's <sup>letter and</sup> memorandum (p. 10) <sup>is a</sup> most useful follow up to his despatch of 17 June about Iraqi Ba'athism. 7

2. The memorandum is not, I think, of wide enough interest to merit printing, but I recommend that it should be reproduced in the "Departmental series" as follows: Arabian Department, Cultural Relations Department, Defence Department, EESD, Export Promotion Department, FPAD, IRD, North African Department, P.O.S.D., Oil Department, UN (Pol) Department, Research Department, WED, Assessments Staff, Ministry of Defence (DS11, DS13 and DI4), DTI (CRE4 for Mr Ashwood), ODA (Mr Cook) and ECGD (Mr MacMahon). If you agree I shall arrange this. 6

3. The point raised by Mr Balfour Paul in the last paragraph of his letter <sup>is</sup> important and should perhaps receive a considered reply after consultation with other Departments. Again, if you agree, I shall take the necessary action. My own preliminary view is that, while I take Mr Balfour Paul's point, it would be very difficult at present for HMG to do much more for the Iraqis. We are being reasonably forthcoming on military matters, the English Language Teaching Institute and the line of credit. And we offered a Ministerial visit - only to find that the Minister in question was immediately dismissed. Moreover the recent expulsions will not dispose Ministers here to treat the Iraqis kindly.

4. Meanwhile you may wish to send the attached draft letter to Mr Balfour Paul.

*Veronica Beckett*  
Veronica Beckett

2 August 1971

Miss Beckett

1. I agree with the action you propose.
2. Before preparing a draft letter to Mr Balfour Paul about ways in which we might preserve sources of Western influence in Iraq, I should be grateful if you would consult Western European Department and Western Organisations Department as well as the Departments

1424 July



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which have an interest in Communist activity in countries outside the Communist world. As you will remember, there was correspondence last year or the year before about the possibility of our trying to get the French to join us in working to contain Communist influence in Iraq.

*R.E.*

R M Evans

Near Eastern Department

4 August 1971

*Registry have arranged for circulation as indicated  
in para 2 of my minute; copies will also go to PS,  
PS to PUS - PS to Mr. Galtier.*

*hs 5/8*

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Near Eastern Department  
**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

His Excellency  
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG  
Baghdad

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 2/2

Date 4 August 1971

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. Very many thanks for your letter of 24 July and its enclosure. We are arranging for both to be printed in the new Departmental Series (for distribution in this case to Departments in the Office and to the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry and ECGD).
2. The reinforcement of the presence and influence of the Communist Bloc in Iraq is indeed disturbing. Yet it is not easy to think of ways in which we and others, individually or collectively, might act to prevent its further reinforcement. The Iraqis are not adept at helping us to give them help. In spite of the expulsion of three members of your staff, we are doing what we can to help over military training courses, the English Language Teaching Institute and the line of credit. We shall now have another careful look at the possibility of our doing more, perhaps in concert with others, to preserve sources of Western influence in Iraq. We shall let you know the outcome as soon as possible.
3. Meanwhile, it would be helpful if you could give us a little by way of exegesis on the final sentence in the enclosure to your letter. When you speak of "the point of no return", do you have in mind the point at which Iraq could no longer pursue policies, at home and abroad, which were in any way unwelcome to the Soviet Union? Or do you mean some point either short of or beyond this?

R M Evans

c.c. Chanceries:

Amman  
Beirut  
Cairo

Jedda  
Kuwait  
Khartoum

Tripoli  
Algiers  
Rabat

Bahrain Residency  
Tehran Paris  
Moscow Washington

UKMis  
New York

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Reference

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Mr Dain  
Assessment Staff / Cab. Off.

REGISTRY No. 10 19 AUG 1971
NEQ 2/2

## Communist Bloc Penetration of Iraq.

1. Iterate the pp as promised. I hope to draft a fairly long reply in 2-3 weeks time on UK policy to Iraq and the question of whether we can do anything to prevent the Iraqis falling completely under E. European sway (see para 4 of Mr Balfour Paul's letter). If you have any points you would like included please let me know a.s.p.

Miss Beckett (Near Eastern Dept.  
FCO)

Beckett  
4/8.

I attach copies of Assessment Staff minutes and of MoD (D173) comments on Mr Balfour Paul's letter. As I mentioned on the telephone, the main points which we feel might be made concern Soviet intentions in Iraq and the degree of the actual involvement and control. You will see that Mr Thomson has suggested that the Embassy might be asked to say whether they now think the judgements in the JIC (A) Note of 29 April underlay the situation.



0  
situation. It would also be helpful if the  
Embassy could at some stage enlarge on their  
comments on Russian-Kurdish relations, though  
you may prefer to deal with this separately.

John  
17/8



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1  
 Thompson. *[Signature]*

I attach Mr. Ballou Paul's letter together with a minute to me from Miss V. Beckett in N.E.).

At first reading I can think of a number of points in the letter on which we should wish to comment. The military section does not entirely square with what we said in our Note of 29 April (also attached) eg. on SA 2 and aircraft deliveries; D14 have agreed to examine this part of it closely.

On oil, it may be worth noting that the Russians' capacity for helping with marketing of WOC production is not unlimited. We go into this point in the Note on Soviet Policy on M.E. Oil, which is at the working draft stage.

The letter does not deal with Soviet intentions in Iraq, which are covered in our Note and which N.E.) will presumably want to take into account in replying. Our judgment in April seems to me for the most part to hold good. One thought which occurs to me is whether the <sup>trend exemplified by Libya and by</sup> recent events in Sudan ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>regional</sup> may in time add a new factor. Looking some way ahead, is it conceivable that the Russians, if they <sup>(a member of a non-aligned federation of Arab Republics)</sup> found their influence decreasing in the UAR, might



E.R.

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concentrate more on improving their position in Iraq.  
if this were a possibility, it would be another  
reason for the West to do what they can  
now to help check the "slither".

Don.  
5/8.

[in fact all present,  
but misassembled,  
photocopying the

Mr Balfour Paul might be invited inter alia to  
comment on JIC(A)(70)(N)?? and asked whether in the  
light of his letter (parts of which seem to be missing) he  
thinks our assessment underplays the degree of Soviet  
involvement and control. I should also like him  
to be asked to elucidate the precise relationship between  
the Russians and the Kurds.

7/12/8

The Baghdad Embassy commented on our assessment. I myself think they  
tend to overplay the alleged "stranglehold" of the Russians over Iraq. I cannot  
think of any instance in which the Russians have manifestly secured  
a shift in Iraqi policy to suit strictly Soviet interests; whereas in our Note  
we gave one important example of a way in which the Iraqis have managed  
to ignore Soviet advice. So long as there is a dispute between the UAR and Iraq  
and so long as the Russians continue to see the UAR as the cornerstone of their  
M.E. policy, there is bound to be a certain dilemma for Soviet policy  
makers. (I myself would think that any shift away from support for the



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the U.S. is still a very remote possibility, (though I agree it is worth mentioning).

The other point I think worth making is that the Inquiry can (to a certain extent has already) emulate the PRRJ by playing off the Russians & the Chinese.

Wm. T. Hall  
13/8



COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQCOMMENTS BY DI 73Military

1. Section A adds nothing to assessments provided in London that the Iraqi armed forces are almost entirely dependent on the Soviet Bloc for their arms. Even the small proportion of ground equipment originating in the West is now relatively old. We see no evidence that the "stranglehold has tightened".
2. The increases noted in the number of aircraft held by the Iraqi Air Force would appear to result from a re-evaluation and not from new deliveries although we estimate that another 10 MIG-21s, possibly 10-15 MIG-17s and a few Su-7s have been received this year.
3. We have no evidence that any SAMs have been delivered; the Iraqis may want SA-3s but could well get only SA-2s. The number of Russian advisers/experts is estimated to have been about 300 at the end of 1970 but this may now be on the low side.
4. As to the 2 Komars reported to be for delivery to the Navy this year, we have been expecting this for so long that we can do no more than simply to accept it when it happens.

Financial/Industrial/Economic

5. The tying of credits to specific projects ab initio appears to be regarded as something new in Soviet aid to Iraq. In fact the first Soviet credit in 1959 was tied largely to specific projects although the agreement was revised in 1964 when some projects were dropped and others added. In some cases "a project" consists of the equipping of a plant or factory.
6. In the past two years new Soviet economic aid to Iraq has been concerned largely with aid to the national oil industry. This is a sphere in which only communist aid is possible since no Western country is going to help to undermine its own, or its friends', oil companies. It is perhaps this aspect more than the "easy terms" which should be emphasised to show the privileged position Soviet aid now enjoys in the competition with Western aid.

Annex B

7. There are some discrepancies here because we hold more detailed information and have a regular exchange with CIA. For instance, although 75% of the smaller of the two 1969 credits is re-payable in oil there is no evidence that the other 1969 credits listed are in a similar category.
8. On the East European countries we have the following information which differs from that in the Baghdad Despatch:

Bulgaria 1970 Credit for \$12 million not £12 million.

Poland. We have no definite information of any Polish credit to Iraq. There were rumours in 1969 that Poland was about to grant one but no confirmation was received. We believe that the projects listed in Annex C are being carried out by Poland under commercial and not aid terms. Certainly a contract for 200 sulphur tankers signed in January 1971 was on what we consider a commercial basis ie 30% down payment and 70% over six years at 5% interest.



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
BRITISH EMBASSY

PRAGUE

3/44

18 August 1971

P J Weston Esq  
EESD  
FCO



Enter  
1 Rm  
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NEQ  
Hwz

Copy Baghdad

Dear John.

IRAQI VISITORS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. "Rudé Právo" of 9 August reported that on 7 August, General S. Gaydan, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, arrived in Czechoslovakia with his wife for "a short visit". He was welcomed at the airport by the Deputy Minister of the Interior for the Czech lands, Colonel Dr. Z. Rajchart.
2. Since 9 August there has been no mention of Gaydan in the press. We have no idea what he came here for. We assume that he has left by now. If he has, the customary two line piece in "Rudé Právo" to mark departures of visiting dignatories has been omitted.
3. "Rudé Právo" of 17 August reported that on 16 August Foreign Minister Marko received the Iraqi Minister of Health, Dr. I. Mustafa who "is on a few days visit to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the Czech and Slovak Ministers of Health".
4. "Rudé Právo"'s recent form gives us little hope that we shall hear any more about this visit either. But if we hear anything further about General Gaydan or about Dr Mustafa we will, of course, let you know.

Yours ever,  
Foster

pub.

J S S Beels

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Ene.

Mr Egerton (first) over →  
Mr Parsons

Mr. Evans

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REGISTRY No. 10
25 AUG 1971
NEQ 2/2

IRAQI BA'ATHISM. DOES IT WORK? DOES IT MATTER?

1. I read Mr Balfour Paul's despatch of 17 June with more than ordinary interest.
2. In my letter of thanks, of which I attach a copy, I said that I would seek your views, and those of Mr Parsons, when you had both returned from leave. I should be grateful to know what your views are and whether you have any comments which you think worth incorporating into a letter to Mr Balfour Paul.

R. M. Evans

R M Evans  
Near Eastern Department

4 August 1971

P.S. Mr Balfour Paul has now sent us the observations promised in paragraph 15 of his despatch. I have thanked him for these observations, saying that we shall now have a fresh look at ways in which we might preserve the sources of Western influence in Iraq.

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EESD *minute. Lu 13/8,*  
 Arabian Dept  
 North African Dept *12/8*  
 CRB  
 Defence Dept *Mr Povey.*  
 EPD  
 FPAD  
 IAD  
 Oil Dept  
 WED *minute*  
 WOD

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 25 AUG 1971

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12

# COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

Flag A

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1. In his letter to Mr Evans of 24 July, enclosing a memorandum on this subject, HM Ambassador at Baghdad suggests that the provision of a "stronger Western life-line" to Iraq would prevent Iraq from falling completely under communist domination and thus serve the Western interest. An interim reply has been sent (Mr Evans' letter of 4 August) but Mr Balfour Paul's argument needs a considered answer.

Flag B

8

2. The attached files contain previous papers on the question of communist bloc penetration of Iraq. The most important documents are :

Flag C

20

1969 NEQ 2/4

i. Minutes on co-ordinated Western action to counter Soviet influence in Iraq (NEQ 2/4 of 1969, folio 20) ;

Flag D

2

1970 NEQ 2/1

ii. Mr Balfour Paul's despatch of 20 January 1970 on Soviet Bloc Penetration of Ba'athist Iraq ;

Flag E

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1970 NEQ 2/1

iii. Further minutes on possible Western action on Iraq (NEQ 3/548/1 of 1970, folios 6 - 8 and 19) ;

Flag F

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1971 NEQ 1/2

iv. Mr Balfour Paul's despatch of 17 June 1971 on Iraqi Ba'athism.

3. Assuming that there is no major disagreement with Mr Balfour Paul's assessment of the extent of communist penetration of Iraq, I think the following questions should now be considered:

a. In the light of recent events in Sudan, is the communist bloc likely to take a greater interest in Iraq?

b. Is communist policy towards Iraq likely to be influenced by their policy towards the Gulf (this point was covered in the attached copy of a recent minute by Arabian Dept, who may have further comments).

c. Is the communist bloc threat in Iraq so serious that we should make urgent efforts to try and counter it?

d. If so, what steps might we take?

e. Could we do anything together with other Western European countries?

4. My own preliminary thinking is that the communist presence in Iraq is certainly disturbing. But it is hard to see what HMG can do to counter it effectively. Since 1967 our relations with Iraq have never been good,



the outstanding dispute between the Iraqi Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company being one of the main bones of contention. The recent expulsions did nothing to improve matters. Increased friendliness on our part towards the Iraqis would be unlikely to have any significant influence with the present Ba'athist Government, while it would upset other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Kuwait and the Gulf states, not to mention Iran. In any case the practical options open to us for improving Anglo/Iraqi relations are limited, and it would be impossible for us to offer military and financial assistance on anything like the communist scale.

5. In our recent dealings with the Iraqis we have tried to be reasonably forthcoming. In the cultural field an agreement was signed in June setting up an English Language Teaching Institute in Baghdad. We have been helping the Iraqis over medical education. We are awaiting their comments on our proposals for a line of credit for Iraq. We are trying to meet their requirements for military training places. But many of our attempts to meet the Iraqis half-way founder on their own obtuseness. In May, Ministerial agreement was given to the issue of an invitation to the Iraqi Minister of Education to visit the UK as a guest of HMG. The following week Dr Al-Rawi was sacked. On arms sales, while we have indicated that we would be prepared to consider any firm Iraqi request, no request for any major arms deal has been forthcoming.

6. The only two spheres in which we might be able to show greater flexibility towards the Iraqis seem to be :

a. Technical assistance. The current programme runs at about £25,000 p.a. Consideration might be given to increasing this figure if any worthwhile projects could be identified.

b. Sponsored visits. There have been very few such visits recently, partly because we have not had many recommendations from the Embassy. We might try and rectify this.

Even if these proposals do not amount to much, there would perhaps be marginal advantage in pursuing them. Such action might not cut a great deal of ice with the Ba'ath, but, as Mr Balfour Paul points out, Iraq is not yet completely communist dominated, and I think we should do what little we can to try and counter communist influence. There might also be advantage in investigating the possibilities of holding talks with other Western European countries on Iraq - even though I am sceptical about such talks producing concrete results.

7. I should be grateful if the addressees of this minute could let me have their views. A copy of the memorandum has been sent separately to the Assessment Staff, who are checking some of the figures in Section A.

*Veronica Beckett*

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

9 August 1971



## Confidence

W12

The Russians appear in no hurry to "get into the Gulf". (I don't blame them, given the problems we are having in getting out).

2. An analysis of Russian policy towards the Gulf was recently completed by the TIC. Arabian Dept concurred generally with the conclusions of that paper: namely that Russian policy would remain cautious & opportunistic.

3. If Iranian/Arab rivalry develops in the Gulf the Russians will be reluctant, I guess, to commit themselves to backing either side unequivocally. They will lose little by waiting patiently until the future pattern of the political forces in the Gulf begins to emerge more clearly, & I believe that they will seek to assert influence gradually, & without any startling or sudden diplomatic gestures unless an obvious opportunity for interference presents itself. I doubt if their short term policy in Iraq is much influenced by long term <sup>global</sup> considerations.

*John Fairs*  
5/8

Min Beckett



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W12

1. I am afraid that I have no very helpful suggestions to make. I agree with Mr. Balfour Paul's assessment of the present degree of Communist penetration in Iraq, although I am not sure what he means about the "point of no return" referred to in paragraph 7 of the memorandum. I think that this point has already been reached insofar as Soviet influence is likely to remain a permanent feature in Iraq. However, this does not mean that the Russians will ever have complete control over the country. Arab nationalism will continue to be a potent force and, because of it, the Russians' relations with the Arab world are unlikely ever to be completely harmonious. In addition, I think that the Iraqis, like the Egyptians, will want to play the Russians off against the West, since this offers a means of applying some pressure on the former. A further factor is that the Russians attach importance to maintaining good relations with Iran, and this will inhibit them from going too far in supporting Iraqi policies. On the other hand, recent developments in the UAR and Sudan may make the Russians attach greater importance to their foothold in Iraq, which seems comparatively secure at present. I think that the Russians may ultimately have ambitions in the Gulf, although they will pursue them cautiously as the Arab Department have suggested, and I think they would be reluctant to abandon the important springboard represented by Iraq's geographical position.

2. In view of the above, I doubt if there are any positive steps which we can take to limit or reduce Soviet influence in Iraq. We are unable to compete with the Russians either militarily or commercially. (Although in the long-run the Iraqis may have to turn towards Western sources of supply as their need for sophisticated equipment increases. However, I presume that this is still a long way off.) It is nevertheless important that the lines of communication should remain open so that the Iraqis have every chance of being able to swing back towards the West should they embark upon a more truly non-aligned policy. British policy towards Iraq therefore represents something of a holding operation and I think we should be content to promote exchanges of the kinds mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of your minute. Providing the Iraqi Government is willing to continue them, they should help to ensure that the lines of communication with the West are not completely cut off.

C. HulseC. Hulse  
EESD

10 August 1971

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Miss Beckett

Events in the UAR and Sudan have shown, very encouragingly, that there are definite limits on Russian influence in the Arab world and I'm sure that even in apparently hopeless cases such as Iraq, we should aim to provide the Western life-line which Mr B-P talks about.

You are obviously making great efforts to extend our contacts with Iraq, and I can only suggest that ~~you~~ we keep hammering away. There does seem to be some

scope for an increase in the T A programme.

£25,000 is very little compared with over £250,000 which we spend in the Sudan.

W. D. Green  
W.D.G. 12/18

/Emm.



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REGISTRY No. 10

25 AUG 1971

NEQ 2/2

13

Mr Gladstone

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ

1. From the papers attached it is difficult to see what HMG can do about communist penetration in Iraq. It could well be argued, indeed, that we should encourage the Russians to pick up the white man's burden in countries as difficult as Iraq, just as they seem willing to do in India. They would find, as we have done, that the hand that feeds is bound to get bitten sooner or later.

2. But WED's views are sought on 3 e of Miss Beckett's minute; can we do anything together with other Western European countries? Of the countries for which I am responsible, only France has a major interest in Iraq, and that interest is identical with one of our own, ie CFP's share in IPC. I assume that we discuss Iraq with the French during our periodic talks with them about the Middle East (though I note that the subject was not raised at the last round on 15 June); I suggest that we talk to the French at the next opportunity, and see whether they are as concerned as we about the communists in Iraq, and whether they have any ideas for dealing with them.

3. Do you think the Germans are interested?

*Civilian*

C C Wilcock  
Western European Department  
16 August 1971

I agree with Mr. Wilcock. We could well discuss this topic with the Germans the next time our Middle East experts get together (I am not sure when that will be). But I am not confident of any tangible results even though the Germans would no doubt really like to re-establish a foothold in Iraq and to do the GDR down

*Mr. Wilcock*  
16/8



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14

Mr Evans

My only comment is that I have nothing to add to Mr. Balfour Paul's despatch which, like all his reporting, is first-class and gives an exact and concise analysis of the position of the Ba'ath in Iraq. However, as Mr. Balfour Paul recognises, I cannot see that we can do anything substantial to wean the Iraqi Government away from its viler inclinations unless we radically change our policy towards Palestine and Iran and unless we are prepared to fly in the teeth of Parliamentary opinion in this country about the Iraqi regime. We are clearly in a position to do none of these things. Therefore we shall have to content ourselves with nibbling at the edges of the problem insofar as this is compatible with the protection of our wider interests and the limits of our hard pressed resources. I look forward to seeing the paper on ways and means sent by Mr. Balfour Paul.

A D Parsons

16 August 1971

Letter to Mr. Balfour Paul.

R.E. 17/8.

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Mr ~~B~~arsons

1. We are studying separately, and will submit in due course, on the paper promised in paragraph 15 of Mr Balfour Paul's Despatch of 17 June.
2. As to that Despatch itself, it is magisterial and I have very little by way of comment. Mr Balfour Paul has in fact made a deep but succinct analysis of Iraqi Baathism in theory and in application, and then answered for us (in terms we would agree) most of the "points arising" for British policy towards Iraq while the present regime lasts. The main point is that there can be no substantial improvement in our relations with Iraq without a dramatic change in our whole Middle Eastern list of priorities, which in turn is inconceivable given the unpredictability and general boorishness of the present Iraqi regime.
3. I take issue with the last sentence of paragraph 14 of the Despatch. It is because we have a pretty good understanding of what animates the present Iraqi leaders, and of what their "gut reactions" to any serious attempt to improve our relations with them would be, that we feel we can do so little to prevent them learning by their own mistakes (which will no doubt tell against Western interests). This may mean that they end up being "strangleheld puppets of the Kremlin". But then they would surely be overthrown, and we might be able to do slightly more business (in the broad sense) with their successors.

  
S L Egerton  
Near Eastern Department

16 August 1971

Copy to: Miss Beckett

/My only....





Miss Beckett (Near Eastern Department W 155)

1. I am afraid it is little use us considering any possible action within NATO on the lines of para 2(iii) of your minute. There is no positive action the Alliance could take even if it were prepared to, without offending a number of the member countries. Iraq is also outside the NATO area and although the Alliance is interested in the course of Soviet policies and the extent of Soviet influence in the Middle East, it is but an interest and produces no positive contribution to ~~counter~~ it.

*Support/*

2. I am sorry for such a futile answer. For what it is worth I would agree with the line put forward in para 6 of your minute and supported by Mr Hulse and Mr Green.

*A J Ramsay*

A J Ramsay  
Western Organisations Dept

17 August 1971

*Mr Poley minus 25/8*  
Miss Beckett

*I am afraid that I have little to add. Evidently, a major arms sale to us would help, but it is difficult to bring about because of Iraqi unwillingness, no doubt partly as a result of Soviet pre-emption; our own security considerations; and Iraqi "obtuseness". Training in the U.K. of the Iraqi military would be useful. Mr Poley may be able to comment further.*




Further. Lastly, British military visits  
to Iraq (at the two officers who  
attended, some months ago, the celebrations of  
the 50th Anniversary of the Iraqi Army)  
may be of some marginal value. But  
here ~~again~~ the problem is partly financial,  
and partly the Iraqis' own unwillingness  
to contemplate anything sufficiently  
significant to have a real influence.

Ylton

23 Aug 71.

Debra Day.





Miss Beckett  
Near East Dept

1. The Iraqi Minister of Higher Education was recently over here on a private visit but had a short programme arranged for her by the British Council. She is keen to send a large number of postgraduates to the UK - at Iraqi expense -; she was advised to do this through the Iraq Embassy in London, but there is a student adviser there who is an ex-British Council man and he will be asked by the Council to do all he can to help. He is of course too late to do anything this year.
2. The Minister also asked for British teachers: here again, she is too late for the current academic year, but if sufficient notice is given to the Council's Representative in Baghdad, he will do what he can to organise some recruitment next year. Whether people will be willing to go to Iraq is, I am afraid, not predictable.
3. An interesting development however was that the Minister suggested dropping the 7 British Council scholarships awarded annually, 'the Iraq Government were now awarding so many scholarships', and using the money to finance professors (?she meant university teachers generally) to come to the UK for short periods of research.
4. The Iraqis are keen to establish university links and are consulting the Council Representative about this.

*Mary Dooley*  
Miss M L Dooley  
Cultural Relations Dept  
G 72/4

20 August 1971



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REGISTRY No. 10  
25 AUG 1971

NEQ 2/2

Mr ~~Parsons~~

## COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. You asked to see Mr Balfour Paul's paper on this subject. A copy is attached below.
2. The file copy is circulating separately so that I can collect the views of the various Departments concerned. My own view is that HMG can do very little to counterbalance Bloc influence in Iraq; but we might consider a small increase in technical assistance to Iraq and in the number of sponsored visitors from Iraq.

*Veronica Beckett*Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

19 August 1971



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**

**DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 332/71**

**NEQ 1/2**

*General Distribution*

**IRAQ**

**17 June, 1971**

**IRAQI BA'ATHISM. DOES IT WORK? DOES IT MATTER?**

*Her Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad to the  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*

**SUMMARY**

What are the professions of this unlovable régime? Do they work in practice? Does it matter, either way, to us? (Paragraph 1.)

2. Summary of the beliefs of the founder of Ba'athism. The inseparable Trinity and the people's Eternal Mission. Arab resurrection impossible without revolution. Rejection of Nasser's methods. Recognition of the dangers of world Communism. (Paragraphs 2-4.)

3. Aflaq's programme of action. Like his principles, unobjectionable if scarcely to our taste. (Paragraph 5.)

4. The Iraqi Ba'ath claims to revere his principles and is zealously pursuing his programme locally. It doesn't work all that badly. (Paragraphs 6-7.)

5. Why more thorns than roses? The two standard explanations: that the Iraqi Ba'ath are just thugs and Iraq just ungovernable by democratic process. The second truer than the first. (Paragraphs 8-9.)

6. Why Iraq is difficult to govern nicely. The Sunni minority's established technique of governing it by intimidation. (Paragraph 10.)

7. But the Ba'ath leaders are not thugs pure and simple. Their Ba'athism is not just eye-wash. And their main organised opponents have always been not the bourgeoisie but the Communists. On present course a Communist take-over less likely than the forced conversion of a failing Ba'athist régime into a Soviet puppet. (Paragraphs 11-14.)

8. Unlovable as they are, our interests would paradoxically be served by propping them up. The complexities of the Middle East appear to preclude this. But we should recognise the consequences. (Paragraphs 15-16.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

*Baghdad,*

*17 June, 1971.*

Like observers elsewhere I find the Iraqi Ba'athist régime, in its internal as well as in its external behaviour, in many ways repellent. But the man on the spot who has to live with it cannot just stand back and be repelled. He must

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try to understand it, to identify what it is that impels it headlong down such loveless paths. The object of this despatch is to examine the régime's ideological professions, the extent to which these professions supply its motive force and the implications of this (if any) for our own policy-making. What in fact is Iraqi Ba'athism? Does it work? Does it matter?

2. All Ba'athists, even the Syrian ones who have thrown him out, still admit the 60-year-old, chain-smoking, French-trained, Damascene "Christian" ideologue, Michel Aflaq, as their "onlie begetter". His philosophy, though better documented than Nasser's or any other version of Arab Socialism, has attracted little study, being dismissed as a sickly child fathered on the Arab Awakening by the joint efforts of coffee-house Marxism and German Romanticism, and left loosely swaddled in rags from the Sermon on the Mount.

✓ 3. To do it justice Aflaq's philosophy, though not profound, has a certain logical coherence as well as a genuine emotional appeal. Starting from the premise that Arab society had been reduced to impotence by centuries of Ottoman/European domination and fragmentation, he defines the mission of the Arabs as the recovery of their long-lost dignity and the regeneration of their national genius. The Arab body politic cannot come alive again (*Ba'ath* means Resurrection) unless its *dissecta membra* are reassembled. The Arabs must unite: they cannot unite unless they are free: they cannot be free if they are exploited by outsiders or by each other: they cannot be Socialist in penny-packets. Unity, freedom and Socialism—the three members of the Ba'ath Trinity—are strictly interdependent: a dogma having, for Aflaq, mystical as well as practical validity. Bravely believing in the capacity of Arabs to love one another, his gospel entailed their moral as well as their material regeneration. But this process could not be set in motion save by the traumatic surgery of revolution—in the sense not just of a single political *bouleversement* but of a continuing state of mind. Success depended on the faith of the people in their eternal mission. The impetus must therefore come from below, from a natural flowering of the popular will: it could not be imposed from above like Nasserism, whose methods Aflaq deplored—for whereas Aflaq invented a philosophy and sought power, Nasser seized power and invented a philosophy.

4. Imperialist Europe, though still the main enemy, he admired; but since its great qualities were corrupted by self-interest, it was to the "Socialist" camp that Aflaq, earlier than other Arabs, turned for guidance. Yet he explicitly recognised in Soviet Communism a new imperialist danger to the Arabs. Indeed for all his inspirational rhetoric he was no mere mystic; and he insisted that Arab Socialism, being quintessentially national and pragmatist, was a clean, different thing from Communism with its presumptuous claim to universality and scientific truth, its primitive obsession with class war. Moreover, he recognised, as a non-Moslem, the need to accommodate Islam in his philosophy as a valid, indeed seminal, feature of the Arab genius. And he supervised, as early as 1947, the translation of his beliefs into a party constitution and programme.

5. This committed the party to the promotion of a single Arab homeland with representative constitutional government, dedicated to the removal of all foreign influence; State ownership of large-scale industries and utilities and State supervision of commerce (to prevent exploitation); modest private enterprise and the sanctity of private property; the redistribution of land into equitable private holdings; planned industrialisation; labour reform and worker participation; and ("within the limits of Arab Nationalist ideology") all the familiar freedoms.



6. What have his Iraqi disciples done with all this? The tablets of the law brought down by Aflaq from Montmartre are still ostensibly revered. His basic slogans—"Unity, Liberty, Socialism", "One Arab people with an Eternal Mission"—continued to be proclaimed from the tops of houses and daubed on their walls. The constitution of the party remains unchanged. Socialism is still pursued by populist (if not exactly popular) revolution—for gradualism is self-defeating and *le bien* (so to speak) *est l'ennemi du mieux*. Government is of the people and for the people, if still by only some of the people. The International Party Command is as inter-Arab as the Iraqi Ba'ath can make it; and Aflaq (though at present estranged, ostensibly over tactics towards Palestine) is still its Secretary-General.

7. Moreover the 1947 programme, as far (they would claim) as lies within their local power, has been largely implemented. They would admit to exceptions. If government is not entirely representative that is because some citizens have not yet seen the light; and similarly if some freedoms are still restricted, was not the promising of them stated to be "within the limits of Arab Nationalist ideology"? Finally, if Ba'athist unity has not yet established itself over the whole Arab homeland, that is because the ambitions of deviating sectionals (*shu'ubiyin*) have not yet been frustrated by the people. But in Iraq the prescribed social, economic and agrarian restructuring is there to be seen, on the statute book if not entirely on the ground. (Everyone knows, so the Governor of Baghdad sadly remarked to me, that the Iraqi peasant will only work if whipped.) Foreign influences, though still seeking what they may devour, have been mightily curbed and foreign (oil) concessions have been shown, with due regard for pragmatism, the writings on the wall. Industrial development pushes ahead. Planning is an industry in itself. Internal exploitation is ended. Peasant co-operatives pullulate. Education is advancing, upwards and sideways. The workers declare their happiness. Opposition movements, Communism perhaps excepted, have visibly evaporated. The millenium (so their apologia would conclude) is round the corner. Or almost.

8. So what is the matter? Why are there, to the eye of the beholder, more thorns than roses in the garden? There are two standard explanations. One is that the present régime is actually a gang of power-hungry thugs ruthlessly pursuing their personal or sectional interests under cover of pan-Arab idealism. (In one part of the Arab world, as I was recently reminded, a *ba'athi* means an evil spirit resurrected from the dead to haunt the living.) The other is that the Iraqis, both as an ethnological farrago and as individuals, are ungovernable by democratic process, whatever guise it might appear in.

9. Most observers would agree that both these explanations are at least partly true. Not all would agree with me that the second is truer than the first: even fewer that the first (in so far as it is true) is largely a consequence of the second. How do I justify this latter thesis?

10. What, first, is Iraq?—A congeries of mutually suspicious races, sects and interests, with no ancient sense of identity or common purpose, each section schooled by history to get what it can for itself—of security and advantage during the centuries of foreign domination, of power and power's fruits during a brief experience of self-rule. Since the '30s rival groups of small-town, minority Sunnites (the dominant caste) have jostled for position, using violence to obtain it and intimidation or if need be assassination to keep it—a technique which neither surprises nor hardly even offends the mass of their compatriots, whatever Fleet Street and the rest of the civilised world may feel about it.



11. The present régime is one such group from the urban, riverain, Sunni minority. (The Shi'ite majority, together with the Kurds and the Christian communities, scarcely figure in the corridors of power—though the Kurds, who are Sunnis and therefore desirable as confessional allies, have been more nearly pacified by this régime than by any of their predecessors.) Is that all the régime is? Is its adoption of Aflaq's misty idealism just so much eye-wash, just an ideological fancy dress, without which no régime anywhere can hold court?

12. I think not. Virtually all the régime's leading figures have long Ba'athist credentials which have carried them in and out of prison or exile over the years—and imprisonment in Iraq under any régime is no small price to pay for one's beliefs. The desire for power is seldom pure and never simple, but I believe the régime as a whole (however power may have corrupted it) does share Aflaq's simpler beliefs and Socialist aspirations and seeks power to pursue them. They may not be nice chaps (as Aflaq probably is); they may not have got far with Unity and Liberty; they may have aroused little genuine enthusiasm amongst the fractious community at large; their whirlwind Socialisation may not have brought or be likely to bring prosperity; they may have to rely (as Governments seem to have to do in Iraq) on a particularly unappetising horde of small-time opportunist narks to keep them where they are. But I do not believe they are simply power-hungry thugs themselves. And they are certainly pursuing Aflaq's Socialist/populist programme with zeal and against odds.

13. In the light of all the above my answer to the question "Does Iraqi Ba'athism work?" is not, for all the régime's faults, entirely negative. Within the borders of this democratically ungovernable country Aflaq's ideals or ideas are being promoted with some appearance of success. Since the question also means "Is Iraqi Ba'athism capable of survival and of thus providing the sort of stability denied to Iraq in the past and essential to planned development?" the answer in this respect too must be affirmative. And even in terms of economic health and growth, their efforts, if they would stop treating party membership as a qualification for office, are at least better co-ordinated and more respectable than those of previous revolutionary régimes—particularly in their determination to expand the agricultural infrastructure, diversify the economy and (a Herculean task) eradicate corruption. And it is difficult to deny that their oil policies are paying off.

14. None of this (except of course their oil policies) may matter much to us. But what is surely of importance is the following. Throughout their history, the principal force opposing the Ba'ath has not been the conservative bourgeoisie (long politically disorganised and apathetic) but the local Communists. More Ba'athist blood has been shed by Communists and more Communist blood by Ba'athists than by any other agencies. And if (internal) Communism is not the imminent threat now that it was in Qassem's day, it is largely the Ba'ath that we have to thank for it. Even today the only foreseeable organised alternative in Iraq to the present régime is a Communist one—though the more likely development (and doubtless the one preferred by the Soviet Union), if matters continue on their present course, is that the régime will remain Ba'athist and independent in appearance but a strangleheld puppet of the Kremlin in effect. To the extent that Iraq matters at all in European perspectives, these are hard facts that seem to me to deserve more attention than they get.

*Nonsense, we fully appreciate these facts*

15. I realise only too well that the complexities of the Middle East leave us little room for manoeuvre in our broader dealings with Iraq. (It would doubtless require a mutation in our handling of the Shah, for instance, were we to risk being detected genuinely supporting the Iraqi Ba'ath—though it is not always clear



to me what it is that the Russians lose in Iran by reason of *their* policies towards Iraq and what we gain by *ours*.) I realise too that the anti-Western prejudice and suspicion to which "progressives" in Iraq, as elsewhere, feel obliged to give tongue, afford us, when added to other unattractive features of this régime, little encouragement to apply any of our diminished resources to underwriting this régime and pulling it back Westwards. But let us anyway not blind ourselves to the consequences of its further alienation, its accelerating slither towards Moscow (on which I shall shortly be submitting some observations to Near Eastern Department) or its overthrow.

16. In short, Iraqi Ba'athism does not work likeably and it is difficult to wish it success. Paradoxically our interests would be served by helping it to work better. Nothing much could be done by us to promote this end (supposing it was agreed to be desirable) within the constraints currently inseparable from our Middle East priorities. But we should recognise the consequences.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Resident Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, Moscow, to the Political Residency in Bahrain, to United Kingdom Delegation Paris and United Kingdom Mission New York.

I have, etc.,

H. G. BALFOUR PAUL.





CONFIDENTIAL

Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

*Mr. Parsons.  
Mr. Egerton.  
Miss Becker.  
R.E. 18/8*

His Excellency  
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG  
Baghdad

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 1/2

Date 17 August 1971

IRAQI BA'ATHISM. DOES IT WORK? DOES IT MATTER?

1. In my letter NEQ 1/2 of 22 July, I promised to ask Tony Parsons and Stephen Egerton whether they had any comments to make on your despatch of 17 June.

2. They have both now written minutes. What they have said is flattering. But, except on one point, they have no observations to make or questions to ask on the substance of what you wrote. The one point is your interpretation of the triangular relationship among the Ba'athists, the Communists and the Soviet Union. But I think it better to reserve this comment until we can send you our considered views on your letter and memorandum of 22 July on "Communist Bloc Penetration of Iraq".

R M Evans

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 25 AUG 1971
NEQ 2/2

19

Miss Beckett ✓ *Mimre*  
Mr Evans ✓

*Mr E Parsons.*

I should rather like to hold a meeting in due course with all concerned to discuss the question of whether or not we should be doing more in Iraq. I realise that there is very little we can do to influence the present regime in Iraq and that there is nothing which we can or need do on the diplomatic plane on behalf of the IPC - it is fortunate that their relations with the Iraqi Government have been kept separate from Anglo/Iraqi relations in general. This is of course a function of the Iraqis' appreciation of their own national interest. However, we have a general interest in trying to minimise Soviet influence in Iraq both in the context of the future of the Gulf, of our oil interests and of our wider interest in CENTO etc. We should at least do enough to try to keep the door open to make it easier for the present regime to diversify a little away from the Soviet Union if it wishes to and also to make it possible for any future regime to shake off the stranglehold.

2. Specifically, I have the impression that we are being reasonably forthcoming. We have been prepared to supply arms: it is the Iraqis who have failed to come up to scratch after initial enquiries about arms requirements. What is the situation about training courses for example? I have the impression again that we are not doing too badly here.

Commercially I think that we are doing as well as can be

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/expected....



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expected and are being as forthcoming in terms of credit etc. as could be expected. Could we do anything more to strengthen professional, educational, technical and business links as suggested in paragraph 6 of Mr. Balfour Paul's paper? We obviously have to steer carefully between the Scylla of the Shah and the Kuwaitis and the Charybdis of British public opinion, but it would be a pity if we failed to do just enough to give the Iraqis something of an escape route if they want to make use of one.



A D Parsons

20 August 1971

I attach below the files on Communist bloc penetration of Iraq. As you will see 4 Departments have still to comment on Mr Balfour Paul's memorandum. I suggest that we let these Departments see the files; I then draft a reply to Mr BP; and a meeting might then be held on the basis of the draft.

Veronica Beckett

23/8

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My own view is that the ideology (or, perhaps, the reflexes) of the Ba'athist leaders very largely rules out/rule out the possibility of our being able to transact much useful business with them.

2. But I do not think that we should wash our hands of Iraq. I believe that we should do all we can with our limited resources to preserve the goodwill which is felt towards this country and towards most things British by many educated Iraqis in the ranks of the upper and middle management of the country. I think we ought to do this for two reasons:

- i. to sustain the propensity of these people to make decisions, or recommendations, in our favour when they dare; and
- ii. invest against the day when the Ba'athists themselves could become better disposed towards us (I think it unrealistic to suppose that we shall ever again see an actively pro-Western regime in Iraq). In order to achieve this end, I think that we ought to concentrate on our cultural relations with Iraq. In my book, the more Iraqis who learn English (and, in the process, learn something about our way of life and our ways of thought) the better. The cultivation of our cultural relations with Iraq would have the added advantage of being less likely than other forms of activity to attract the hostility of the Ba'athist leaders. It is perhaps encouraging that President Bakr himself has sent his son to Cambridge.

3. I was very surprised to be told the other day that there are more students from Iraq in this country than from any other country in the Arab world. My informant was the Jordanian Ambassador.



4. I suggest that you might hold your meeting when all the Departments from which Miss Beckett has sought comments on Mr Balfour Paul's memorandum of 24 July have responded. I think it might be useful if Miss Beckett were to prepare a list of topics or questions to be discussed at the meeting. I doubt, however, whether it would be useful for her to draft a letter to Mr Balfour Paul before the meeting had taken place.

R. M. Evans

R M Evans

24 August 1971

I agree with Mr Evans's para 4. No great hurry but I should like to have a meeting within the next fortnight.

Mrs Beckett

AD

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BRITISH EMBASSY

BUDAPEST

3/30

*Mr. Hulse to see* 24 August 1971

J B Noss Esq  
East European and Soviet Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Dear John*

*the p.m.*

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
27 AUG 1971
NEQ 2/2

*Mr. Sheikli 1/1*  
*Mr. G. R. 2/9*  
*Arabic 2/9*  
*N. A. 2/9*  
*7.9 pm 2/9*

VISIT TO HUNGARY OF FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ

Abdel Karim al-Sheikli, Foreign Minister of Iraq, paid an official visit to Hungary from 15 - 19 August as the guest of the Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Péter. As an official news item previewing the visit pointed out, this was only the latest in a series of visits of Middle Eastern Foreign Ministers to Hungary this year. But it received perhaps slightly higher-level press coverage than some, possibly because the Iraqis fall at the approved end of the spectrum of different "levels of advancement" detected among the Arab states by Hungarian commentators.

2. The press article referred to above mentioned that Hungarian-Iraqi trade and technological exchanges had been flourishing since the signing of basic agreements in 1958 and that the volume of Hungarian exports to Iraq had doubled since 1966. Iraq delivers dates, cotton and leather to Hungary, but the two countries also co-operate on the supply of petroleum and it is probably here - as a non-COMECON supplier of basic materials - that the real value of Iraq as an ally to Hungary lies. The countries also run a scheme for the exchange of university students.

3. Al-Sheikli, who was accompanied by three officials of his own Ministry, began his talks with Janos Péter on the afternoon of 16 August and was received on the same day by Deputy Prime Minister Lajos Fehér, who may have some special responsibility for developing countries. On 17 August he was shown the petroleum plant at Szazhalombatta where Iraqi petroleum is processed, on 18 August he gave a dinner for Péter and on 19 August he was received by the President, Pál Losonczi, to whom he delivered a message from the Iraqi Prime Minister, before leaving Hungary finally for Stockholm.

4. In a statement to reporters at the airport Al-Sheikli expressed his gratitude to his Hungarian hosts in unusually effusive terms, which were to be reproduced in the final Communiqué. Both he and Péter referred to the importance of their countries' co-operation in the petroleum industry and Péter also attempted to claim that Al-Sheikli's visit had served not only the cause of better Hungarian-Iraqi relations but also the "averting of the danger of a world war". The Communiqué on the visit, a copy of which I enclose, is predictable in its references to Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian rights, Vietnam, and European Security and includes a less expected

/appeal

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appeal for the termination of the British presence "in any form" in the Arabian Gulf. Favourable opportunities are noted in all fields of bilateral relations, and not only Péter but also Fehér is invited to visit Iraq. Fehér has not been abroad for a while and it may be that this is an invitation he would like to take up fairly soon.

5. The UAR Counsellor commented to Robin Blair that there were some omissions from the Communiqué: no mention of the Security Council Resolution, because Iraq believes that the only solution is force, and no condemnation of the executions of Communists in the Sudan, because Iraq is persecuting her own communists. He was sure that the reference to British imperialism ("just as you are getting out") was put in by the Iraqis rather than the Hungarians. (We take it that it refers to the Gulf federation, regarded as a neo-colonialist extension of our presence.) As for the "reactionary imperialist manifestations directed against the . . . Palestine people", Kamal said that this could only be a reference to King Husain; and who were the Palestine people? He seemed to imply that the words were used to include the Jordanians as well, and the reference to "national self-determination" seems to support this interpretation.

*Yours ever,*  
*Alyson*

(Alyson J K Bailes)

c c Chancery, Baghdad  
Near Eastern Department, F C O  
Research Department (EES), F C O  
Information Research Department, F C O

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HUNGARIAN PRESS SUMMARY No.193

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NÉPEZETLAP, N. 197 of August 23, 1971

Monday, Aug. 23

Communiqué on the visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister.

At the invitation of János Peter, Foreign Minister, Abdel Karim al-Sheikhli, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq, paid an official visit to the Hungarian People's Republic between August 15 and 19, 1971.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister was received by Pál Losonczi, President of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, and Lajos Fehér, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers.

Janos Peter and Abdel Karim al-Sheikhli informed each other in a friendly atmosphere about the standpoints of their Governments concerning the more important international questions, and reviewed current questions of the relations between the two countries.

The two parties reviewed the Middle East situation which they regard as very grave on account of continued Israeli aggression. They demand that Israel withdraw without delay her troops from the Arab territories occupied by aggression. They support the struggle of the Palestine people for their legal and recognized rights of national self-determination. Their views agree that the Palestine resistance movement is the only legal representative of the Palestine people and that it constitutes an integral part of the Arab and international liberation movements. The two parties condemn the reactionary imperialist machinations directed against the restoration of the rights of the Palestine people and the safeguarding of their self-determination, and threatening the just struggle of the Arab peoples.

The two parties stand up for the termination of British imperialist presence in any form in the area of the Arabian Gulf. They support the struggle of the peoples of that area for their independence and freedom.

The Hungarian party received with recognition the information of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq on the development, results, and progressive domestic and anti-imperialist foreign policy of Iraq.

It was confirmed by the two parties that they would continue to support the fight of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos against American armed aggression, and that they support the efforts of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the south-Vietnamese provisional revolutionary government aimed at ensuring the withdrawal of the American troops from Indochina as soon as possible, and at creating peace in that area.

The two parties assure of their support the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their struggle against imperialism and racial discrimination.

The Iraqi party supports the efforts of the Hungarian People's Republic and other fraternal socialist countries aimed at the convocation of the European security conference, the consolidation of European security, disarmament, and the banning of nuclear weapons.

(overleaf)



HUNGARIAN PRESS SUMMARY No.193

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NEPSZABADSIG, No.197 of August 23, 1971

Monday, Aug.23

The two parties express their readiness to increase in international life and in the UN their cooperation for the consolidation of world peace resting on justice and right. They emphasize the necessity of the respect for the UN Charter, international law, and international agreements.

The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq expressed his thanks for the sincere and cordial reception accorded to him which had reflected the friendly relations between the two countries.

The negotiating parties declared with satisfaction that the relations between the two countries and the two peoples - on the soil of the joint struggle against imperialism - showed a many-sided and successful development.

Both parties see an opportunity for the strengthening of friendship and cooperation, for the expansion of technical, scientific and cultural relations, on the basis of mutual advantages. They attach exceptional importance to the cooperation which had developed and which was expanding in the petroleum industry.

The two parties emphasize the importance of high-level meetings between party and state leaders and of cooperation between the workers' and agricultural organizations. These contribute successfully to the consolidation of the friendly relations between the two countries.

Abdel Karim al-Sheikhli, member of the revolutionary commanding council, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq, invited Lajos Fehér, Deputy Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, and János Péter, Foreign Minister, to pay an official visit to Iraq; the invitation was accepted with thanks.

- - - -

Károly Szarka, permanent UN representative of Hungary, paid a visit to the Korean People's Democratic Republic - at the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Republic - between August 11 and 18.

He was received there by Pak Song Chol, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, and Ho Dam, Foreign Minister.

- - - -

Dr. Károly Szabó, the new Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic in Washington, who is shortly leaving for his post, has been received by Pál Losonczi, President of the Presidential Council, and Lajos Fehér, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers.

- - - -

Dr. Mohamed Zakaria Ismail, Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic to Hungary, left Budapest last Sunday.

- - - -



British Embassy

BAGHDAD

20 August 1971


Mr. Parsons  
Enter

Mr. Evans

R.E. 24/5/79 see %  
8

7/9

2/12 "S"

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
F C O§5 below is exceedingly  
gloomy, but I feel  
right.

Dear Richard,

## COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. In paragraph 3 of your letter NEQ 2/2 of 4 August you asked what I meant by "the point of no return" when I suggested that the Iraqi slither to Moscow might, in the absence of a stronger western counter-pull, soon pass it.

2. I did not conceive of this point as one at which (as you put it) Iraq could no longer pursue policies, at home or abroad, which were in any way unwelcome to the Soviet Union. I meant something distinctly short of that, better expressed by putting the relationship the other way round. Perhaps I could describe it as a degree of dependence on Soviet goodwill which would enable the Russians to exercise a veto, if they judged this needful, on Iraqi policies. For instance, they would be in a position to obstruct any attempt by the Iraqis to reverse the slither and climb back again to a position of non-alignment. Similarly they could silence any significant Iraqi opposition to Russia's own policies in the area. (I am not here thinking of Iraq's extremism on Palestine. No doubt they could silence that too, but they would not regard it as significant).

3. If these illustrations suggest that the Russians would only be able to impose their veto on Iraqi external policies, that is not my meaning. If they saw advantage in doing so, they could twist the Iraqi's arm on internal issues too; but, if I understand the Soviet Union's current attitudes to the third-world, this is not something they would wish, in the context of their wider and long-term aims, to be seen doing. ✓ Nor, as long as the external behaviour of a fairly unimportant third-world government like this one serves Russia's major purposes (or does not impede them), have the Russians any reason to worry unduly about its internal behaviour. It is surely in this light that we should view Soviet indifference to the fate of local CP's. They could insist on better treatment for them, but the game would not be worth the candle.

.../4



4. Current history in the Sudan (which, from what little I know, would appear to enjoy about the same degree of dependence on Russia as does Iraq) does not seem to me to contradict any of the above. For it seems to be thought unlikely, however much he might wish to do so, that Nimeiri will be able to throw off the Russian yoke without jeopardizing so much that his régime would probably founder. Even if he succeeds, the cases are not parallel. Nimeiri has the backing of powerful Arab friends. Iraq hasn't.

5. There is, I ought perhaps to make plain, an assumption underlying all this. This is that, when it came to the point, the Iraqis would prove pragmatic enough to realize that a Soviet veto could not be defied. This is not to say that they are alive to this hypothetical embarrassment now: they aren't, or at least they close their eyes to it. But (since its members know what would happen to them if it is overthrown) the present régime has a lively sense of its own self-interest; and if the crunch came and the consequences of defiance were spelt out to them, I believe they would toe the line rather than risk the collapse of their defence arrangements, export markets and development plans, not to mention the Kurdish peace.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to those who received yours, though I feel the issue is somewhat esoteric for so wide a distribution.

*Yours ever*

*Glen*

H G Balfour Paul

c.c. Chanceries:

AMMAN	JEDDA	TRIPOLI	BAHRAIN RESIDENCY	UKMIS,
BEIRUT	KUWAIT	ALGIERS	TEHRAN	PARIS
CAIRO	KHARTOUM	RABAT	MOSCOW	WASHINGTON

*Copies sent to Tel Aviv 30/9/71*



*Restricted*



With the compliments of  
**THE EASTERN EUROPEAN AND  
SOVIET DEPARTMENT**

NEED  
Yours for entry.  
(Please return to MR NOSS).  
Sylvia Coker  
ENPW

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**

S.W.1.

*27 August, 1971*



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22



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-6 SEP 1971

NEQ 2/2

BRITISH EMBASSY

BUDAPEST

27 August 1971

3/30

J B Noss Esq  
East European and Soviet Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Handwritten initials: S. H.*

*Dear John,*

VISIT TO HUNGARY OF IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER

(20)

As a footnote to my letter 3/30 of 24 August, you may like to know that the Ambassador was told the other day that the Iranian Government had taken great offence at the reference in the final communiqué on al-Sheikli's visit to the "Arabian Gulf" and that the Iranian Ambassador would probably be making representations to the Hungarians concerned to the effect that "Persian Gulf" was the only acceptable term. If, as the UAR Counsellor suggested (para 5 of my letter under reference), the whole section on the Gulf was inserted at the Iraqis' suggestion, the Hungarians must be kicking themselves now at the way they have blotted their copy-book with the Iranians.

*Yours ever,*  
*Alyson*  
(Alyson J K Bailes)

cc Near Eastern Department, F C O  
Chancery, Baghdad  
Chancery, Tehran (with copy of previous letter and enclosure)

*28.9 Arabian Dept  
pm 14. 7/9*

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-7 SEP 1971

23

Miss Beckett

## IRAQI MILITARY TRAINING IN UK

NEQ 2/2

In paragraph 2 of his minute of 20 August Mr Parsons asks what is the position about training courses for Iraqis.

2. MOD are providing them with most of the places they have asked for though some courses must remain barred for security reasons. FCO's biggest achievement was to persuade MOD to accept an IRAQI on the Army and RAF Staff Courses in 1972 in spite of security considerations. Places allocated to Iraqis are shown in the Annex to this minute: the courses in paragraph 4 are very expensive and I doubt whether Iraq will really try for them all.

3. In view of the fact that Iraq has asked for all this training without asking us to pay, I see no reason why we should increase our allocation of £4000 from our UKMTAS fund at this juncture. This sum more than covers the two Staff Course places which are being offered free.



T E POOLEY  
Defence Department

26 August 1971



ANNEX

MILITARY TRAINING FOR IRAQ

1. NAVY - There has been no training undertaken by Iraq with the Navy. MOD (NP1) did arrange for an attachment for a civilian, from the Iraqi Ports Administration, to their Salvage yard from April 1971 to August 1971.

2. ARMY -

- 1 Officer Army Staff Course 1972
- 2 cadets Sandhurst 51 (Sep 71 - July 73)
- 2 " " 52 (May 72 - Apr 74)
- 1 cadet Mons 49 (Sep 71 - Feb 72)
- 1 " " 51 (Mar 72 - Aug 72)
- 1 " " 52 (Jun 72 - Nov 72)
- 1 " " 53 (Sep 72 - Feb 73)
- 1 " " 54 (Dec 72 - May 73)
- 4 cadets Overseas English (Sep 71 - Feb 72)
- 2 " " " (Mar 72 - Aug 72)
- 12 officers Attachments to (Lt Cols) Army Units (18 Oct 71 - 27 Oct 71)
- 2 soldiers Bandmasters (1974-1 & 1975-1)
- 1 officer Regimental Signal Officer (Sep 71 - Dec 71)
- 2 officers Medical Supply Course (early 1972)
- 1 officer Observation of Fire Course (26 Sep 71 - 8 Oct 71)
- 2 officers Platoon Commanders (Jun 71 - Aug 71)

Iraq has also asked for a place on the Security, Staff Intelligence and Air Photo Reading courses at the Intelligence Centre. These are "Oversubscribed Courses" for which places will be allocated at a special MOD meeting in September.

3. AIR FORCE -

- 1 Officer 53 Mechanical Engineering at Cranwell (Apr 71 - Apr 72)
- 1 " 54 " " " " (Aug 71 - July 72)



1 officer	23 Electrical & Instrument at Cranwell	(Apr 71 - Apr 72)
2 officers	Qualified Helicopter Instructor	(starts Jan 72)
1 officer	RAF STAFF COURSE	(Oct 71 - Sep 72)
3 "	Personnel Selection Officers course	(Sep 71 - 2 weeks)

(This is part of an exercise that is assisting the Iraqis to set up an Aircrew Selection Centre. One of the officers is the Project Officer. 4 other officers are due to attend courses next year.)

2 "	Joint Air Traffic Control	(starts Jan 72)
2 "	" " " "	(starts Feb 72)

The 4 officers will attend Pre JATC English courses lasting 6 weeks.

4. The Iraqis have also made bids for the following courses:

Ab Initio Flying (20 places)

Qualified Flying Instructors

Pilot Attack Instructor (Security barred)

Navigator for Norman Islander aircraft  
(not likely to be offered as the Iraqis wish the Navigator to learn Survey Photography which is not taught by the RAF.)

The RAF say that these bids are only tentative ones and are likely to be changed by Iraq.

#### UKMTAS

Iraq has an allocation of £4,000 for 71/72 though none has yet been spent. In 70/71 we allocated £2,000 and spent it on pre-Sandhurst English training.



Miss Beckett

Reference

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
- 7 SEP 1971
NEW 2/1

(24)

I agree with Mr Parsons;  
commercially we are doing as well as  
can be expected. If and when the  
line of credit is agreed, our exports  
should benefit. Something may also  
come eventually of new enquiries for  
arms.

*John Bullen*

EPD 26/8



25

Defence Dept. Mr Porter, 2nd minute under 26/8

EPA minute under 27/8

FPA ID minute under 31/8

IA

Oil Dept 11/31/8

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. TO -7 SEP 1971 NEQ 2/2
--

Please see my minute of 9 August at folio 12, and Mr Parsons' minutes of 20 and 24 August at folio 19. I should be grateful if you could pass these pp quickly so that I can arrange a meeting as requested.

Beckett

25/8

I doubt if there is a great deal which FPA can contribute to this particular discussion. Both EPA's aid framework and the rough FCO guidelines for aid policy sketched out at the meeting of the FCO Aid Committee of 16 June (copy attached) leave the position flexible enough to accommodate some measure of technical assistance to Iraq if this were thought to be worth while.

W.H. Bullen  
31/8.

As regards sponsored visits from Iraq the position is clear. We have



have told Baghdad several times in the past year or so that we would be happy to accept Iraqis on official visits and on occasions we have made specific proposals for candidates, e.g. hospital and health administrators. So far, however, nothing has happened.

Last week Baghdad telegraphed to say that their plans for visits had been disorganised "by the accusations made against HMG and this Embassy and the accompanying expulsions in July", but that they hoped to make other proposals fairly shortly. We still have provision for 3 or 4 Iraqis in our sponsored Tours programme for the current financial year and I see no reason why we should not make similar provision in 1972/73.

W. Haywood  
31/8 IAD

I agree in general with the minutes by other Departments.

2 Whilst it is true that the IPC dispute



must be a major factor in the poor relations we have with Iraq, I think there is a (mistaken) tendency to assume that, once the major problem of Law 80 is solved, all will be sweetness and light. In fact no oil company can expect to be treated with much more than grudging tolerance in any "revolutionary" OPEC country — or indeed in many of the non-revolutionary ones.

3. Clearly a settlement of Law 80 would do something to improve our relations with Iraq; but I do not see how HMG can help, nor what the IPE can do. They have, in the past 18 months, made several conciliatory moves with the Iraqis, but all have been greeted with a massive lack of response. The October talks may do something to improve



the atmosphere, but their success depends entirely on Iraqi calculations of their own self-interest: if they conclude that they cannot sell North Kuwait oil next year without IPC help, then they may be prepared to reach a settlement acceptable to the IPC. Otherwise the problem will doubtless remain in being with the possibility that relations could even deteriorate if the talks on participation are conducted in an atmosphere of rivalry.

A. H. Haneh  
Oil Dept  
31/8.



FCC AID COMMITTEEAid Committee Meeting on 16 June 1971

1. The Chairman told the Aid Committee that he had heard from the ODA that they were recommending to Mr Richard Wood that he should advise the Secretary of State to agree to the proposal in the Chief Secretary's letter of 1 June (circulated under AC(71)9) that there should be "a fundamental look at the objectives of the aid programme." The resulting inter-departmental review would to a large extent subsume Mr King's letter of 3 June about the Aid Framework 1972/ 73 to 1975/ 76 (also circulated under AC(71)9). Mr Bottomley's meeting with Mr King on 23 June would presumably be concerned mainly with the problem of how to reconcile FCC/ODA views before embarking on inter-Departmental discussion.

2. In the discussion that followed, broad agreement was reached on the following points:

(1) General Aid Policy

(i) Aid for Richer Countries

We should be more ready to give, or to continue to give, aid to the "middle class" developing countries on soft enough terms to attract them. Such aid should not be given in cases when it would in effect only increase already adequate reserve holdings.

(ii) Need for Flexibility

ODA should be more flexible in their application of aid criteria, particularly in respect of politico - strategic considerations (eg para-military aid in support of internal security, or English language teaching in eg Cambodia). It was not so much a question of redrafting the criteria in the 1969-70 Guidelines as of changing the mix of the criteria.

(iii) Concentration of effort

In certain parts of the world capital aid should be concentrated on a few selected countries rather than scattered broadcast throughout the region (eg in the Middle East we should concentrate our capital aid on Jordan, Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic rather than distribute it in penny packets to countries including Morocco and Tunisia). But this should not exclude small amounts of aid (especially of technical assistance) for minor countries.



(iv) Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid

The present balance was about right. We should not allow the multilateral portion to rise very much more, because we got little credit for it in recipient countries. On the other hand we had to think of our international position (eg as a permanent member of the Security Council). Certain increases eg more UNDP Contributions were, therefore, appropriate.

(v) Aid and Private Investment

UK acceptance of the 1% GNP target was dependent upon a high level of private flows. For this and other reasons we should exploit to the full the new procedures for using aid directly to stimulate British investment in recipient countries.

(vi) Aid for Strategic Reasons

There were certain cases where it was desirable to give development aid for strategic reasons (eg Malta, Mauritius, Cyprus) either in order to preserve our access to existing defence facilities or to deny such facilities to eg the Russians.

(vii) Constant Prices

It was essential, in any discussion of "trends" over the years to distinguish between real increases (as measured at constant prices) and apparent increases (as measured in current cash prices).

(viii) Military Assistance

Requirements for directly military assistance, including military technical assistance eg after our withdrawal from the Gulf, should if possible be met from an ECO Vote separate from the aid programme. Only if the Secretary of State so decided should we regard them as candidates for the aid programme.

(ix) Technical Assistance

ODA should be pressed once more to provide a full country breakdown of technical assistance expenditure.

(2) Bilateral Aid

(x) Indian Sub-Continent

This was a very large element in our aid programme (though not on a per head of population basis).



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Changes, therefore, could have a significant effect on the make-up of the total programme. The need for external aid resources was and would continue to be very great. Our level of aid should at least be maintained in real terms (this must of course be subject to special factors in Pakistan at present). The question of how far the scale of debt repayments affected the net value of aid given was also of great importance here, as indeed elsewhere also.

(xi) Africa

Aid for Africa was still important and could pay useful political dividends. It should remain at about the present level in real terms, with the main emphasis continuing to be on Commonwealth Africa.

(xii) Latin America

This big gap in our aid programme could probably best be filled in future by the provision of capital aid on softer terms than hitherto offered to some of the more go-ahead countries. The possibility of aid as a means of facilitating private investment might be particularly relevant in this region.

(xiii) Dependent Territories

We should maintain the present arrangement whereby the reasonable needs of the territories were a first charge on the aid programme. The extent of their reasonable needs - both as to amounts and as to terms of aid - would need to be kept under constant review.

(xiv) Caribbean and Guyana

The level of aid proposed was acceptable.

*J W R Shakespeare*  
J W R Shakespeare  
(Secretary)

22 June 1971



FCO AID COMMITTEE

Distribution

AID COMMITTEE

Mr Bottomley  
Mr Turpin  
Mr Fingland  
Mr J A Ford  
Mr Hankey  
Mr Holland  
Mr Parsons  
Mr Smedley  
Mr D A Scott

Mr Wiggin  
Mr Wilford  
Mr Cradock  
Mr Keeble  
Mr Smallman  
Mr Marshall  
Mr Shakespeare  
Mr Ducker

For information

Mr Daunt  
Sir T Brimelow  
Sir S Crawford  
Mr Le Quesne  
Sir L Monson  
Sir C O'Neill  
Sir S Tomlinson  
Mr H O Wright  
Mr Cole  
Mr Gallagher  
Mr Reddaway  
Mr Rose  
Mr C P Scott  
Mr Foggon  
Mr A H Hughes  
Mr Lamb  
Mr Aspin


and to Heads of:

Atlantic and Indian Ocean Dept.  
Arabian Dept.  
Caribbean Dept.  
Central & South African Dept  
Cultural Relations Dept.  
Dependent Territories General Dept.  
East African Dept.  
European Integration Dept.  
Far Eastern Dept.  
Hong Kong Dept.  
Latin America Dept.  
Information Administration Dept.  
Near Eastern Dept.  
North African Dept.  
North America Dept.  
Pacific Dependent Territories Dept.  
Science & Technology Dept.  
South Asian Dept.  
South European Dept.  
South West Pacific Dept.  
UN (E&S) Dept.  
West African Dept.  
West Indian Dept.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Confidential.



Mr Egerton ✓

Mr Parsons ✓

Good: let's proceed accordingly.

Miss Beckett

AD! 8/9

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

Flag A (Mr Balfour Paul's memorandum of 24 July)

1. Mr Parsons wishes to hold a meeting to discuss this subject on Friday 17 September at 3pm. If you agree, I shall arrange for the attached minute to be circulated to the Heads of those Departments with an interest in this question. Comments already received from these Departments are at folios 9, W12, 13, 16, 17, 23, 24, and 25 on the attached file (NEQ 2/2). You may also like to see Mr Balfour Paul's letter of 20 August (folio 21).

Flag L

Veronica Beckett

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

7 September 1971

Enc

Thanks. Mr Evans shd see Mr Balfour Paul's letter of 20/8 at 7/21 p/r, & Mr Parsons may be interested in § 5 of it. I fear Mr Balfour Paul's gloomy judgment in this is right.

Minute despatched BU 14/9<sup>noted</sup> 9/9 St. Egerton 7/9



RECEIVED IN

IRY No. 10

SEP 1971

EQ 2/2

RESTRICTED (27)  
CONFIDENTIAL

Lord Bridges

Ent. and p. a

ATR

7/9

## COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. Your note on Near Eastern Department's minute of 8 September below.
2. Neither Mr Braithwaite nor I have seen the memorandum of 24 July referred to in Near Eastern Department's minute, but Mr Ramsay saw Mr Balfour Paul's despatch last month and minuted briefly on it to Miss Beckett.
3. The gist of Mr Ramsay's minute was that there was nothing NATO could do for obvious reasons to counter Soviet penetration of Iraq although it was agreed that this was desirable. Iraq was of course outside the NATO area, and in brief any plans or action by NATO were a non-starter.
4. With regard to the question in paragraph 2(d) of the minute as to whether discussions on Iraq with selected Western European countries would be of any value, I would say that although WED might see advantage in bilateral discussions there would be little or nothing to be gained from raising the subject in the WEU. Iraq is not amongst the subjects remitted by Ministers to the Permanent Council, and in order to raise it in the Council we would have to invoke the "urgency procedure" with all its cumbersomeness and special clearance with the Quay d'Orsay. This subject is neither urgent nor important enough to us to expend our limited credit in this way. We have invoked the "urgency procedure" once this year over Uganda and the Belgians have invoked it in respect of the Sudan for the next meeting of the Council on 15 September.



N A I French  
Western Organisations Dept

9 September 1971

We have a marginal interest in 2(d). On the NATO side, analysis of developments already takes place in the meetings of Middle Eastern experts, but this is not likely to lead to any plan for



for action by NATO countries - nor  
would that be desirable.

I rather think we ought to  
be represented. Could you discuss with  
Mr French please?

Bondje  
10/9

Mr Ramsay.

I have seen Mr French. I'd  
be happy to go.

A Ramsay  
10/9

I cd not, in the event, go to the  
meeting

A Ramsay



Mr Brightman to  
Mr Ramsey.

---

Have you seen  
the memoranda  
referred to?

It is a bit  
outside the area,  
isn't it?

B 8/9.

Discussion in WTEU?

Mr French

I think not.  
Wrote to Lord

Ridge 11 9/9



CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Bullard, EESD  
Mr Acland, Arabian Dept  
Mr James, WED  
Lord Bridges, WOD ✓  
Mr Craig, NAFD  
Mr Stewart, CRD  
Mr Tesh, Defence Dept  
Mr West, EPD  
Mr Marshall, FPAD  
Mr Moore, IAD  
Mr Ellingworth, Oil Dept  
Mr Evans, o/r

Separate copies

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. Copies of HM Ambassador at Baghdad's Despatch NEQ 1/2 of 17 June 1971 on Iraqi Ba'athism, and of his memorandum of 24 July 1971 on Communist Bloc penetration of Iraq, have already been circulated to your Department for comments.

2. Mr Parsons now wishes to hold a meeting on Friday 17 September in Room 38 DSW, to consider the latter question further and to agree ~~on~~ the lines of a reply to Mr Balfour Paul's memorandum.

3. In the light of minutes already submitted by Departments, Mr Parsons has agreed that the following questions should be discussed:

- a. Soviet intentions in Iraq Have the Russians taken a policy decision, on strategic and/or political grounds, to increase their influence over the present or any foreseeable Iraqi Baathist régime? Is the Communist Bloc likely to take greater interest in Iraq eg after recent events in Sudan?
- b. Does increased Communist Bloc penetration of Iraq matter to HMG? What are HMG's interests in Iraq?
- c. Can HMG do anything to counter Communist Bloc penetration of Iraq? Could we, and if so should we be more forthcoming in any of the following fields :-

Cultural relations  
Arms supplies  
Military training  
Export policy  
Credit policy



CONFIDENTIAL

Aid

Technical assistance


Sponsored visits

Ministerial visits

Oil

- d. Would discussions on Iraq with selected Western European countries be of any value?

4. I should be grateful if you would kindly inform Miss Beckett, Main B extension 1024, whether you will be able to attend Mr Parsons' meeting, or whether you will send a representative.

  
S L Egerton  
Near Eastern Department

8 September 1971

Copy to : Mr Parsons



RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
24 SEP 1971

Mr Parsons *AS 17/9*

NEQ 2/2

Copies to : Mr Evans, Mr Egerton

# COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. The following will attend your meeting on Friday 17 September at 3.00 pm :

Mr Hulse	EESD
Mr Egerton	Arabian Dept
<del>Mr Unwin</del>	<del>WED</del>
Mr Ramsay	WOD
Mr Shawyer	CRD
Mr Pooley	Defence Dept
Mr Willson	EPD
Mr Cook	ODA (a member of FPAD may also come)
Mr Tunnell	Oil Dept
Mr Evans	NED
Miss Beckett	NED

Neither North African Department nor Information Administration Department have anything to add to their earlier minutes (copies attached). These Departments will not therefore be represented unless you think it essential.

2. I think it might be a good idea to ask the Head of the Soviet Section of Research Department, Mr Murrell. I wonder if you agree.

3. I should be grateful to know whether there are any points you would like to discuss before the meeting takes place.

*Veronica Beckett*

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

15 September 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

*pk 29/9*



Min. Beckett

Events in the UAR and Sudan have shown, very encouragingly, that there are definite limits on Russian influence in the Arab world and I'm sure that even in apparently hopeless cases such as Iraq, we should aim to provide the Western life-line which Mr B-P tells about.

You are obviously making great efforts to extend our contacts with Iraq, and I can only suggest that ~~you~~ we keep hammering away. There does seem to be some scope for an increase in the T.A. programme. £25,000 is very little compared with over £250,000 which we spend in the Sudan.

John Green  
NHG 12/18

/Emr.



Defence Dept. Mr Potter, sub minute under 26/8

EPA minute under 27/8

FPA D minute below 28/8

IA

Oil Dept 18/31/8

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-7 SEP 1971
NEQ 2/2

25

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25/8

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Colt. Bullen

21/8

IA

As regards sponsored visits from Iraq, the position is clear. We have



have told Baghdad several times in the past year or so that we would be happy to accept Iraqis on official visits and on occasions we have made specific proposals for candidates, e.g. hospital and health administrators. So far, however, nothing has happened.

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W. Haywood  
31/8 IAD

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2 Whilst it is true that the IPC dispute



Mr Bullard, EESD  
Mr Acland, Arabian Dept  
Mr James, WED  
Lord Bridges, WOD  
Mr Craig, NAFD  
Mr Stewart, CRD  
Mr Tesh, Defence Dept  
Mr West, EPD  
Mr Marshall, FPAD  
Mr Moore, IAD  
Mr Ellingworth, Oil Dept  
Mr Evans, o/r

Separate copies

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Military training  
Export policy  
Credit policy



Aid

Technical assistance


Sponsored visits

Ministerial visits

Oil

- d. Would discussions on Iraq with selected Western European countries be of any value?

4. I should be grateful if you would kindly inform Miss Beckett, Main B extension 1024, whether you will be able to attend Mr Parsons' meeting, or whether you will send a representative.



S L Egerton  
Near Eastern Department

8 September 1971

Copy to : Mr Parsons ✓





VB

REC  
REGIS

20

N

With the compliments of  
**WESTERN ORGANISATIONS**  
**DEPARTMENT**

*NEG to enter.*

**FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,**  
**LONDON, S.W.1.**

**197**



RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 18
30 SEP 1971
NEQ 2/2

(29)

Mr Bullard, EESD  
 Mr Acland, Arabian Dept  
 Mr James, WED  
 Lord Bridges, WOD  
 Mr Craig, NAFD  
 Mr Stewart, CRD  
 Mr Tesh, Defence Dept  
 Mr West, EPD  
 Mr Marshall, FPAD  
 Mr Moore, IAD  
 Mr Ellingworth, Oil Dept  
 Mr Evans, o/r ✓

Miss Beckett.  
 Lwe.

Separate copies

R.E. 17/9.

#### COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

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Lat 3, sm  
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Aid  
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S L Egerton  
Near Eastern Department

8 September 1971

Copy to : Mr Parsons  
Mr Cook (ODA Room E745)



30

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COVERING TOP SECRET

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 30 SEP 1971
NEQ 2/2

Mr Egerton ✓

Mr Evans ✓

Mr Parsons ✓

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

Flag A

1. I submit a draft reply to Mr Balfour Paul's memorandum of 24 July, which reflects the views expressed both at Mr Parsons' meeting on 17 September and in previous minuting. The draft has been cleared with EESD, Defence Department, Cultural Relations Department, Export Promotion Department, Oil Department, and the ODA.

*Veronica Beckett*

Veronica Beckett

Near Eastern Department

23 September 1971

*St Egerton*

24/9

1. Miss Beckett has put a great deal of work into this exercise. I think her draft letter to Mr Balfour Paul quite admirable and

/have...

CONFIDENTIAL  
COVERING TOP SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL  
COVERING TOP SECRET

have told her so.

2. The next Confidential bag for Baghdad leaves on Thursday,  
30 September. I imagine that you would like to catch it if you can.

R. M. Evans

R M Evans  
Near Eastern Department

24 September 1971

I too congratulate this basket : a  
first class draft: Could you  
please sign it on my behalf.

Ad  
24  
9

Mr Evans





Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

31

30 September 1971

His Excellency  
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG  
Baghdad

#### COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. As Richard Evans said in his letter to you of 4 August, we have been thinking very carefully about the points raised in your most interesting letter and Memorandum of 24 July. This reply sets out the collective views of all concerned.

#### Soviet Bloc activities and intentions

2. On this general question, we agree with you that all the evidence suggests that the Bloc - and the Russians in particular - have decided to devote increased attention to Iraq. The Russians have probably concluded that they should make the most of their chances and build up their position there, while hoping to avoid if possible the mistakes they have made in some other "third world" countries by becoming too dependent on one man. They may see the prospects in Iraq as better than elsewhere in the Arab world because of Iraq's relative isolation from the mainstream of Arab politics; because Iraq (in contrast to Egypt) does not live at a high level of tension with Israel; and because Iraq is apparently set on a fairly steady anti-Western course. The Russians may politically see Iraq in the longer term as an alternative power base in case Egypt turns sour on them, no doubt after some sort of accommodation with Israel over Sinai. Finally, the Russians must set store on their relations with Iraq in the context of its position at the head of the "warm waters" of the Gulf.

3. This said, we question whether the dangers of the situation are quite as great, at least in the short term, as you imply both in your Memorandum and in your letter to Evans of 20 August. Iraq is after all still very far from being a satellite. The Russians are not working through a Communist party, but through a political party most of whose aims and ideals are entirely alien to those of Communism or of individual members of the Bloc. The Russians may be able to ensure a certain degree of Iraqi dependence by providing arms and soft loans; but they are not yet in a position to exercise a veto on any particular Iraqi policy. After their experiences in both Egypt and Sudan, they will be careful not to over-commit themselves; and they must realise that it is no easy task to exert decisive influence on Iraqi policies. Nothing suggests that they regard the present or any foreseeable Iraqi regime as reliable. We expect cautious

pull 1/16





opportunism to be the guiding principle of Soviet policy, unless the Russians suddenly feel impelled by developments elsewhere in the Arab world, or in Iraq itself, to protect their existing stake. You will remember that the conclusions of the JIC paper on Soviet Involvement in Iraq of 29 April (JIC(A)(71)(N)77) were along these general lines. Seen from here, these judgments remain valid. We wonder, however, whether you think there is a case for re-examining them.

4. So much for Soviet attitudes. What of our own? Do events and developments in Iraq matter to us? To this the answer is unequivocally yes. We have considerable interests in Iraq. First, there is oil. We must do what we can to ensure that Iraqi oil reaches the West without interruption; and we have responsibilities towards IPC, a British registered company, which we should as far as possible protect against harassment. Then we would not wish to see Iraq fall completely under the indirect domination or exclusive influence of a hostile power, thus depriving us of any opportunity - however small - to influence the Iraq Government over their activities in Kuwait or the Gulf. The same applies, although to a lesser degree, in the context of the Arab/Israel dispute. We do not, therefore want (nor can we afford) to wash our hands of Iraq. We may not like the present regime. But it seems they are there to stay. We must therefore make the best of the situation and, in particular, do what we can to prevent any increase in the present degree of their hostility towards the West.

5. We should also do all we can with our limited resources to preserve the goodwill which is felt towards this country and towards most things British by many educated Iraqis in the ranks of the upper and middle management of the country. There are two reasons why we should do this. First, we should aim to sustain the propensity of these people to make decisions or recommendations in our favour when they dare. Secondly, we should do so to invest against the day when the Ba'athists themselves might become better disposed towards us (although we think it unrealistic to suppose that we shall ever see in the measurable future an actively pro-Western regime in Iraq).

6. Against this background, we have considered what we might do to improve our links with the Iraqi regime. An effort on the Bloc scale is obviously out of the question for us. We do not have resources to mount an operation which could compete. But the following is an analysis of the possibilities open to us.

#### (i) Arms Sales

Arms sales to Iraq must be considered in the context of our relations with both Iran and Kuwait. We cannot therefore afford a major arms sales drive to Iraq. But we have, I think, been reasonably forthcoming about arms sales to Iraq. The Iraqis have made numerous enquiries, for most of which we have given political approval (e g for Sea King helicopters, Vosper





Thorneycroft patrol boats and training jets). Our most up to date listing of Iraqi enquiries which we have turned down is at Annex A. Only two orders (for 3 Ground Controlled interception Simulators and 3 Islander Aircraft) have been forthcoming. The Iraqis may find our prices and credit terms unattractive, but we do not discriminate against them except occasionally on security grounds, and there they are in the same boat as dozens of other countries. We shall continue to meet their requests wherever possible.

(ii) Military training

Our understanding is that although the equipment of the Iraqi armed forces is mainly Bloc-supplied, their organisation still remains largely along British lines. We think this link should be preserved as long as possible and therefore attach importance to providing Iraqis with training places. The list below shows that we have been more than reasonably forthcoming, even if, as you say in paragraph A6 of your Memorandum, the Iraqis are dissatisfied with what we can offer them:

a. Naval Training

No naval training has been asked for by Iraq. The Ministry of Defence did arrange for an attachment for a civilian from the Iraqi Ports Administration to their salvage yard from April to August 1971.

b. Army Training

The Army training places allocated to Iraq and attachments are listed in Annex B. As you know Iraqis have of late been excluded from Staff courses on security grounds, but we have now persuaded the Ministry of Defence to accept an Iraqi at Camberley in 1972. It is doubtful whether places will be available in 1973 and 1974; but we can take this up again with the Ministry of Defence in due course and we doubt if the present nil forecast for 1973 and 1974 is final. As regards places at Sandhurst and Mons, which we regard as second only in importance to Camberley, the figures for overseas cadets (bids in brackets, allocations open) are:

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
<u>Sandhurst overall</u>	(70) 35	(75) 48	(104) 41
Iraq	(6) 2	(4) 3	(10) 2
<u>Mons overall</u>	(154) 75	(146) 80	(182) 80
Iraq	(10) 4	(3) 3	(20) 4

These figures may help in explaining to the Iraqis how oversubscribed these courses are.

c. Air Force Training

The Air Force training bids and places allocated are listed





in Annex C. As in the case of the Army we have obtained a place for an Iraqi at RAF Staff College Bracknell in 1972, but we cannot guarantee a regular place.

Thus, whatever the Iraqis themselves may think, they have in fact had a proportionately large slice of the cake. They have been treated at least as well as our other Arab customers and better than the North African countries. In 1970/71 we allocated £2,000 from our Military Training Assistance Scheme fund for Iraqi training, which was spent on pre-Sandhurst English language courses. This year we doubled the allocation, which we understand will also be spent on English Language courses. We shall continue to look carefully at Iraqi applications for places and to give them as favourable treatment as possible.

### (iii) Culture

This again is a sphere to which we attach great importance and in which we think our record is not bad. We have heard from various sources, and have no reason to doubt, that there are more students from Iraq in this country than from any other Arab country. Unfortunately, the exact figures are not available; many of the students are here on oil scholarships or privately funded - like President Bakr's son (who by the way appears to have improved his performance recently at the Bell School at Cambridge). The British Council figure for Iraqi students during 1970 is 700, but of course they do not process by any means every student coming to this country. The British Council have written to their Representative, asking him to obtain in good time details of the British university staff needed by the Iraqis so that some can be recruited for the academic year beginning September 1972. They also promote exchanges (these have been particularly successful recently in the medical field) and links with university faculties over here. As you know, it is hoped to arrange collaboration between Baghdad University and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, though with all the upheavals at the former, progress has been slow. The Professor of Semitic Studies at Cardiff is already a Visiting Professor at the University of Mosul. The Council have also been informed by their Representative that the Iraqis are interested in forming other links and they are awaiting further details. The English Language Teaching Institute seems to be going ahead well, after an unavoidable delay caused by the resignation of the Minister with whom you negotiated the agreement. The only point on which we have failed is the question of "cultural manifestations". The cancellation of the "Hamlet" production was most regrettable, but we hope it will be possible to provide an alternative manifestation in the fairly near future.

### (iv) Commerce

Here it is disappointing to notice that there has been a slight decline in the value of British exports. We wonder whether there is any scope for an increased information effort on the commercial side. Perhaps, too, you might like to suggest names of influential





businessmen for a visit sponsored by Information Administration Department, since there may be some hold-up due to lack of funds for DTI visitors.

On the line of credit, we hope that the present negotiations will be successfully concluded. As you know, discussions about the interest rate for export credit cover are continuing here and we shall keep you informed of developments.

(v) Oil

We should, of course, like to see the IPC settle their problem over Law 80 with the Iraqis and recognise that this could make a contribution to better bilateral relations generally, as well as reducing the area of opportunity for Soviet penetration. But it would be unrealistic to suppose that we could or should press the IPC to take a softer line with the Iraqis, or that a more forthcoming posture by the Company would lead to anything other than further Iraqi demands. Frankly, I can see little hope of improvement in this sphere. It is really depressing that, after all the concessions made by the IPC over prices etc in recent months, their refusal to meet Iraqi demands for capacity utilisation of the pipeline and/or yet another loan should be met by Ammash's petulant cancellation of the talks planned for next month. These bilateral oil problems may be further exacerbated by the participation issue, in which Iraq appears to be on the side of the hawks.

We have taken up again with IPC the question of their reluctance to let British exporters conclude contracts with Iraqi institutions which might increase INOC's potential to exploit Rumaila or other expropriated oil, but so far with no success.

(vi) Aid

As you know, Iraq does not qualify for capital aid as her per capita national income is too high. There is at present no prospect of any change in this position.

(vii) Technical Assistance

We think this is an area where our effort might be increased and agree in general with the views put forward by MacRae in his letter of 26 July to Cook in the ODA. We have discussed this with Cook, who has agreed to look again at the ODA programme which might be adopted, e g export-orientated assistance (see iv above). To this end, we wonder whether it might be worthwhile asking DEVDIV to send a team out to Baghdad to see if any useful projects could be identified. We should be grateful for your views. We should also like to know whether you think the time has yet come for a review of the ODA policy of not providing exports on long contracts for Iraq.

(viii) Visitors

We do not think that the time is propitious for a Ministerial visit either way. The proposal for a visit by the Iraqi Minister





of Education was a casualty and we doubt whether any of our own Ministers would be willing to go to visit Baghdad officially at present. We shall, however, bear both these possibilities in mind. On the other hand, we do think that the sponsored (inward) visits programme for Iraq might be stepped up. As you know, Information Administration Department would be happy to accept Iraqis on official visits and look forward to having proposals from you in the fairly near future. We realise that there may have been some disinclination in the past either for you to recommend or for us to accept active Baath Party members on such visits. But if we are to cut any ice with the regime we think that, subject to your views, we shall have to make a real effort to cultivate middle rank Baathists on the way up from now on. Are there for instance any Mutasarrifs or Under-Secretaries in any of the Ministries who might be suitable candidates this winter, or for the spring/summer season?

7. You talked in your Memorandum about the possibility of establishing a "stronger Western lifeline" for Iraq. We have considered whether we should promote discussions on Iraq with other European countries. We have concluded that, although it would be unwise to suggest discussions in NATO (over and above the normal exchanges in the six monthly meeting of NATO "Middle East experts") we might take a suitable opportunity to exchange views on Iraq in talks with either the French or the Germans. We shall also bear in mind the possibility of raising Iraq at the Permanent Representatives' Council of the WEU, which meets fortnightly in London at Ambassadorial level. We do not, however, hold out much hope of achieving anything concrete by such discussions, which (on past experience) quickly degenerate into "gloom groups".

8. To sum up, therefore, we should like to increase our modest effort in Iraq, but not, as you say, at the cost of a dramatic change in our Middle East priorities. We think the most promising areas of activity are likely to be culture (in particular English Language teaching), commerce, sponsored visits, and military training.

9. We wonder what you think about all this and look forward to having your comments when you have had time to think things over. I apologise for the length of this letter, but hope that you will take it at the same time as an index of our interest in a fascinating, if maddening, country.

A D Parsons

P.S. Richard Evans will be signing on my behalf as I shall be on the way to New York for a week before the letter has been typed in





form. Not often that I write at such length but we really have had an exhaustive run through all aspects of our relations with Iraq.

Copied to:

Chanceries:

Amman  
 Beirut + DevDiv  
 Cairo  
 Jedda  
 Kuwait  
 Khartoum  
 Tripoli  
 Algiers  
 Rabat  
 Bahrain Resy  
 Tehran  
 Moscow  
 Paris  
 Washington  
 UKMis New York  
 Tel Aviv (with copy of Memorandum and Mr Balfour Paul's letter of 20 August)

[ EESD  
 Arabian D  
 N African D  
 WED  
 WOD  
 CRD  
 Defence D  
 EPD  
 FPAD  
 IAD  
 Oil D  
 Assessment Staff]

MR. N. REODAWAY  
 G.I.P.D. (Balfour)  
 RESEARCH (Rundle)  
 I.R.D. (Miss Thomas)





Military Equipment we have refused to Supply and Why

Armour Piercing Weapons

Conical Charges

Anti-Personnel Mines:

Fragmentation

Booby-Trap

Plastic

Flame Throwers and Cartridges

Accurate Snipers' Rifles:

Semi Automatic with Telescopic  
Sights

Cymbeline

Jaguar

2 B298 Ground  
Surveillance Radar

PRC 320

MOD objection

MOD Operational Objection

Political and Security  
objection to sale before  
1975

Demonstrated in Lebanon  
and seen by Iraqis.  
Operational objection  
to sale before 1973/74

Demonstration authorised,  
but operational objection  
to sale at this time



## ANNEX B



## IRAQI ARMY TRAINING IN UK: 1970-1972

		From	To
1 English Language	OE 16	8. 1. 70	5. 6. 70
1 Plat. Cmdrs Battle	No 7	31. 3. 70	7. 6. 70
7 Offrs & SNCOs	No 85	9. 4. 70	29. 4. 70
1 " " "	No 86	cancelled by Iraq	
1 ASE	No 17	7.70 cancelled by Iraq	
1 English Language	OE 17	9. 9. 70	19. 2.71
1 English	OE 18	10. 3. 71	10. 8.71
1 Army Cmdrs Battle	No 11	13. 6. 71	23. 7.71
2 Plat. Cmdrs Battle	No 11	13. 6. 71	22. 8.71
4 English Language	OE 19	6. 9. 71	6. 2.72
1 Regtl. Signal Offrs.	No 9	20. 9. 71	10.12.71
2 cadets Overseas English		Mar 72	Aug 72
2 soldiers Bandmasters		1974-1	& 1975-1
2 officers Medical Supply Course		early 1972	
1 officer Observation of Fire Course		26.9.71	8.10.71

Iraq has also asked for a place on the Security, Staff Intelligence and Air Photo Reading courses at the Intelligence Centre. These are "Oversubscribed Courses" for which places will be allocated at a special MOD meeting in October 1971.

## ATTACHMENTS

1 Depot Para. Regt	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 HQ REME 3 Div.	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 HQ RA 3 Div. SLR	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 3 Med. Rgt. RA	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 HQ Engineering Bde	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 12 Light Rgt. RA	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 3 Divn. HQ Signal Rgt.	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 Lt. Col. HQ Airportable Bde	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 Lt. Col. HQ 3 Divn. RA	18.10.71	27.10.71



## ANNEX C

IRAQ AIR FORCE TRAINING IN UK 1970-721970 - FLYING

<u>Bid or Enquiry</u>	<u>Detail</u>	<u>Result</u>
B	2 places on QHI Course	Places allocated and taken up
B	1 place on Navigation Course	Place allocated and taken up. Student subsequently recommended for suspension and withdrawn
B	1 place on Navigation Course	Place allocated and taken up

1971 - FLYING

B	1 place on IRE (Hunter) Course	Place allocated but bid subsequently changed to multi-engined.
B	2 places on IRE (Multi-engined) course	No such course. Possible alternatives put to IAF Director of Training and reply awaited
B	2 places on specialist "Survey Navigation" course	No suitable RAF Course available. Being advised of civilian firm who can provide suitable course

1972 - FLYING

B	2 places on QHI Course	Places allocated and nominations received
B	20 places on ab-initio pilot courses	To await allocations of available F and C slots for 1972
B	4 places on "CFS" course	IAF asked to clarify whether for QFI or QHI and on what type of aircraft
B	2 places on PAI Course	IAF advised no places available in foreseeable future.





### 1970 - GROUND COURSES

<u>Bid or Enquiry</u>	<u>Details</u>	<u>Result</u>
B	1 place on Diploma in Aviation Medicine Course	Allocated and taken up. Various post-course attachments arranged.
B	2 places on Supply Officers Course	Places offered but declined (no reason given)
B	Attachment for MO to CME	Agreed and took place
B	IAF authorities bid for 2 places at Staff College	Iraq not included among countries invited to bid (on security grounds) and nothing further heard
B	4-10 places on ATC course	No places available. 1971 position to be reviewed. Subsequently 2 places allocated but only 1 student acceptable after aptitude testing.

### 1971 - GROUND COURSES

B	2 places on Overseas Officers Mech Eng Course	Places allocated and taken up
	1 place on O'seas Officers E and I Course	Places allocated and taken up
	1 place on O'seas Officers Armament Course	Place allocated, but not taken up because no Iraqi student educationally acceptable
E	6 places on 8 week refresher courses for Technical Officers	No such courses run by RAF
E	6 enquiries addressed in Jan 1971 to ODR by Iraqi Attache in London	Answers in brief for Secretary of State
	a. QFI Course	No places available in 1971 - further details needed
	b. RAF Staff College	Iraq invited to bid
	c. Flight Engineer Course	Places available. Subsequently discovered that this was wrong description for technical officer courses already provided





1971 - GROUND COURSES (CONTD)

<u>Bid or Enquiry</u>	<u>Details</u>	<u>Result</u>
E	d. Instrument Rating Examiner	Could be done given sufficient notice
	e. Fighter Controller Course	No vacancies until 1973
	f. Operational Conversion Course	Assuming this is for the Hunter, no places available
E	3 enquiries addressed in March 1971 to British Air Attache in Baghdad	
	a. 3 Fighter Controllers to be trained and categorised as examiners	No formal course for categorising examiners. Offered briefing in UK by MOD C & R Evaluation Team or visit to Iraq by Cat. Team
	b. 1 place on a "senior Officers staff course" for a Colonel considered too senior for Staff College	No suitable courses available within allowable security levels
	c. Visits required for 4 IAF officers to attend major air exercises as observers	Handled by FLS. No visits possible within allowable security levels.
B	1 place on Photo Interpretation Course	Place allocated. Student arrived in UK too late after course state date for acceptance
E	Details of bandmaster training courses requested	Given, and now a place is being negotiated for a course at the RAF School of Music
B	7 places on Personnel Selection Officers Courses	7 places offered. 3 taken up so far
B	2 places on Supply Officers Course	No places available in 1971 - to be notified later re 1972
B	32 places on ATC Courses to be filled as and when possible	4 places offered in 1971
B	2 places on Staff College Crse	1 place allocated. Nomination still awaited
B	3 places on Fighter Control course in connection with Solartron sale	2 places allocated and third under review



NEI

Reference

Mr Ramsey  
Lord Bridges ✓

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 13 OCT 1971 NEQ 2/2
--

Enla and P?

ATR

12/10

32

Communist Plot Substitution of Iraq

Enla.

Your minute of 30 September

I am afraid I was unable to attend the meeting. Having called at the last minute to the Cabinet Office to discuss a draft telegram on the Revision of the NATO Alert System.

2. I did however make the following point to Mrs Backhouse of the Eastern Dept and asked her to put them to the meeting.

- a. Iraq is outside the NATO area
- b. Any concerted NATO action was therefore difficult to envisage even if it was desirable (which is doubtful as it would most certainly give rise to the usual Scandinavian objections and might cause quite



figure to the Greeks and Turks who  
is justly claim that charity should begin  
at home)

- c. I was doubtful if a concerted NATO  
effort, whatever form it might take,  
would be acceptable to the League, but  
NATO would have no objection to  
individual members of the Alliance  
doing what they could to in an effort  
to counter Communist subversion in  
Iraq

Ramsay

I think it suits us quite  
well that the NATO angle has  
dropped out.

B.

12/11



UNCLASSIFIED



BRITISH EMBASSY


BAGHDAD

33

EPH

18 October, 1971.

Miss V. E. Beckett,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.,  
London.



*Dear Veronica*

VISIT OF G.D.R. DEFENCE MINISTER 7

As forecast in Berlin telegram no. 404 of 14 October to Bonn, General Hoffman arrived here on 14 October for a five day visit. Neither the numbers nor the composition of the delegation accompanying him have been released yet.

2. We have no information on what they did on 14 or 15 October. On Saturday 16 October he called on President Bakr and Saddam Husain, the Vice-Chairman of the R.C.C., accompanied in each case by General Shehab, the Minister of Defence. He also visited the Military College here. In the evening, the Minister of Youth, Hamid al-Jebouri, who is also Chairman of the Iraqi-G.D.R. Friendship Association, gave a dinner for the visitors. There were the usual affirmations of solidarity in the anti-imperialist struggle and General Hoffman recalled that Iraq had been the first non-communist country to extend diplomatic recognition to the G.D.R.

3. On Sunday 17 the General and his delegation visited Basra where they were received by the Governor. They also visited the Iraqi Naval Force and Shore Defence Headquarters, and were later taken on a tour of archaeological sites.

4. General Hoffman is due to hold a press conference later this evening.


*Yours ever  
Ian*

D. I. Lewty

c.c. Chanceries at  
Bonn, Berlin, Cairo, Moscow

UNCLASSIFIED





CONFIDENTIAL



A most useful letter. (34)  
Miss Beckett. Pl. Consider  
the wider distribution point (last para)  
British Embassy  
+ start action as discussed today with  
BAGHDAD Mr Evans. of 9/11  
28 October 1971

3/4 Pl. speak.  
A D Parsons Esq CMG MVO MC  
FCO

R.E. 4/11.

Dear Tony,

Mr Evans minutes in due  
Miss Beckett come. ASI 9/11  
(31)

COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. I am most grateful for your letter of 30 September on this subject and for the time and trouble taken by all concerned to comment in depth on my letter and memorandum of 24 July. This letter sets out our reactions in general terms. Individual points and suggestions are being followed-up in greater detail separately. (6)

2. Paragraph 3. I agree that Iraq is by no means a satellite yet, but I find the grounds for reassurance in the second sentence not wholly reassuring. Certainly the Russians are not working through a communist party; but surely the most significant change that has come over Soviet policies towards the Third World in recent years is that they now see positive advantage at this stage in not doing so. At least as far as Iraq is concerned, whatever the régime's aims and ideals, its procedures bear an increasingly striking resemblance to those of bloc governments, its behaviour (save perhaps in relations to Palestine and Iran) suits Soviet interests well enough; and the purpose of the Novikov mission in June, as we read it, was to confirm Russian readiness to work with and through the Ba'ath (with scant regard for the fortunes, at this point in history, of local communists). In short, they do not try to dictate policy to the Ba'ath, because they do not need to. The only question is whether they could, if they did.

of the Kurds?

3. And on that point, my forebodings are rather gloomier than yours. Of course one can't be categorical; but quite apart from the tightening strangle-holds which were the subject of my memorandum, the Russians have some other useful means at their disposal (for which there is little parallel in other Arab countries) of tying the Ba'ath up if they misbehave. The Kurds, the depressed Shi'ite majority, and the Shah, for instance, all have powerful grievances against the "minority within a minority" represented by the clique of riverain Sunni autocrats which leads the Ba'ath. All these opponents could in different ways be encouraged to cause the Ba'ath trouble if it suited the Russians. So also, of course, could the resentful pro-Soviet Communist Party of Iraq.

4. I am not suggesting that the Russians have this régime well and truly sewn up already. But to anyone watching the endless teams of sempstresses whose activities fill the pages of the daily papers here,



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they look well ahead with sewing-up the strait-jacket at the edges even if there are still seams needing attention in the middle. I do not believe it would be grossly melodramatic to suggest that on present form it will not be long before the Russians will be in a position to keep the Ba'ath in power or push them out of it, or at least to convey that impression to the Ba'ath - and this ~~fact~~, rather than degrees of satellitisation, is what counts.

5. But enough of Cassandra. The rest of this letter is about the practical measures open to us to obstruct the slither. I have no quarrel at all with the principles in your paragraphs 4 and 5.

6. Military Affairs

- (a) There is clearly little we can do in the arms field but struggle on with odds and ends - though I hope the time is coming when we shall be better able to coordinate our endeavours with the French, who remain rivals rather than allies in this field.
- (b) I recognize that on training facilities the Iraqis, whatever they may think, are not badly done by. But my Attachés and I believe strongly that the dividend from getting vacancies for Iraq at Camberley and Bracknell in 1972 will be much reduced if this cannot be followed up in either of the next two years. They will draw the conclusion that we simply let them in just once to keep them sweet. I don't so much mind about 1974, but the grant of a vacancy at both colleges in 1973 - ie two years running - is the only way to show them that 1972 was not just a tactical flash-in-the-pan.
- (c) On a point of detail it is not quite correct that they have never asked for naval training. I recall that a request was received and forwarded early last year but because the Iraqis never explained exactly what they were after, it got nowhere. It's not of much relevance now, since they have evidently put all their naval eggs in the Soviet basket (having withdrawn them from the Egyptian one).

7. Culture

I agree that we are doing rather better in this important field. Incidentally, you may not know that quite apart from the stream of top doctors being brought out here by the Iraqis, they have also recruited about 30 British nurses for the Medical City (which is Baghdad's show-piece). However, I find it lamentable that, following the transfer in June of the No 2 in the British Council here and the last minute withdrawal of his successor, there is still no sign of a new nominee. And as regards university teachers, we are conspicuously less forthcoming than the East Europeans. It has, for instance, just been announced that the Hungarians are supplying 26 straightaway. And the traffic in cultural delegations in both directions with Eastern Europe is positively bewildering.





## 8. Commerce

It is true, as you note, that our exports to Iraq are running at a slightly lower level than last year. This is saddening but not too surprising. In a nutshell, we have remained Iraq's largest foreign supplier hitherto thanks to inherited momentum; but, as few, if any, other factors are operating in our favour at present (except the Iraqi restrictions on imports from certain Western competitors, mainly the US, West Germany and Japan) that momentum is a wasting asset. However, as the market is expanding and Iraq is now a relatively rich country, we must do all we can. We welcome your suggestion that IAD might sponsor some business visits and have already taken this up separately. So much of the import purchasing power in Iraq is now concentrated in State agencies that "influential businessmen" is hardly a meaningful term in the private sector; so it is to the public sector that we must address ourselves. We also keep our commercial publicity distributions in continuous review, varying the recipients every month. But a technical and trade press in which we could usefully place items does not really exist here, and it is hard to see how to expand our effort beyond the present distribution of British trade and technical magazines.

9. We will certainly be hard put to it to keep our export figures even near their present disappointing level with the barometer set more and more distinctly here in favour of countries able to offer easy credit and to barter goods and services for Iraq's oil and sulphur. Moreover the Iraqis are developing an unwelcome preference for doing business under inter-governmental arrangements. See my letter (6/21) of 15 October to MacMahon in ECGD, copied to Stephen Egerton, reporting the disinterest of the Minister of Planning in our proffered credit facilities at 7%. Although Iraq is still basically open to trade with Western countries, as our own and others' sizeable exports show, it is discouraging that their huge increase in oil revenues from the June agreement with IPC has not so far impelled the Iraqis clearly to step up their commercial and contractual dealings with the West or to improve their reputation for sluggish and niggardly disbursement of payments (although they seldom deal so ill as to get into ECGD's bad books). In this general context there are one or two possibly hopeful signs, no more than that. Similarly, there is still no rush by British exporters not already in the market, and particularly no enthusiasm by the major British contractors so active in other Middle East countries, to seek work in Iraq. One thing we must certainly do is to make our participation next year in the Baghdad Fair (from which we have been conspicuously absent at official level for 2 years) a measure of our continuing interest in this market. Our miserable 1969 pavilion did us, in my view, more harm than good. Our participation should also help a little to draw the attention of British firms to the possibilities.

## 10. Oil

Here too the omens for any better relations are unpropitious - particularly if our information is correct that the Russians are overjoyed at the removal of Ammash from the oil scene and that he has been replaced as Chairman of the RCC's Oil Affairs Bureau by Saddam Hussain.





#### 11. Aid and Technical Assistance

It would be a useful talking-point and alibi if we could be told what the maximum per capita income is to qualify for aid (assuming it is disclosable).

12. It is good to know that you support the expansion of our technical assistance effort and its possible orientation towards exports. N E Department will have received a copy of our first reaction (my letter 6/16 of 20 October to Rowley) which covers your suggestion that Dev Div might send a team to help identify projects. We have proposed that Dev Div should be represented in our approaching session with the DG of Technical Assistance, instituted last year, to discuss her ideas for the ensuing programme. Incidentally, we would be glad if the ODA could be rather quicker in according sanction of principle to the proposals for new fields of activity which we put to them from time to time. Sometimes we feel that vital momentum is lost at this stage, since the Iraqis lose interest if our response to requests initiated by them is much delayed.

13. As regards the ODA policy of not providing experts on long contracts for Iraq, I would certainly like to see the rubric amended in principle. This does not mean that we should immediately wish to exploit the change in practice - simply that in the event of a profitable opening materializing, we should not like it to be automatically ruled out by the rubric. As things stand, even British experts working for the UN are exposed to this régime's congenital readiness to listen to personal intrigue against them. The admirable British director of the Forestry Research Institute in Arbil is just being expelled "for security reasons" as a result: and a British ICAO communications expert has been told that his contract is (unexpectedly) not being renewed, because (so an Iraqi has given him to believe) the Iraqis are suspicious of a UN employee "who is Chairman of the British Club". However, where the Iraqis themselves are anxious to recruit British experts, eg as University instructors, would it not be possible for ODA funds to be used to top up their emoluments if the Iraqis declare their expectations prohibitive? It seems unlikely that the Security authorities would be quite so ready to accept aspersions on experts engaged by their Government's own efforts rather than supplied spontaneously by us. It doesn't matter to us how they are recruited as long as they are good material.

#### 14. Visitors

I continue to think that ministerial visits in either direction are the only possible way of making a serious impact in the corridors of power here. (The admirable programme recently laid on by the British Council for the Minister of Higher Education, was a tremendous success - and she is a devout Ba'athist even if not at the centre of political power.) But if visitors of a more strictly political kind - including the suggestion in my letter 4/1 of 2 October, 1971 for a ministerial attempt to get the Iraqis to see reason over the Islands, etc - are definitely out, there it is.





15. Anyway we entirely support your view that we must make a real attempt to cultivate middle-rank Ba'athists from now on; and we are working on your suggestions.

16. Discussions on Iraq with other Europeans

I'm sorry it is judged unwise to discuss Iraq in NATO. By the time a more obvious forum is available to us (with luck) in the EEC, the Western stake in Iraq will probably be further down the drain. Maybe the Middle East experts could be encouraged to consider Iraq a little more in their six-monthly NATO meetings? In any case, I would think it well worth while to discuss things with the French, or with the French and the Italians combined. (Both of them are active here, the French of course being particularly well placed, whereas the Germans are hampered by the refusal of the Iraqis to contemplate restoring relations.)

17. I hesitate to try to sum up these discursive comments on your letter. Some of the action points are the subject of separate correspondence. As to the rest, perhaps I could draw attention to the following items of a small but practical nature:

- a. Vacancies on Staff Colleges (paragraph 6 b.).
- b. Posting of a new Deputy Director of the British Council (paragraph 7).
- c. 1972 Baghdad Fair (end of paragraph 9).
- d. Topping-up from ODA funds of emoluments of experts recruited by the Iraqis (paragraph 13).

18. I have not given this letter the same wide distribution as yours. If you think anyone else needs it, perhaps you could send them a copy.

*Yours ever*  
*H G Balfour Paul*  
 H G Balfour Paul

cc Chanceries:

BEIRUT (for Dev Div)  
 CAIRO  
 KUWAIT  
 TEHRAN  
 WASHINGTON  
 MOSCOW



(35)

9 November 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter

His Excellency  
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG  
Baghdad

COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ

(34)

Many thanks indeed for your very useful letter of 28 October. This is just to say that we are looking into the various proposals you put forward and I shall send you a substantive reply in due course - and certainly before your leave starts on 14 December.

See (49)

A D Parsons

pa 18/12

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Std 2/11  
pa 9/11

BU 1/12.



Confidential

Mr Parsons

Communist Penetration of Iraq.

A 1. I am, as you asked, collecting the views of those concerned on Mr Ralfar Paul's letter of 28 October. Meanwhile you may wish to send off an interim reply along the lines of the attached draft.

Veronica Beckett

8/11



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36

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 941 10 NOVEMBER. INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ.

THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ASKED ME TO CALL YESTERDAY. ZELLI SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, IN PARTICULAR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIANS.

2. FROM LATEST REPORTS AND DEVELOPMENTS THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT DISCERNED A PATTERN OF INCREASING SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ. THEY WERE TRYING TO RECREATE UNITY IN THE IRAQI BODY POLITIC SO AS TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO CONTROL IRAQI POLICIES.

3. ZELLI GAVE A NUMBER OF ILLUSTRATIONS, (A) SOVIET MOVES TO TRY AND PATCH UP THE NEW RIFT BETWEEN BARZANI AND THE BA'ATH. A RECENT PRAVDA ARTICLE ON THE KURDISH PROBLEM WAS SIGNIFICANT.

(B) SOVIET EFFORTS (NOT SPECIFIED) TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL STANDING OF THE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY

(C) SOVIET MOVES TO SECURE NEW ELECTIONS WHICH COULD ENABLE THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND COMMUNIST PARTY TO HAVE ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION ALONG WITH THE BA'ATHISTS.

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See 41  
p 16 15/11 /4.



4. THIS STEADY EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE DESERVED CLOSE STUDY. IRAN HAD TO CONSIDER WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS MIGHT BE BOTH IN REGARD TO HER OWN INTERESTS AND TO THOSE OF THE PERSIAN GULF. AS A FIRST STEP, THEY WISHED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US. THESE WERE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE WERE NO DOUBT ALSO FOLLOWING CLOSELY SEMICOLON OUR COMMENTS AND OUR VIEW OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE WELCOME.

5. I THANKED HIM FOR THE INFORMATION AND FOR INDICATING HOW HIS GOVERNMENT ASSESSED THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ. I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT, MORE ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN IRAQ SEEMED SET ON TRYING TO SOW TROUBLE BETWEEN IRAN, THE MODERATE ARABS AND BRITAIN IN THE PERSIAN GULF. I UNDERTOOK TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM NEXT WEEK TO SEE WHAT WE COULD USEFLUY CONTRIBUTE.

6. SEE M.I.F.T. — (37)

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL 942 OF 10 NOV INFO BAGHDAD  
MOSCOW BAHRAIN RESY WASHINGTON BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

M.I.P.T. —

36

### COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ

ZELLI WAS CLEARLY ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS - NO DOUBT FROM THE SHAH OR AT LEAST WITH HIS APPROVAL. WE KNOW FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT THE IRANIANS ARE SHOWING INCREASING CONCERN AT THE EXTENSION OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS THE BURDEN OF THE SHAH'S LATEST MESSAGE TO US (MY TEL 926). I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO RESPOND TO THIS APPROACH: IT IS CENTRED ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE SAID TO BE A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN CENTO ALLIES.

2. IF YOU AGREE, I WOULD PROPOSE TO SEE ZELLI NEXT WEEK AND TO DRAW GENERALLY ON THE POLITICAL MATERIAL IN THE

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND THE DEPARTMENT ABOUT COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ (BALFOUR PAUL'S MEMORANDUM OF 24 JULY AND SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ENDING WITH HIS LETTER OF 28 OCTOBER). I WOULD HOWEVER BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON THE PARTICULAR POINTS RAISED BY ZELLI.

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Mr Parsons

AS 12/11

## IRANIAN REQUEST TO DISCUSS COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ

Flag A &  
Flag B

Flag C

1. In his telegrams Nos 941 and 942, Mr Ramsbotham has asked for authority to respond positively to Mr Zelli's request to exchange analyses of the position achieved by the Russians in Iraq. Within certain limits Mr Balfour Paul, in his telegram number 1153, has agreed that Mr Ramsbotham should do so.

39

2. We shall not gain much from the exaggerated stories and impressions the Iranians will give us. On the other hand it is difficult to refuse such a request, provided that it does not lead on inexorably to joint anti-Iraqi action, even of a propagandist kind.

3. I recommend therefore that Mr Ramsbotham be instructed to agree to the Iranian request, subject to certain conditions. Two self-explanatory telegrams are attached. The second (DEDIP) telegram has been cleared with PUSD.

*S L Egerton*  
S L Egerton  
Near Eastern Department

*Paul*  
15/11

12 November 1971

Atts

Copies (with drafts) : Mr Acland  
Mr Ritchie, PUSD  
Mr Evans  
Mr Bullard, EESD



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FM BAGHDAD 120930Z

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TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO. 1153 OF 12 NOVEMBER INFO TEHRAN ROUTINE  
MUSCAT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

TEHRAN TELEGRAMS NO 941 <sup>(36)</sup> AND 942 <sup>(37)</sup> TO YOU: COMMUNIST PENETRATION  
IN IRAQ.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
15 NOV 1971  
IN NEQ 2/2

1. YOU MAY WISH FOR COMMENTS FROM HERE.

2. AS TO THE FACTS, MY VIEWS ON ZELLI'S ILLUSTRATIONS  
PARAGRAPH 3 OF TELEGRAM NO 941 ARE:

(A) THE RUSSIANS (WHO HELPED PROMOTE THE 1970 AGREEMENT)  
CERTAINLY WANT TO STOP THE RIFT WIDENING<sup>G</sup> FURTHER. THE  
VISIT AT THE END OF LAST MONTH TO BARZANI OF THE DELEGATION  
OF THE COMMITTEE OF AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY IN THE SOVIET UNION  
PRESUMABLY HAD THIS IN MIND. AS REGARDS THE ATTEMPTED  
ASSASSINATION OF BARZANI THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TWO  
NIGHTS AGO H HAD RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE  
BEEN PUTTING PRESSURE ON BOTH GOVERNMENT AND KURDS TO FORGET  
ABOUT IT. IF, AS WE INCLINE TO BELIEVE, THE ATTEMPT WAS  
ORGANISED BY SADDAM, THE GOVERNMENT AT LEAST WILL HAVE BEEN  
HAPPY TO RESPOND. THE REPORT (IF ANY) OF THE COMMISSION OF  
INQUIRY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SWEEPED UNDER THE CARPET.

(B) WHILE IT REMAINS MY VIEW THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT  
GREATLY CONCERNED IN THE WELFARE OF IRAQI COMMUNISTS, EITHER  
INDIVIDUALLY OR AS A PARTY, IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE ME IF SADDAM  
HIMSELF, FEELING SOMEWHAT ISOLATED, WERE PURSUING A RAPPROCHEMENT  
WITH THE ICP (WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD OBVIOUSLY ENCOURAGE).  
INDEED I WAS TOLD LAST NIGHT BY A WELL-PLACED OFFICIAL IN THE  
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION THAT SADDAM HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN  
HAVING A MEETING EVERY WEDNESDAY WITH THE "FIRST SECRETARY  
OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY". IT IS QUITE SOME TIME SINCE  
THE LAST ONSLAUGHT IN THE BEIRUT COMMUNIST PAPERS AGAINST THE  
IRAQI REGIME. THE 2-HOUR AUDIENCE GIVEN BY BAKR TO THE SOVIET  
AMBASSADOR ON 8 NOVEMBER AND PROMINENTLY PICTURED IN THE PRESS  
NEXT DAY, IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT.

(C) PUBLICATION OF THE PROMISED NATIONAL CHARTER IS EXPECTED  
IMMINENTLY. NO DOUBT IT WILL AIM TO PROMOTE A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,  
REPRESENTING THE KDP, THE COMMUNISTS AND PERHAPS OTHER

/"PROGRESSIVES" 18/5/71

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"PROGRESSIVES" AS WELL AS THE BA'ATH. THE FACT THAT ONLY BA'ATH PARTY CADRES HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN CONSULTED BEFORE FINALISING THE CHARTER DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED. IT MAY BE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROVE TO HAVE SECURED THE ADVANCE CONCURRENCE OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE KDP (TO WHOM THE CHARTER IS NOW BEING SENT FOR STUDY) FROM GANGING-UP WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHER PROGRESSIVES AS THEY DID LAST TIME THE BA'ATH UNSUCCESSFULLY CANVESSED A NATIONAL FRONT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. ALTHOUGH NATIONAL FRONTERY IS LARGELY A PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE FOR THE BA'ATH, THE FORM AND SCALE OF COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD CERTAINLY BE OF INTEREST TO THE RUSSIANS. EVEN IF THE ASSEMBLY PROVED VIRTUALLY POWERLESS, COMMUNIST MEMBERS COULD AT LEAST PROVE OF NUISANCE VALUE.

3. AS REGARDS THE SUITABILITY OF THE SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE IRANIANS, I RECOGNIZE THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES OF ESTABLISHING THE MAXIMUM COMMON GROUND WITH THE SHAH AT THIS STAGE IN GULF DEVELOPMENTS (PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT THE IRAQIS ET AL ARE GIVEN NO CHANCE, BY LEAKS OF ANY SORT, TO ADD FLESH TO THEIR CURRENT CHARGES OF ANGLO/IRANIAN COLLUSION). BUT I TAKE IT THAT NOTHING WOULD BE SAID WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE IRANIANS THE IMPRESSION THAT WE OURSELVES WOULD REGARD RENEWED HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BARZANI AND THE BA'ATH WITH FAVOUR OR THAT WE THINK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, EVEN WITH COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION, AS SELF-EVIDENTLY UNDESIRABLE AND WORSE THAN THE EXISTING ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP. THOUGH THEY ARE PLAYING HARD TO GET, THE KURDS THEMSELVES (TO JUDGE BY WHAT THE MINISTER OF NORTHERN AFFAIRS, A STRONG KURDISH PATRIOT RECENTLY SAID TO ME) BELIEVE THAT A PHONEY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE BETTER THAN NO PUBLIC FORUM AT ALL, SINCE THERE WOULD AT LEAST BE A CHANCE OF PRESSURES BUILDING UP FOR CONVERTING IT INTO SOMETHING BETTER,

4. MOREOVER, I HOPE THE IRANIANS CAN BE BROUGHT TO RECOGNIZE THE VALUE, AS A COUNTER TO SOVIET PENETRATION, OF MAXIMISING WESTERN COMMERCIAL, TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL EFFORT IN IRAQ.

BALFOUR PAUL

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 951 DATED 12 NOVEMBER AND TO PRIORITY  
BAGDAD AND MOSCOW.

SAVING TO WASHINGTON , BONN, BAHRAINRESY, AND KUWAIT.

MY TEL NOS 941 AND 942.

(36)

(37)

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COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE AUDIENCE YESTERDAY  
WITH THE SYAH HE SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE FOREIGN  
MINISTER TO BRIEF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN AMBASSADORS  
ON THE DANGERS OF COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ. THE  
SHAH REFERRED TO SOME RECENT COMMUNIQUE, APPARENTLY  
BETWEEN A RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION AND THE  
BA'ATHISTS, WHICH HE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT.  
ZELLI NEVER MENTIONED THIS TO ME. CAN BAGHDAD  
EMBASSY IDENTIFY THIS EVENT ?

2. THE SHAH ALSO MENTIONED A RECENT VISIT TO IRAQ

OF THE EAST GERMAN WAR MINISTER, INTO A REPORT THAT  
IRAQ WAS PLANNING TO SEIZE THE GULF ISLANDS  
PRESUMPTIVELY WITH EAST GERMAN HELP, WHICH , OF COURSE,  
HE DISCOUNTED.

FCO PASS SAVINGS ADDRESSEES

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TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELNO 662 OF 12 NOV AND INFO PRIORITY  
BAGHDAD, ROUTINE MOSCOW BAHRAIN RESIDENCY WASHINGTON BEIRUT  
KUWAIT

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 941 AND 942 AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO  
1153: COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ

1. WE AGREE THAT, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, YOU SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS  
APPROACH. BUT WE MUST AVOID BEING INVEIGLED BY THE IRANIANS  
INTO ANY APPEARANCE OF JOINT ANTI-IRAQI ACTION (MOUNTED EG  
FROM A THIRD COUNTRY) AS A CONSEQUENCE OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH  
ZELLI. NOR DO WE WISH TO GIVE GROUNDS FOR THE SUGGESTION THAT  
A SOVIET MILITARY OR SUBVERSIVE THREAT VIA IRAQ IS BEING, OR  
SHOULD YET BE, DISCUSSED AS A CENTO PROBLEM. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE  
STEERED CLEAR OF ASSESSING SUCH THREATS IN CENTO PLANNING  
BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF OPENING THE DOOR TO EG DISCUSSION OF  
AN INDIAN THREAT TO PAKISTAN.
2. WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO WARN ZELLI IN TERMS THAT KNOWLEDGE  
OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM MUST BE KEPT WITHIN A CLOSELY RESTRICTED  
CIRCLE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND NOT (NOT) COMMUNICATED IN  
ANY FORM TO IRANIAN POSTS IN ARAB COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY OF  
COURSE TO THE NEW IRANIAN CHARGE AT BAGHDAD.
3. AS REGARDS THE PARTICULAR POINTS RAISED BY ZELLI WE HAVE LITTLE  
TO ADD TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WHILE WE AGREE  
WITH ZELLI THAT THE QUESTION OF COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ  
IS SERIOUS, WE DO NOT THINK HIS ILLUSTRATIONS ARE VERY WELL  
CHOSEN AND WE DO NOT (NOT) HAVE MUCH DIRECT EVIDENCE TO  
SUPPORT THEM. THE IRANIANS MAY HOWEVER HAVE CHOSEN THEIR  
ILLUSTRATIONS ON PURPOSE, AND WE DO NOT (NOT) THINK YOU SHOULD  
SPEND TOO MUCH TIME IN TRYING TO PUT ZELLI RIGHT ON SUBJECTS  
WHICH THE IRANIANS HAVE ALWAYS SEEN DIFFERENTLY FROM US.

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/ H. FINALLY,



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4. FINALLY, WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD DRAW IN GENERAL ON BALFOUR PAUL'S MEMORANDUM OF 29 JULY AND SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE; BUT WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT YOUR GOING INTO DETAIL ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET AND BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID BEING DRAWN ON THIS.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 953 13 NOVEMBER INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD AND MOSCOW.

SAVING TO WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY AND KUWAIT.

MY TEL NO. 951. <sup>(40)</sup> /COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ/

PARA 2, SECOND LINE FOR "INTO" PLEASE READ "AND".

FOURTH LINE FOR "PRESUMPTIVELY" READ "PREEMPTIVELY".

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1155 OF 13 NOV 71 INFO PRIORITY  
TO TEHRAN AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON, BONN,  
BAHRAIN RESIDENCY AND KUWAIT.

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TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 951 TO YOU : COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ.

1. THE EVENT TO WHICH PARAGRAPH 1 REFERS WAS PRESUMABLY  
THE VISIT BY THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE IN THE  
SOVIET UNION (SEE PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF MY TELEGRAM NO 1153).  
WE CANNOT TRACE ANY RESULTING "COMMUNIQUE", BUT THE  
VISIT WAS THE SUBJECT OF A FAVOURABLE EDITORIAL IN THE  
KURDISH DAILY TA'AKHI ON 27 OCTOBER.

39

2. THE VISIT OF GENERAL HOFFMAN FROM 14 TO 18 OCTOBER  
WAS REPORTED IN LEWY'S LETTER OF 18 OCTOBER TO MISS  
BECKETT AND OTHERS (BUT NOT COPIED TO TEHRAN).  
WE ARE AWARE OF THE REPORT AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 2,  
WHICH WE TAKE TO BE A HAM-FISTED IRAQI PLANT.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BALFOUR PAUL

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO..1767 OF 15TH NOV 1971, AND TO PRIORITY TEHERAN.

INFO TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT.

SAVING TO BONN.

PSI? 40

43

TEHERAN TELEGRAM NO..151 AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO..1155.

1. WE HAVE SEEN NO MENTION HERE OF A RECENT SOVIET-IRAQI COMMUNIQUE UNLESS, PERHAPS, THE SHAH IS THINKING OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF JUNE FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO IRAQ BY THE SOVIET PARTY AND GOVERNMENT DELEGATION LED BY V.N. NOVIKOV. (BALFOUR-PAUL'S LETTER 3/13 OF 26 JUNE TO EVANS).

F.C.O. PASS SAVING TO BONN.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FROM TEHRAN 151300Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 963 15 NOVEMBER INFO BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON  
AND MOSCOW. ROUTINE BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

41  
YOUR TELEGRAM 6621 COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ.

1. THANK YOU FOR THIS GUIDANCE.

2. WHEN COUNSELLOR SAW THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE  
MFA THIS MORNING ON OTHER BUSINESS, ZELLI REFERRED TO THE  
JOINT COMMUNIQUE' ISSUED AFTER THE VISIT OF THE RUSSIAN AFRO/  
ASIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE (MY TELEGRAM NO. 951 AND BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM 1155). ZELLI INSISTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A COMMUNIQUE,  
SIGNED BY SHARIF AND BOBUJAN, AND QUOTED EXTRACTS IN TRANSLATION  
WHICH HE SAID HAD CAUSED CONCERN IN TEHRAN. SOME OF THESE  
REFERRED TO NATIONAL UNITY, INCLUDING A STATEMENT THAT  
NATIONAL FORCES COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DEFEATING  
IMPERIALISM PROVIDED THAT THESE FORCES ENJOYED COMPLETE UNITY  
AND SOLIDARITY. ANOTHER REFERRED TO SOVIET SOLIDARITY IN THE  
FIGHT IN THE PERSIAN GULF AGAINST LOCAL COLONIALISM AND  
NEO-COLONIALISM AFTER THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS NO DOUBT  
THIS LATTER POINT WHICH THE SHAH HAD IN MIND.

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 1164 OF 16/11 INFO TEHRAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, AMMAN, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA AND MUSCAT.

NATIONAL CHARTER.

1. THE PROMISED NATIONAL CHARTER (SEE PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO. 1153, NOT TO ALL) IS BEING PUBLISHED IN TWO STAGES. THE FIRST HALF OF THE CHARTER WAS BROADCAST YESTERDAY EVENING, 15 NOVEMBER, AND IS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS THIS MORNING, THE SECOND INSTALMENT IS TO BE BROADCAST TONIGHT.
2. A NUMBER OF FOREIGN, BEIRUT-BASED CORRESPONDENTS, INCLUDING THE "DAILY EXPRESS" MAN, DAVID HIRST OF THE "GUARDIAN", AND AT LEAST 2 AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN AT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT'S INVITATION AND EXPENSE. THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT PRESIDENT BAKR IS TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE TOMORROW EVENING (17 NOVEMBER) AT WHICH HE WILL ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATIONAL CHARTER AND ABOUT IRAQ'S POLICY IN ARAB AFFAIRS.
3. THE HALF OF THE CHARTER WHICH HAS SO FAR BEEN VOUCHSAFED TO US, IS A LENGTHY, NOT TO SAY TURGID, DOCUMENT, THE BURDEN OF WHICH IS THAT "THE GREAT NATIONALIST ROLE WHICH OUR COUNTRY IS CALLED UPON TO CARRY OUT REQUIRES TAKING THE ROAD OF EARNEST COALITION (SIC.) FOR SETTING UP AN UNITED FRONT". A LONG HISTORICAL PREFACE IS FOLLOWED BY A LIST OF THE PARTY'S ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE LAST 3 YEARS. THE TEXT OF BOTH PARTS, TOGETHER WITH A DETAILED COMMENTARY, WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. A



CONFIDENTIAL

4. A SUBSEQUENT POPULAR DEBATE ON THE CHARTER IS (IMPROBABLY) PROMISED. ALL THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE KDP HAVE NOT BEEN CONSULTED BEFOREHAND BUT THE THE COMMUNISTS, OR SOME OF THEM, HAVE BEEN SQUARED.

FCO PASS SAVING TO ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA AND MUSCAT.

BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED

ARAB D

N AFR D

OIL D

EESD

IRD

NEWS D

MOD (INTERNAL)

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED



BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

1/30

Miss Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
29 NOV 1971

NKQ 2/2

25 November, 1971

*Enter*

*Dear Miss Beckett -*

IRAQI NATIONAL CHARTER

1. The revelation of the draft Iraqi national charter by the Iraqi president was accorded a commentary column in Pravda last week: this was described as an important event in Iraqi political life.
2. Demchenko quoted As-Saura as saying that <sup>this</sup> opened a "new page in relations between the patriotic and progressive elements in the country, both Arabs and Kurds." He pointed out that there had not been a proper general programme of activity in Iraq for many years and that even now there was no unity between "basic political forces occupying a progressive platform - the Ba'ath, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Communist Party." The new Charter foresaw a "national coalition with the participation of all the national and progressive forces" and guaranteed the freedom of political parties.
3. Yet again we have the Iraqi Communist Party being placed on a par with the Ba'ath and the Kurdish Party, being described as one of the "basic political forces" of Iraq. This would seem to be a further confirmation of the line, which has been implicit in recent Soviet reports and articles on Iraq, namely that there must be some kind of new deal for the Communist Party. The Soviet reader, remembering periodical denunciations of Iraqi government persecution of the Communist Party, will no doubt recognise that the position of Iraqi communists has been much improved recently.

*Yours ever -  
Nick Livingston*

N H Livingston

c.c.

Eastern European and Soviet Department  
Chanceries: Baghdad, Tehran, Cairo, Amman,  
Tel Aviv, Beirut

RESTRICTED

*pc 629/4*



RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
-1 DEC 1971

NEQ 2/2

Mr Hulse, EESD *minute in 1/11*  
Mr Pooley, Defence Dept *and 1/11*  
Mr Shawyer, CRD  
Mr Moore, IAD  
Mr Willson, EPD *minute 19/11*  
Mr Tunnell, Oil Dept *17/11*  
Mr Shakespeare, FPAD *22/11*  
Mr Ramsay, WOD *23/11*  
Mr Unwin, WED *24/11*

Copies + copies of  
Mr Balfour Paul's letter  
of 28 October :  
Mr Dain, Assessment Staff  
Mr B Cook, ODA  
*sent 9/11*

# COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ

Flag A  
Flag B

1. HM Ambassador at Baghdad has now replied to Mr Parsons' letter of 30 September. Mr Parsons has asked to see the minuted copy of Mr Balfour Paul's letter in due course (*by about 7 December*).

2. I should be grateful if Departments could let me have their comments on Mr Balfour Paul's letter as follows:

- i. EESD : paragraphs 2-4
- ii. Defence Department : paragraph 6, and in particular the suggestion in paragraph 6b that Iraq should be allotted vacancies at Camberley and Bracknell in 1973.
- iii. CRD : paragraph 7, and in particular the question of the posting of a new Deputy *Representative* ~~Director~~ of the British Council
- iv. IAD : paragraphs 8 and 15.
- v. EPD : paragraphs 8 and 9 and in particular the Ambassador's recommendation that we participate in the Baghdad Fair next year (Mr Ashwood of DTI, CRE 4 has been working on this).
- vi. Oil Dept ; paragraph 10.
- vii. FPAD : paragraphs 11-13 and in particular the suggestion in paragraph 13 about the topping-up from ODA funds of emoluments of experts recruited by the Iraqis. You may wish to discuss with Mr B Cook of the ODA, to whom I am copying these papers.
- viii. WOD/WED : paragraph 16.

*Veronica Beckett*  
Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Dept  
DD 737719 557664 500M 2/71 GM 3643/2

8 November 1971

CONFIDENTIAL



Miss Beckett, NED.

Your minute of 8 November.

As you know, we have told Baghdad that we will consider any proposals for visits which they may like to put up. The D.T.I. have agreed to take ~~on~~ on the visit of three Iraqi business directors which Baghdad suggested recently.

W.H. Young  
IAD  
18/11



Miss Beckett (Near Eastern Dept)

YOUR MINUTE OF 8 NOVEMBER

1. Since British Council Headquarters do not have to consult us about staffing in Iraq below the level of the Representative himself, we were unaware of the hiatus in their numbers in Baghdad. They are apparently having difficulty in finding a suitable person, but I have pressed them strongly to look again and more urgently at the problem. I will not hold up circulation of this file while waiting for further information, but I hope to let you have something firmer before you reply to the Ambassador.

2. As for the university teachers, the Council have told their Representative that they will recruit what they can (the number will obviously be far less than asked for but no doubt some could be found) when they receive properly completed application forms showing the subjects to be taught, the posts available, the terms being offered (accommodation, salary, etc), in short all the details necessary to recruitment. Presumably Mr Springford is having difficulty in getting this information from the Iraqis.

*R C Shawyer*

R C Shawyer  
Cultural Relations Dept

15 November 1971



copies on DPT 36/8 &  
DPT 36/4

Miss Beckett NED

## COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. Your minute of 8 November.

2. Paragraph 6(b). Where scarce places on staff courses are concerned I am much in favour of starting as one means to go on. If we were to give places to Iraq at Camberley and Bracknell two years running they would expect places every year (and so would Mr Balfour-Paul when the time came!) I think we should set our sights no higher than one place at each college every other year and that will be very difficult to achieve.

The first meeting on allocating places at Camberley for 1973 was held last month. Iraq did not get a place because there were more pressing customers and the invitations have now gone out. Iraq could go on the waiting list but that is all.

Places for the 1972/73 Bracknell Course are not <sup>due</sup> down to be considered until next May. The DA had better put in a special bid to MOD(Air) copy to Defence Department.  
*Places at Bracknell are easier to come by than those at Camberley.*

*T E F Pooley*  
T E F POOLEY  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT  
11 November 1971



CONFIDENTIAL

W 48

Miss Beckett (NED)

## COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ

1. Your minute of 8 November.
2. I do not think I can add usefully to what has already been written in earlier minutes on this subject, and in Mr. Parson's letter of 30 September. Mr. Balfour Paul persists in taking a very much blacker view of the situation than the facts seem to warrant. I would disagree with his basic assumption that Iraq is on the slippery slope and that the only movement can be downwards. In particular, I think that - as far as I can judge - the assessment in the final sentence of paragraph 4 is indeed altogether too melodramatic. Recent events in Egypt and the Sudan seem to illustrate very graphically the limitations of Soviet power in the Middle East. However entrenched the Soviet position seems to be in any particular country, Soviet interests seem to be disregarded when it comes to the crunch. Although the Russians would undoubtedly like to have considerable ability to interfere in the internal Iraqi affairs, I think the strait-jacket image is misleading in that it implies total subservience. The Russians are not aiming at this kind of relationship: better experience has shown them how much it can cost.
3. I do not think that there has been a change in the Soviet attitude to the third world, as is suggested by Mr. Balfour Paul in the second sentence of his paragraph 2. The Soviet Union has always obeyed the rules of Realpolitik and it has ~~always~~ been prepared to forfeit the interests of local Communist Parties when their immediate political aims cannot be achieved by supporting them. The Russians are developing their relations with established regimes, rather than Communist Parties, faute de mieux, in changed circumstances they would rapidly switch back to active support of their communist clients.

MulseC. Hulse  
EESD

9 November 1971

CONFIDENTIAL




(W 48)

Miss V Beckett (Near Eastern Dept)

## BRITISH COUNCIL IN IRAQ

1. The Head of the Council's Overseas Careers Section is in Madrid, where he is checking up on several young Council officers, sent there for training; he has one particularly in mind for the post of Assistant Representative, Baghdad. We shall not know the result of his review until he returns at the end of this week. The Council are fully aware of the disadvantages of this post remaining empty, and I will progress them closely.

  
M L Dooley (Miss)  
Cultural Relations Dept

29 November 1971



Confidential

Miss Beckett NED

Communist Penetration in Iraq

1. I think Mr. Balfour Paul's suggestion (in para 16 of his letter to Mr. Parsons) that the ~~new~~ Middle East Experts might give a little more time to discussing Iraq at their meetings is sensible. If we support his views and think they should be aired <sup>more</sup> (he should make certain that our written contribution to the next meeting (in April) includes a substantial piece on the question of Communist Penetration in Iraq.
2. The question could also be introduced into the discussions of the Middle East Experts (whose brief includes Iraq and whose paper is submitted twice a year



to ministers in the North Atlantic Council).  
We have a chance to comment here on  
the draft paper before it is discussed  
by experts (in our case usually compare  
from under on this department).

3. From my limited experience of these  
meetings I do think that Mr Balfour  
Paul's view on the extent of Communist  
influence in Iraq is not without  
ground at least the Americans and Italians.  
(It was impossible last month to get  
the majority of experts to accept the  
views put forward in para 2 of Mr  
Hulse's minute of 9 November to you)

4. There is certainly a problem.  
This in itself might do some good but  
I do not believe it will lead to it.  
on one or two of the allies acting  
under the NATO umbrella or on NATO's  
behalf, to do much to <sup>in order to</sup> mitigate the  
effects of Communist penetration. The  
Alliance, if it accepted that Iraq was  
indeed on the slippery slope, would be delighted  
if individual countries did something



to accept the slide. N.E.D. must say  
if there is any mileage to be got  
out of the suggestion that our policies  
ought to be co-ordinated in some fields  
with those of the French and Italian

AT Ramsey  
23/11

Mr Gavin N.E.D.

We see no objection to discussing  
Iraq with the Germans, French and  
Italians; but I really doubt if  
much will come of it which will  
increase individual West European  
efforts there. The French and Italians  
both have major stakes in Iraq; the  
PRG sees it essentially in terms of  
disturbing the GDR. They are all three  
doing that what they conceive it to  
be in their interest to do.

Peter Urry  
23/11



(W 45)

Miss Beckett (NE D)Communist Penetration of Iraq

Your minute of 8 November.

2. You should discuss Mr. Balfour-Paul's aid suggestions (pages 11-13 of his letter) direct with O.D.A. F.P.A.D. does not involve itself in essentially bilateral aid discussions between F.C.D. geographical departments & their opposite numbers in O.D.A.
3. Unless there is some strong doctrinal objection on the part of O.D.A. Mr. Balfour Paul's "topping up" proposals seem quite sensible.

W.R. Hughes-Pearce

22/11.

F.P.A.D.



Confidential

Reference

W 48

Miss Beckett, NED.

Soviet Penetration of Iraq

1. Your minute of 8 November.
2. I had not heard that the Russians were "overjoyed" about the replacement of Amarah by Saddam Hussain on the oil bureau. The IPC have always felt that Amarah was, faute de mieux, likely to be a restraining influence whenever relations with the IPC were nearing a crunch, and it therefore seemed likely that his replacement by anyone else was unlikely to be helpful. They (IPC) had however regarded



Saddam as being unapproachable rather than downright hostile.

3. The recent flurry of hints that the Russians are seriously considering moving into the oil scene (Iraq/Mediterranean pipeline, marketing et al) lends credence to the possibility that Saddam is likely to play the Russian game on oil.

W. W. W. W.  
Oil Dept  
19/11



Miss Beckett (Near Eastern Dept W 133

1. Your minute of 8 November
2. Mr Balfour-Paul's letter was of course written the day before it was announced that the export credit rate was to be reduced to 6½%; this should prove to be of some assistance to British exporters.
3. As far as the Baghdad Fair is concerned, it is of course rather a chicken and egg argument. The Ambassador says that our exports will not go up unless there is British participation in the Fair; DTI (whose responsibility it is) maintain that participation is not worth while unless there is sufficient interest expressed by British exporters. If I can quote from the DTI telegram Creda 53 of 17 May: "You will realise that our decision must be based on coldly commercial considerations .... we understand the possible Iraqi argument that we cannot be short of money if we are prepared to spend it elsewhere. The counter argument is that we spend it where we can expect the best results and of this British industry, not HMG, must in the last resort be the judge."
4. COMET and the Fairs and Promotions Branch of DTI have issued a joint circular to exporters, a copy of which I attach to this minute. DTI tell me that they have had a number of telephone calls expressing interest, but so far only two firm bookings. They comment, however, that there is still time for more, and many firms tend to leave these things until the last moment.



19 November 1971  
Enc

J M Willson  
Export Promotion Dept





## Department of Trade and Industry

Fairs and Promotions Branch

Tower Block Hillgate House 26 Old Bailey London EC4M 7HU

Telex 886143 Answer Back Bothillgate Ldn

Telephone 01-248 5757 ext

20

Your reference

Our reference XP/10250/G

Date

Dear Sir

BAGHDAD: INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIR 1-20 OCTOBER 1972

### PROPOSED BRITISH PAVILION

1 The Iraqi Authorities have announced that an International Trade Fair, including both capital and consumer goods, will be held in Baghdad from 1 - 20 October 1972. A British Pavilion will be organised at this Fair by the Department of Trade and Industry provided there is sufficient support from industry.

2 British exports to Iraq have steadily increased over recent years and are currently in the region of £24 a year. The extra oil revenues, which will accrue as a result of the Tehran Agreement signed earlier this year, - possibly nearly £350m in 1971 as opposed to just over £200m in 1970 - will considerably increase Iraq's purchasing power and should provide the means for further implementation of the 1970-74 Development Plan. This market offers a good potential for both capital goods and reasonable quantities of consumer goods and the existence of an official British Pavilion will attract an additional quota of import licences. Participation in the Fair, either directly or through agents, will give British exporters an excellent opportunity of showing the wide range of goods they have to offer and an opportunity to make personal contact with Iraqi buyers.

3 In particular it is believed that a strong demand will exist for the following commodity groups:-

All types of machinery, including electrical machinery;  
Agricultural and earth-moving equipment;  
Motor vehicles, motor cycles, bicycles and other transport equipment;  
Engines;  
Electrical goods and accessories;  
Construction materials;  
Chemicals and textiles.

### AGENTS

4 The role of agents representing overseas companies in Iraq is complex and it is in an effort to clarify the extent of agents' activities in the Iraq market and more especially the role they play at the Baghdad International Fair that this paragraph has been included.



a In dealings with Government Departments, agents assist their principals to follow up bids in response to Government issued calls for tender. The Purchasing Departments are allocated a large share of the total Iraq import quota (ID 199m in 1971) and are able to place orders from their quotas for products which they see on display at the British Pavilion, without calling on the special quota allocated for the Fair.

b Agents are completely ruled out of any sales to the Government-controlled companies eg African-Iraqi and Iraq stores. Since these companies have the sole importation rights for 200 different items (mostly in the consumer goods field) and buy direct from the manufacturers. They may make direct purchases from the Fair, against the Fair quota.

c The allocations of quotas specifically issued for the Fair have to be made available to licensed importers in Iraq. It is essential therefore for any British company participating at the Fair to have an agent who is also a licensed importer to represent their interests in Iraq.

5 Inside the Pavilion a shell stand scheme will be provided for which the charge will be £15 per square metre. This is an inclusive charge covering rent, shell stand, general lighting and power points, pavilion decoration, cleaning (excluding the cleaning of exhibits), security and reception. Outdoor space for display will be available at a charge of £5 per square metre, to include site dressing, fascia boards and reception costs.

6 The British Pavilion will be clearly identifiable as such and displays within must be wholly of British manufacture. Any company wishing to exhibit goods either wholly or partly of foreign manufacture must seek the prior approval of the Department of Trade and Industry. Agents' names may be featured in conjunction with those of their British principals, providing it is clear that the goods displayed are British. The Department of Trade and Industry will arrange suitable publicity for the Pavilion as a whole.



ADDITIONAL MEASURE OF ASSISTANCE

7 The Department of Trade and Industry on certain conditions offer participating firms up to 50% assistance towards:


a the expenditure actually incurred on any form of travel (within the maximum of half the return air fare) for up to two representatives of British firms each of whom mans the stand for the duration of the event;

b the cost of freight in returning unsold goods, consigned from this country specifically for exhibition and sale, provided that the goods are exhibited for the duration of the event, remain unsold, and are shipped direct to the United Kingdom within 12 months of the close of the event.


Full details of these measures of assistance will be provided to exhibitors.

8 An application form for space is enclosed. Please note that completed application forms together with deposits should be returned to the Department of Trade and Industry not later than 17 December 1971. Invoices for the balance of the charge will follow when the pavilion plans have been finalised. Prompt application is urged as space in the British Pavilion is likely to be taken up rapidly; letters declining this invitation are not necessary as all addresses will be retained on the mailing list unless a specific request is made for a name to be removed. For further information please consult Mr M L Sellek (Extension 7314) at the above address and telephone number.

Yours faithfully



Lord Denman  
Chairman, BNEC Committee  
for Middle East Trade



W T Pearce  
Director, Fairs & Promotions Branch



CONFIDENTIAL

49

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 1 DEC 1971
NEQ 2/2

Mr Egerton

Mr Evans

Mr Parsons

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

- Flag A
1. In his manuscript minute of 4 November Mr Parsons asked to see minutes on HM Ambassador at Baghdad's letter of 28 October.
  2. I have consulted the Departments concerned and suggest that their comments should be incorporated into a reply to Mr Balfour Paul. In order to prevent the correspondence becoming unwieldy, I suggest that the letter should concentrate mainly on points requiring further action either here or in Baghdad.
  3. I submit a draft. If this is to reach Mr Balfour Paul before he goes on leave on 14 December the latest Bag it can catch is on 9 December.

*Veronica Beckett*

Veronica Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

30 November 1971

Registry

*In the light of the impending break in Anglo/Iraqi  
no further action at present. Please keep on file.*

*pa 1/2 4/12*

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No.	CONFIDENTIAL		Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  Top Secret. Secret. <u>Confidential.</u> Restricted. Unclassified.	DRAFT letter  To:—  His Excellency Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG BAGHDAD		From  Mr Parsons Telephone No. & Ext.  Department
PRIVACY MARKING			
.....In Confidence			
<p>Flag B</p> <p>Copies to:</p> <p>Chanceries:</p> <p>Beirut (Devdiv)</p> <p>Cairo</p> <p>Kuwait</p> <p>Tehran</p> <p>Washington</p> <p>Moscow</p> <p>Khartoum (plus copy of letter from Baghdad under reference)</p> <p>B Cook Esq, ODA</p> <p>D Dain Esq, Assessments Staff</p>	<p>COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ</p> <p>1. In my letter of 9 November I promised you our detailed comments on your letter of 28 October. Here they are.</p> <p>2. First, the general question of the extent of Communist Bloc penetration of Iraq. We take your point that the situation is dangerous, but our view remains that the picture you paint is a little too black. We certainly do not deny that the Russians are obviously well entrenched in Iraq and would undoubtedly like to have power to influence the internal affairs of Iraq. But they are still a long way from achieving this aim and the Iraqis are at present by no means totally subservient to the Russians. Looking further afield, recent events in Egypt and the Sudan seem to illustrate clearly the limitations of Soviet power in the Middle East. However entrenched the Soviet position appears to be in any particular country, Soviet interests can be - and often are - disregarded in a crisis. There is little, if any, evidence to show that the Russians have reached the stage where they can exert an unshakeable stranglehold on any Middle Eastern country. Perhaps you will think it is easy for us to</p> <p>/pontificate .....</p>		



CONFIDENTIAL

pontificate in this way from the safe distance of London; so I think it would be very useful if both Dick Beaumont and Gordon Etherington-Smith could let us have their views on how Russian activities and techniques in Iraq compare with what has been going on in Egypt and the Sudan respectively.

3. Now let me turn to specific practical questions.

4. Military Training (your paragraph 6b) Here the difficulty is to strike a balance between what would be ideal, and what is in fact possible. It seems at present that it is a little too optimistic to hope for a vacancy for the Iraqis at both Camberley and Bracknell in 1973, as both courses are in great demand. The first meeting on allocating places at Camberley for 1973 was held last month and Iraq did not get a place because there were more pressing applicants. We are arranging for Iraq to be put on the waiting list, but we cannot promise that she will eventually obtain a place. On the other hand, we are well aware that it is important not to neglect Iraqi interests over the question of military training. Our aim will therefore be to try if we possibly can to get one place at each College for the Iraqis every other year, but I am afraid it would be more realistic to think in terms of one place at each College every three years, provided of course that MOD still agree to give them special dispensation on security grounds. We shall ~~therefore~~ do what we can to see that Iraq obtains a vacancy for the 1972/3 Bracknell course. Applications are due to be considered in May and we would advise your DA to put in a special bid to

/Ministry .....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



## CONFIDENTIAL

Ministry of Defence (Air) with a copy to Defence Department. Meanwhile we shall of course continue to be as helpful as we can over Iraqi bids for training. In this connection you may like to know that MOD have told us they would be prepared to consider offering Iraq two places on the junior command and staff courses in 1973. There are four courses lasting eight weeks each. If the Iraqis make bids in good time, they will be considered in June 1972.

5. Culture I can report some progress on the appointment of a new Deputy Representative of the British Council (your paragraph 7). The Head of the Council's Overseas Careers Section is in Madrid, where he is checking up on several young Council officers, sent there for training; he had one particularly in mind for the post in Baghdad and we hope to have further news on this shortly: the Council are fully aware of the disadvantages of the post remaining empty. We shall keep a watchful eye on this.

6. On University teachers, the British Council have told Springford that they will recruit as many people as they can (the number will obviously be far less than asked for, but we hope that some can be found) when they receive properly completed application forms showing the subject to be taught, the posts available, the terms being offered (accommodation, salary etc), in short all the details necessary to recruitment. We suspect that Springford is having difficulty in getting this information from the Iraqis.

7. Commerce The questions of business visitors  
(your .....



CONFIDENTIAL

*and credit (your paragraph 9)*

(your paragraph 8) *L* are the subjects of separate correspondence and I do not think I can usefully add anything for the present; so I shall confine myself here to the Baghdad Fair. The problem of our participation in 1973 is obviously tricky. I agree with you that, in the light of our present disappointing export figures to Iraq, our participation is important. This is something I should like to discuss with you *fairly soon after your arrival* ~~when you are over~~ here, so that we can decide on a course of action. It might for instance be useful for *you and* someone from Near Eastern Department and/or Export Promotion Department to take this up with those concerned in the DTI *and COMET* *I*

*Shortly after 17 December which was, as you will remember from the DTI's circular letter XP/10250/G, signed by Lord Denman and Mr Pearce, the closing date for applications for participation in the Fair.*

8. Oil We had not heard that the Russians were "overjoyed" about the replacement of Ammash by Saddam Hussein at the Oil Bureau. The IPC have always felt that Ammash was likely to be a restraining influence whenever relations with the IPC were becoming dangerous. It therefore seemed likely that his replacement by anybody else would not be helpful to the IPC; but they have regarded Saddam as being unapproachable rather than downright hostile.

*(your paragraph 11).*  
9. Aid *L* I am sorry that paragraph 6 (vi) of my letter of 30 September may have been a little *unclear, misleading*, as there is in fact no absolute figure of per capita income on which eligibility for capital aid is based. This is because many factors are taken into account in assessing the type and terms of aid to be offered, and thus any generalisation would be misleading.

*(your paragraph 12)*

10. Technical Assistance *L* The ODA have taken note /of your ...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Flag*



of your request about speed in according sanction of principle to the proposals for new fields of activity. They also say that the rubric about not providing experts on long contracts for Iraq is by no means inflexible and they would be prepared to look at this again in the event of a profitable field materialising.

*(your paragraph 13)*

Flags D & E

11. On "topping up" I have seen Lewty's letter of 25 October and Cook's reply of 16 November. I agree with the latter that this is a good idea in principle, but that it should be discussed during Rowley's visit to Baghdad when there will be an opportunity to consider the whole field of technical assistance to Iraq.

12. Discussions on Iraq with other Europeans You will be glad to hear that we have looked at this again and have concluded that there might well be advantage in discussing Iraq at the meetings of Middle East experts in their six-monthly NATO meetings. We have put down a marker that our written contribution for the next meeting in April should include a piece on the question of Communist penetration of Iraq. The question might also be introduced into the discussions of the Mediterranean experts, whose brief includes Iraq and whose paper is submitted twice a year to Ministers in the North Atlantic Council. We do not however hold out a great deal of hope of anything concrete coming out of such discussions.

13. I look forward to hearing any comments you may have on all this sometime during your visit to London.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



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British Embassy


BAGHDAD

50

3/10

25 November 1971

B Smith Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
F C O



Dear Brian

IRAQ/GDR RELATIONS

*of para 3* 1. We were slightly surprised by the remark in the last sentence of Arbuthnott's letter 2/2 of 4 November about the East German/Iran Relations, to the effect that East German/Iraqi Relations were under a cloud.

2. The East Germans are not significant suppliers of arms to Iraq, nor have we any reason to believe that the Iraqis are in general dissatisfied with their arms supplies from the Soviet bloc. And in any case it seems inconceivable to us that the Iraqis would be unaware that all Communist arms supplies are coordinated and that if they had any complaints about East German deliveries, which they don't, they should go for redress to the organ grinder and not the monkey.

*Min Beckett*  
*and pa*  
*3/12*

*Cons can*  
*(can*

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1092 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT, BAHRAIN RES, BONN,

MOSCOW, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI.

MY LETTER 2/7 OF 19 NOVEMBER TO EVANS;

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 14 DEC 1971 NEQ 2/2
--

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ.

1. THE MINISTER OF COURT TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THE SHAH WAS WORRYING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ. THE EAST GERMAN MINISTER OF WAR HAD VISITED BAGHDAD A MONTH OR SO AGO (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MYTEL NO. 951) AND THERE WERE NOW REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER WAS ABOUT TO GO THERE. COULD WE CONFIRM WHETHER THIS WAS TRUE ?

2. THE SHAH IS WONDERING WHETHER THE RUSSIANS MAY BE TRYING TO CREATE TROUBLE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD BY ENCOURAGING THE IRAQIS TO PURSUE EXTREMIST POLICIES. THE RUSSIAN ENCOURAGEMENT OF INDIA'S MILITANT ASPIRATIONS MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO PURSUE A SIMILAR POLICY ELSEWHERE. WHY WERE THEY PROVIDING IRAQ WITH SO MUCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT ?

3. I SUGGESTED THAT A VISIT BY THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER MIGHT NOT CARRY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND A CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT. WE WERE NO LONGER IN A POSITION TO REPORT ON CURRENT EVENTS IN BAGHDAD BUT I WOULD SEE WHAT USEFUL COMMENT WE COULD OFFER.

RAMSBOTHAM

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1092 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT, BAHRAIN RES, BONN,

By Evans

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1092 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, CAIRO, BEIRUT, BAHRAIN RES, BONN,

MOSCOW, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI.

MY LETTER 2/7 OF 19 NOVEMBER TO EVANS;

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ.

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RAMSBOTHAM.

*Mr Evans*

*I suggest*

*we might show this (ref) to Mr*

*Balfour Paul this afternoon & get a view from him. There we should consult*

*EEs*

*before replying.*

*JDG*

*13/xii*

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 DEC 1971 NEQ 2/2
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1117 16 DECEMBER INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW,  
CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, DELHI AND ANKARA.

(attached 51)

MY TELEGRAM NO 1092 (NOT TO ALL), PARAGRAPH 2 : RUSSIA AND  
IRAQ.

THE MINISTER OF COURT TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT THE IRANAIN  
ARMED FORCES THOUGHT THAT RUSSIA MIGHT BE SUPPORTING INDIA BY  
FLIGHTS FROM OR THROUGH IRAQ. HAD WE ANY INFORMATION?

RAMSBOTHAM.

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See reply  
p/k 20/12

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**British Embassy**  
Tehran



53

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
LONDON S W 1

Your reference NEQ 2/2

Our reference 2/7

Date 19 November, 1971

Dear Richard

See tel to  
Tehran

pa 18 27/12

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ

1. In your telegram no 662, you gave me guidance for responding to an Iranian approach on this subject, as reported in my telegrams nos 941 and 942. In the event, I did not go back to see Zelli as the Foreign Minister had suggested a lunch and a tour d'horizon and this had to be delayed because of Bill Luce's recent visit. But I had a lengthy session with Khalatbari on 18 November and we talked about this subject in the light of the Shah's remarks to myself and Luce two days previously.

2. On that occasion the Shah had again stressed his concern at the deteriorating situation in Iraq. He had just been reading the first part of the lengthy National Charter (Baghdad telegram no 1164). A popular front was now being formed between the Ba'ath, the Communists and the Kurds. This was what the Russians had been seeking. It was the answer to their setbacks in the Sudan and Libya and was intended to be a lesson to Egypt. The Shah saw all this as confirming the analysis that the Russians were seeking to create greater political unity within Iraq so as to place them in a better position to expand their influence and control Iraqi policies (cf the line Zelli took on 9 November - my telegram no 941). The Shah concluded that Soviet policy in Iraq was a long term one. When he had been trying to persuade the Russians to supply Iran with long-range guns and missiles, they had prevaricated. He then told them he had been obliged to obtain this equipment from the Americans. The Russian reply to this was, that if they had supplied Iran they would also have to supply Iraq. This clearly rankled with the Shah.

3. Khalatbari developed this theme when we met for our talk. If the National Charter promotes a national assembly and some sort of national front, this could only result in a deepening of Soviet influence in Iraq. It seemed as though the Communists had been consulted in advance on

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the preparation for the Charter and this would suggest that the Russians might have had a hand in its preparation.

4. I then gave, in broad terms, our own analysis of the stage now reached in Communist Bloc penetration, making the points in Balfour Paul's letter to you of 24 July and in the first 3 paragraphs of your letter to Balfour Paul of 30 September. Despite the manifest dangers of the situation, I said we thought Iraq was still far from being a satellite and that the Russians themselves no doubt shared the general assessment of the Iraqi regime as thoroughly unreliable, and adjusted their own policies accordingly. (31) (C)

5. Khalatbari said he would not disagree with any of this analysis though, not unnaturally in view of the Iranian position and experience, he seemed to view the latest developments as indicating quite a significant advance and deepening of Soviet penetration in Iraq. The Foreign Ministry would be studying the new National Charter and the Iraqi President's explanations and then perhaps give us further appreciation. I took this opportunity to make the point in para 2 of your telegram no 662 that this exchange between us should be closely restricted within the Foreign Ministry and on no account communicated abroad; it would not be in Iran's or Britain's interests to give Iraq ammunition to make accusations of Anglo/Iranian collusion. Khalatbari said he ~~fully~~ agreed: any exchanges would be restricted to a very small circle. I also invited Khalatbari to accept that it was in Iran's interest to welcome the maximum commercial, technical or cultural effort in Iraq by Britain or other western powers as a means of countering Communist Bloc penetration. Of course, we would always bear Iran's particular interests in mind but I would like to think that we had sympathy and understanding, as and when we found means of promoting British interests in cooperation with the Iraqis, and with a view also to preventing any increase in the present degree of Iraqi hostility towards the West. None of this caused Khalatbari any difficulty: he said he thought it made good sense. So I hope this exchange will have helped to allay the suspicion that, when there is some Anglo/Iraqi cooperation, this reflects some deep-laid scheme inimical to Iranian interests. At least I will be able to reproach Khalatbari if, in the future, we are taxed by the Iranians on this score.

*Yours ever*  
Peter Ramsbotham *Peter*

cc H C Balfour Paul Esq CMG, Baghdad  
Chanceries at Moscow, Bahrain Res,  
Washington, Beirut and Kuwait



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Reference

54

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 20 DEC 1971 NEQ 2/2 IRAQ
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See telex

Tehran

51  
17/12

Mr Hulse EESD

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ

1. Would you please see Tehran No 1092 at folio 51 together with Mr Ramsbotham's letter of 19 November (immediately below).

2. We have not so far consulted Mr Balfour Paul about this telegram (he is now back from Iraq), but we will do so if we have an opportunity. Meanwhile it will be most helpful if you could let me have your views on what Mr Ramsbotham might say to the Minister of Court. I think it would be unwise for Mr Ramsbotham to go into any great detail with the Minister and most undesirable for the Minister to be left with the impression that this is a subject on which we would like regular exchanges with the Iranians.

Veronica Beckett

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department

15 December 1971

1. As you know, we are anxious to avoid a dialogue with the Iranians on this subject. I suggest that Mr. Ramsbotham might stall for the time being by saying that Grechko has only just left (on 13 December) for his visits to Iraq, Syria and Somalia, and that he will be in a better position to comment once an assessment of the trip as a whole has been completed. Could he not also imply that exchanges are now likely to be less fruitful since we are less well informed on developments in Baghdad?

2. If you feel there is any need to offer comments on Tehran telegram No. 1092 and the Ambassador's letter of 19 November, the following points may be of some use.

3. We would disagree with the suggestion in the second paragraph of the telegram that the Russians are actively encouraging the Iraqis to pursue extremist policies. I do not think that the Russians have, a priori, an interest in doing this; their aim is to

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acquire a sufficient degree of influence to ensure that the Iraqis take account of Soviet aims. In some circumstances, e.g. if the Iraqis greatly ~~stop~~ up their hostility towards Iran, the Russians might have a moderating influence. This is what they have done (in entirely different circumstances) in India. It was only when a military conflict in East Pakistan became inevitable that the Russians gave the Indians their head. As far as arms deliveries are concerned, this is ~~simply~~ a fundamental part of the Soviet scheme for winning friends and influencing people; ~~and~~ <sup>it</sup> is not necessarily for specific military purposes. (In ~~many~~ cases the Russians <sup>supply</sup> arms because if they failed to do so they would come from America or China.)

4. I agree with the suggestion in paragraph 3 that the visit might simply be a continuation of negotiations on arms supplies.

5. I am not in a position to comment on the significance of the National Charter (paragraph 2 of Mr. Ramsbotham's letter of 19 November). However, it does not seem to me to mark a change in Soviet policy; the previous line of co-operation between the CPSU and the Ba'ath did not mean that the Iraqi communist party was being ditched altogether. The Charter does suggest that the Russians have had a measure of success in getting - on paper at least - something of a new deal for the communists (see <sup>But</sup> Livingstone's letter of 25 November at folio 47). I think we shall have to wait and see whether this really is a significant development. I think that the Iraqis could present it to the Egyptians, Sudanese or Albanians, as a concession that cost them little.

6. I do not see IRD material on the Middle East, but there may be some useful material on which the Ambassador could draw.

*M.H.*  
C. Hulse  
EESM

16 December 1971

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TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 761 OF 17 DECEMBER INFO CAIRO, BEIRUT,  
BAHRAIN RESY, BONN, MOSCOW, ABU DHABI, DUBAI.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1029: <sup>(51)</sup> COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN IRAQ.

1. YOU WILL REMEMBER FROM FCO TELEGRAM NO 662 OF 12 NOVEMBER THAT WE ARE NOT (NOT) ANXIOUS TO PROMOTE A DIALOGUE WITH THE IRANIANS ON THIS QUESTION. THIS REMAINS THE CASE, EVEN THOUGH RELATIONS WITH US HAVE SINCE BEEN BROKEN BY THE IRAQIS. THERE IS ALSO THE ADDITIONAL FACTOR THAT WE ARE NOW UNABLE TO FOLLOW THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

2. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, YOU MAY DRAW SELECTIVELY AT YOUR DISCRETION ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHEN YOU (OR MR MURRAY) ARE QUESTIONED AGAIN ON THIS SUBJECT BY THE MINISTER OF COURT:

A. THE SUGGESTION, IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING THE IRAQIS TO PURSUE EXTREMIST POLICIES SEEMS TO US MISLEADING. THE RUSSIANS' MAIN AIM IS IN OUR VIEW TO ACQUIRE A SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THE IRAQIS TAKE ACCOUNT IN THEIR POLICIES OF SOVIET AIMS. IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, EG IF THE IRAQIS GREATLY INCREASED THEIR HOSTILITY TOWARDS IRAN, THE RUSSIANS MIGHT WISH TO EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE. (THIS IS WHAT THEY HAVE DONE, IN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IN INDIA. IT WAS ONLY WHEN A MILITARY CONFLICT IN EAST PAKISTAN BECAME INEVITABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS GAVE THE INDIANS THEIR HEAD). ARMS DELIVERIES ARE OF COURSE A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF THE SOVIET SCHEME FOR WINNING FRIENDS AND INFLUENCING PEOPLE. THESE DELIVERIES DO NOT (NOT) NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE A SPECIFIC MILITARY PURPOSE IN MIND.

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B. WE OURSELVES DOUBT WHETHER THE RUSSIANS PLAYED ANY SIGNIFICANT PART IN DRAWING UP THE IRAQ NATIONAL CHARTER. BUT EVEN IF THEY DID, WE DOUBT IF THE LINE TAKEN IN IT WOULD SEEM TO THEM RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POLICIES VIS A VIS IRAQ. THEIR POLICY HAS BEEN, AND REMAINS, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR LINKS WITH THE BA'ATH - BUT THIS DOES NOT IMPLY ANY INTENTION OF ABANDONING RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQ COMMUNIST PARTY. INDEED, THE CHARTER SUGGESTS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE HAD A MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN OBTAINING - ON PAPER AT LEAST - SOMETHING OF A NEW DEAL FOR THE IRAQI COMMUNISTS. BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT OF LASTING SIGNIFICANCE.

C. GRECHKO'S VISIT IS OF COURSE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE BY NOW. WE DO NOT THINK WE CAN USEFULLY COMMENT ON IT AT THIS STAGE: HE LEFT MOSCOW ONLY ON 13 DECEMBER. HIS VISIT MIGHT, AS YOU SAY, REPRESENT SIMPLY A CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO. 763 OF 17 DECEMBER INFO MOSCOW  
CAIRO ISLAMABAD DELHI ANKARA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1117 : RUSSIA AND IRAQ.

1. YOU MAY TELL THE MINISTER OF COURT THAT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION  
THAT RUSSIA HAS BEEN SUPPORTING INDIA BY FLIGHTS FROM OR THROUGH  
IRAQ.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE THINK THAT THERE HAVE NOT (NOT)  
BEEN ANY SUCH FLIGHTS SINCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN.

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# Middle East and Mahgreb Topics

NEQ 2/2

Editor: Communist Bloc  
December, 1971 *penetration  
of Iraq  
p. 22  
1/2*

## EAST GERMANY IN THE ARAB WORLD

The two main elements in East Germany's policy towards the Arab world in the last three years have been the support of Moscow's efforts to gain an increasing stake in Arab affairs and the search for wider recognition. The campaign for recognition has achieved the establishment of full diplomatic relations with six Arab States and of consular relations with one other\*. But these diplomatic gains have brought political problems that could in future prove as embarrassing to the East Germans as they have to the Soviet Union. Foremost among them is that of reconciling the obvious obligation to support fellow Communists - largely outlawed in their own countries - with the need to exploit any opportunity of strengthening relations with the Arab ruling parties. East Germany, no less than Moscow, seems to hope that its growing involvement in the political, economic and cultural life of the Arab States will influence the forms of Socialism practised by the ruling parties, with their strong Islamic overtones, in directions more acceptable to Communist thinking.

Even while pursuing the recognition campaign in the Middle East, East Germany gave considerable support to the Arab Communist Parties. Representatives of the Iraqi, Tunisian and Sudanese Communists attended the eighth congress of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in June, 1971, alongside delegations from ruling parties in several Arab States - including Iraq and Sudan. And although East Germany had established ambassadorial relations with Sudan in May, 1969, its reaction to the abortive coup of July, 1971, was particularly vehement, foreshadowing tensions that could arise in relations with other Arab régimes facing a challenge from Communist elements.

East Germany sprang to the defence of Sudanese Communists in an article in the SED newspaper, Neues Deutschland, on July 28. It spoke of an "hysterical anti-Communist drive" in Sudan and warned the government that only by ending the persecution and consolidating all "patriotic forces" could it "fight successfully against imperialism and neo-colonialism and secure national independence and the development of social advancement". Despite the ostensibly friendly relations established by East Germany with President

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\*Iraq, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Sudan (all May, 1969), Syria (June, 1969), Egypt (July, 1969), Algeria (May, 1970), Kuwait (consular, December, 1970).



Nimeiri's régime, Neues Deutschland on the following day demanded "an end to the murder and persecution of our Sudanese comrades". Apart, however, from the etiquette of verbal support for comrades in difficulties, the East Germans have followed Moscow's example in pursuing tactical relations with those in power at the expense of local Communist Parties.

East Germany had already shown its interest in industrial development in the northern areas of Sudan and in aiding improvements in rural areas. In July, 1970, East Germany had provisionally agreed to provide five scholarships for members of the Sudanese diplomatic service to study diplomacy in East Germany.

### Trend of relations

Although bi-lateral trade has grown as a natural consequence of East German recognition in the Arab world, the most significant trend of East German/Arab relations has been in the growing East German links with governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the region. East Germany seems to have been concentrating efforts in the last two years on developing extensive ties with Arab civil service and government departments, political parties, trades unions and other semi-official organisations. These ties must inevitably lead to an increasing East German involvement in the internal affairs of Arab Socialist countries.

East German Embassies have been particularly active in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In each, East German officials have shown interest in increased cooperation in such fields as science and technology, radio and television, cultural affairs, local government, posts and telecommunications, health - even in drawing up and disseminating statistical information. In November, 1971, a delegation from the East German Statistical Administration visited Iraq, and the subject has been discussed between East German and Syrian officials.

Particular attention is given to the training of personnel, either under East German instructors in the Arab countries or through exchanges of students. The PDRY Institute for the Development of Cadres in the Public Sector and National Economy, opened in November, 1971, is to be run by East German instructors with the assistance of Yemeni teachers. A scheme to train policemen or security experts in the PDRY, under East German personnel, has also been reported, while the visit to Cairo in February, 1971, of the East German Minister of the Interior ended with a cooperation agreement including provision for the "exchange of expertise and training of police". An élite corps of policemen, wearing uniforms similar to those in East Germany, who had taken a 1,500-hour training course (including 146 hours of political training), recently made their appearance in Egypt. But the Egyptian Gazette of May 23, 1971, quoted a denial by a spokesman of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior that East German experts were serving in the Egyptian security service.

Members of the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in Egypt have been sent for training in East Germany - a sign that the East Germans are anxious to establish strong relations between the SED and the Arab ruling parties.



The ASU has exchanged a number of delegations with the SED and in 1970 an ASU delegation went to East Germany to study political and ideological work in the Press, radio and television. Talks have also been held with the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale and with the Ba'ath parties of Syria and Iraq - apparently regardless of the deep rivalry between the Ba'ath factions in these two countries.

#### Law and communications

The administration of justice and the information media are other fields in which East Germany feels that its experience might be of value to Arab countries. In 1968 Egypt and East Germany signed a protocol on legal cooperation - though there has been no evidence of East German influence on Egyptian legal procedure or the legal code. In 1970, the East German Minister of Justice visited Syria and Iraq, and in June, 1971, the then Minister of Justice of Iraq, Aziz Sharif, went to East Germany to study the judicial system and "the development of Socialist legality".

The East Germans have shown particular interest in Arab information media. On August 4, 1971, the Iraqi and East German Journalists' Associations signed a five-year agreement on cooperation in the Press, radio and television. Syria and East Germany have signed a protocol on cooperation in posts and telecommunications, and in December, 1969, Atiyah al-Jawdah, Director-General of the Syrian broadcasting and television organisation, was received by the SED Central Committee Secretary responsible for culture, education and science, Kurt Hager, for discussions on the problems of ideological work. In March, 1971, the head of the East German Foreign Ministry Information Department held discussions in Damascus with the Syrian Minister of Information. An agreement on posts and telecommunications was signed with the PDRY in East Berlin on July 28, 1971, and two months later the PDRY Information and Culture Minister, Abdullah al-Khamiri, said he had concluded a number of agreements and protocols in the sphere of Press, radio and television with East Germany and Romania. Cooperation in radio was also discussed during the visit to East Germany in April, 1971, of Mohammed Uruq, Director of Cairo Radio's "Voice of the Arabs", and in August, 1970, the Egyptian television service broadcast a German language course supplied by East Germany, (also due to be broadcast by television services in Iraq, Syria, PDRY and Sudan) following a television agreement in May which had covered exchange of films and scripts, provision of mutual assistance for correspondents and the exchange of experts on study visits.

A number of Syrians have been trained at the school of the Organisation of Journalists' in East Berlin.

East German friendship weeks, youth weeks and film weeks have been held in a number of Arab capitals, and East Germany shows interest in improving links with young people in the Arab world. The East German Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Wolfgang Kiesewetter, told a Press conference in Cairo in March, 1971, that more than 600 Egyptians were studying in East Germany, and that a number of Egyptian teachers were to visit East Germany. A joint committee was studying the possibility of establishing further schools in Egypt similar to that at Shubra al-Kheima, where East Germany is supplying equipment, laboratories and teachers to provide a five-year course in electronics. When



the Shubra institute was first set up, under the Egyptian-East German cultural agreement of February, 1970, the Egyptian Minister of Education said that outstanding students, on completion of the course, would be able to continue studies in East Germany.

#### Para-military training

Young Egyptians, according to Neues Deutschland on March 10, 1970, were taking para-military training with the East German Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik. Originally claimed to be a sports organisation, though it had a para-military bias from the time it was founded in 1952, this society became progressively more military in character, until finally in 1968 its leadership was replaced by army officers and its aims announced as those of preparing young East Germans for military service. The East German Minister of Defence told the organisation's Fourth Congress in 1968 that it aimed to achieve "a course of training in which young men are accustomed continuously to firm discipline and order, so that they accept the directions of their instructors and officials and carry them out without question". Ideological instruction also plays a major part in the curriculum, and the Egyptian trainees will learn parachute-jumping, marksmanship, driving and maintenance of military vehicles and radio operation and maintenance. The society is also, according to Neues Deutschland, supplying Egypt with equipment for para-military training and "military sports" for the use of members of the Egyptian Futuwa organisation.

The political aim of all these contacts is clearly to establish and consolidate an East German presence in the bureaucracies and semi-governmental organisations of the Arab Socialist States. As these States develop and decentralise their administrations, so the Communist countries show a growing interest in extending relations with local administrative bodies, such as regional councils and city administrations. In November, 1969, the Governor of Damascus was invited to lead a delegation for talks with the East Berlin city council, and in April, 1971, Syrian local government officials attended a seminar in Weimar. Similar invitations have been extended to local government administrators in Algeria, the PDRY, Iraq and Egypt. For example, in August, 1970, a delegation of 38 Iraqi local government officials were sent on a four-week study course in East Germany, while the PDRY news agency, ANA, reported on October 30, 1971, that East Germans were teaching at the Institute of Administration and Planning, which provides two-year courses for employees in the public sector and various government departments to train local cadres in administration and planning.



(LAST PAPER)



ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY  
British Interests Section  
BAGHDAD

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UNCLASSIFIED

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
29 DEC 1971  
NEQ 2/2

22 December 1971

6/12 done 29/12  
Copy to ECSD

Dear Veronica

HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNIST VISITS

1. This is just to report the various high level visits, which have taken place poignantly enough, in the 2 weeks since HMA left Baghdad, in a form more manageable than the Baghdad Observer.
2. Grechko. Marshal Grechko arrived in Baghdad on 14 December as the guest of General Shihab. He was also received by the President and Saddam Hussein and his programme included the normal round of speeches, banquets, parades etc. He was due to leave on 17 December but our present unseasonable weather struck him down with 'flu and he is due to leave today. His accompanying party had left earlier. A copy of the joint communiqué issued on 17 December is enclosed.
3. Lajos Feher. Mr Feher, the Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary visited Iraq from 16-20 December as the guest of Sd Samarraie, the Acting Minister of Economy in the Minister's absence in Cairo. He too was received by the President, Saddam and Abdul Baqi the Foreign Minister. His programme consisted mainly of economic talks together with visits to various factories, and an Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed on 19 December covering technical assistance in the fields of irrigation, agricultural cooperatives and water resources, and providing for the establishment of a number of projects concerning livestock production and the food industries. A copy of the communiqué issued on 20 December is enclosed.
4. Bakirov Zakir Nermanovich. Mr Bakirov, the Minister of Culture of Azerbaijan, who is also described as a member of the Supreme Soviet (? presumably of Azerbaijan) arrived in Iraq on 18 December at the head of a delegation of 18 for a 10-day Iraqi/Soviet friendship festival. His principal host, given the fact that other more senior Iraqi ministers were dealing with other visitors, has been Shibly al Assami, the Assistant Secretary-General of the International ABSP.
5. Comrade Conti. Mr Conti a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party has also been here during the last week. I have been unable to trace the date of his arrival, but on 18 December he was received by Assami and expressed support for Iraq's revolutionary stand and denounced the Iranian invasion of the Gulf. In addition to talks with the ABSP, he also had talks with the Baghdad Branch of the KDP and with the National Union of Iraqi Students and the General Federation of Trades Union. He was also reported as

(LAST PAPER)

.../saying





saying that he would return to Iraq next month with a number of other comrades from the Central Committee. He left Baghdad for Beirut on 22 December.

6. This morning's Baghdad Observer gave the names of the delegation which is to leave for China on 24 December led by al-Samarrai'e, the Acting Minister of Economy and Abdul Baqi, the Foreign Minister. The purpose of the visit is not explained but it is presumably to hold further discussions in connection with the loan which China agreed to make available to Iraq during the visit to Peking by Dr Hammadi, the Minister of Oil and Minerals in the summer.

*Yours for  
/an*

ENCS

D I Lewty

c.c. Chanceries at: MOSCOW, TEHRAN (All enclosures)  
BUDAPEST, ROME, PEKING (appropriate  
enclosures, if any)



# DELEGATION TO PE NAMED

The Iraqi delegation which is to accompany **Abdul Khaleq al-Samarrate**, member of the two **Central and Regional Leaderships of the Arab Revolutionary Socialist Party**, and **Acting Minister of Economy** of the **People's Republic of China** was named yesterday.

The delegation, which will be off on Friday morning, will comprise **Sd. Murtadha Sa'eed**, **Abdul Baqi**, member of the **Revolutionary Command Council** and **Foreign Minister Dr. Fahri Qadouri**, member of the **Economic Bureau of the Revolutionary Command Council**; **Sd. Ali al-Rawi**, **Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Irrigation**; **Sd. Hussein Hassan Ghulam**, **Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Oil and Minerals**; **Dr. Mahmoud Ali al-Dawood**, **Iraq's Ambassador-Designate to Ankara**; **Sd. Madhol Naji al-Mhanna**, **Chairman of the State Organisation of Trade**; **Sd. Mohdi al-Ubaidi**, **Director General of Foreign Relations at the Ministry of Economy**; **Dr. Noraddin al-Ruba'ie**, **Director General of Planning and Follow-up at the Ministry of Transport**; **Dr. Amir al-Sayid**, member of the

**Mohammed Ali**, **Director of the Technical Department at the Spinning and Weaving Industries State Organisation**; **Sd. Majid Najem**, **Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister**; **Sd. Mohammed Ridha al-Jabbari**, **Director of the Socialist Countries Division at the Foreign Ministry** and **Sd. Hamed al-Farhan**, of the **Protocols Department**.

The delegation is accompanied by an information team from the **Iraqi News Agency**, **"AL-Naba"** daily of Baghdad and the **Organisation of Broadcast and Television** — **TNA**.



# DELEGATION TO PEKING

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Mohammed Ali, Director of the Technical Department at the Spinning and Weaving Industries State Organisation; Sd. Madhi al-Najem, Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister; Sd. Mohammed Hisham al-Jabir, Director of the Socialist Countries Division at the Foreign Ministry and Sd. Hamed al-Farhan, of the Protocols Department.

The delegation is accompanied by an information team from the Iraqi News Agency, "AL-Naba" daily of Baghdad and the Organisation of Broadcast and Television — INA



**HUNGARY JOIN T COMMUNIQUE:**

# ALL FORMS OF IMPERIALISM IN ARAB GULF MUST BE LIQUIDATED

**COMMUNIQUE VOICES SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR RECOVERING THEIR LAND**

**Plan under study for establishment of joint economic projects**

A joint communique was issued simultaneously in Baghdad and Budapest yesterday on the talks conducted in Baghdad by Mr. Lajos Feher, Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister. Following is the text of the communique:

Mr. Lajos Feher, member Chairman of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party of the Revolutionary Command Council and Foreign Minister, the Hungarian People's Republic, Deputy Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, visited Iraq from December 18 to 20, 1971, at the invitation of the Iraqi government. In the course of this visit he was received by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary-General of the Revolutionary Command Council and acting Minister of Economy, and Mr. Lajos Feher, Deputy Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic. The two sides exchanged opinions on important international issues and discussed the progress made in political, economic and cultural relations between the two countries and ways and means of developing these relations.

"In an atmosphere of genuine friendship and mutual understanding, official talks were conducted by Mr. Abdul Khaleq al-Samarrie, member of the two National and Regional leaderships of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and Vice-

(Continued on page 5)



# **Hungarian Deputy Premier leaves for Damascus**

## **TERMS VISIT TO IRAQ SUCCESSFUL**

Mr. Lajos Feher, Deputy Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Hungary and Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Workers Party in Hungary and the accompanying delegation left Baghdad for Damascus yesterday morning after a four-day visit to the country.

During its stay in Baghdad the delegation conducted discussions which led to signing an economic cooperation agreement between the two friendly countries.

The delegation was seen off at Al-Muthanna Airport by Sub-Commander Abdul Karim Al-Sammari, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Acting Minister of Economy, a number of ministers, heads of diplomatic missions and high-ranking officials.

In a statement to INA correspondent Mr. Feher said that his visit to Iraq was successful and that economic relations will be consolidated for the interest of the two countries.



# Iraq & USSR denounce Israel's expansionist & aggressive policy

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF GRECHKO'S VISIT

Iraq and the Soviet Union have denounced Israel's expansionist and aggressive policy backed up by imperialism in general and the U.S. in particular.

That was stated in a joint communique issued on Friday simultaneously in Baghdad and Moscow on the outcome of the visit made to Iraq by Marshal Grechko, Defence Minister of USSR. Following is the text of the communique:

"At the invitation of Gen. Hammad Shehab, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Minister of Defence, Marshal Andrei Grechko, Defence Minister of USSR, paid an official good-will visit to the Republic of Iraq. The Soviet guest was accorded warm welcome reflecting the feelings of friendship harboured by the people of Iraq towards the Soviet people and their armed forces. Marshal Grechko met Marshal Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and President of the Republic of Iraq, Comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership Party and Vice-Chairman of

the Revolutionary Command Council, Gen. Hammad Shehab, member of Revolutionary Command Council and Defence Minister, and other senior officials in Iraq.

In the course of the talks which were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual friendship and understanding, opinions were exchanged on foreign policy issues, the consolidation and subsequent development of military cooperation between the two countries and some other matters of common interest to both sides.

The two sides noted the gravity of the situation in the Middle East arising from Israel's continuous aggression on the Arab states. The two sides further noted that Israel could not have pursued its expansionist policy of aggression were it not for the constant backing offered by the forces of imperialism and the U.S. in particular.

The two sides expressed satisfaction at the friendly relations between the armed forces of the Republic of Iraq and the Soviet Union and noted the necessity of further developing these relations in the interest of reinforcing the defence power of the Republic of Iraq. The two sides reached an agreement on the further development of military cooperation, the exchange of military delegations and other matters related to expanding sports and cultural relations.

the Arab peoples that were exposed to the Israeli aggression and for its great aid and support rendered with the object of strengthening the defence power of the Republic of Iraq" — INA.



Assessment Of Communist Bloc Penetration Of Iraq; British Attempts To Minimise Soviet Influence. Political Relations Between Soviet Bloc Countries And Iraq. 22 Mar. 1972. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1533. Newspaper Cutting And Tables. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107476690/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=e3ab2b67&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107476690/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=e3ab2b67&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.